

ARM® CoreLink™ SSE-200 Subsystem for Embedded

Revision: r1p0

Technical Reference Manual

Beta



ARM CoreLink SSE-200 Subsystem for Embedded

Technical Reference Manual

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Release Information

The following changes have been made to this book.

Change history			
Date	Issue	Confidentiality	Change
20 December 2016	A	Confidential	First release for r0p0 Beta.
5 June 2017	B	Confidential	Beta release for MPS FPGA

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Product Status

The information in this document is for a Beta product, that is a product under development.

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Preface

This preface introduces the *ARM® CoreLink™ SSE-200 Subsystem for Embedded Technical Reference Manual*. It contains the following sections:

- [About this book on page vii.](#)
- [Feedback on page x.](#)

About this book

This book is for the *ARM® CoreLink™ SSE-200 Subsystem for Embedded* (SSE-200). It provides a high-level overview of the SSE-200. It describes architectural information, and as such, facilitates the creation of software or a SoC targeted at an *Internet of Things* (IoT) application.

Product revision status

The *mpn* identifier indicates the revision status of the product described in this book, for example, r0p0, where:

rm	Identifies the major revision of the product, for example, r0.
pn	Identifies the minor revision or modification status of the product, for example, p0.

Intended audience

This book is written for system designers, system integrators, and programmers who are designing or programming a System-on-Chip (SoC) that uses the SSE-200.

Using this book

This book is organized into the following chapters:

Chapter 1 *Introduction*

Read this for a high-level view of the SSE-200 and a description of its features.

Chapter 2 *Functional description*

Read this for a description of the major interfaces and components of the SSE-200. This chapter also describes how the components operate.

Chapter 3 *Programmers Model*

Read this for a description of the address map and registers of the SSE-200.

Appendix A *Signal Descriptions*

Read this for an overview of the signals present in the SSE-200.

Appendix B *Revisions*

Read this for a description of the technical changes between released issues of this book.

Glossary

Read this for a description of terms specific to the SSE-200. See also *ARM Glossary*.

ARM Glossary

The *ARM Glossary* is a list of terms used in ARM documentation, together with definitions for those terms. The *ARM Glossary* does not contain terms that are industry standard unless the ARM meaning differs from the generally accepted meaning.

The *ARM Glossary* is available on the ARM Infocenter at <http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.aeg0014-/index.html>.

Conventions

Conventions that this book can use are described in:

- *Typographical conventions.*
- *Timing diagrams.*
- *Signals.*


Typographical conventions

The following table describes the typographical conventions:

Timing diagrams

The figure named *Key to timing diagram conventions* explains the components used in timing diagrams. Variations, when they occur, have clear labels. You must not assume any timing information that is not explicit in the diagrams.

Shaded bus and signal areas are undefined, so the bus or signal can assume any value within the shaded area at that time. The actual level is unimportant and does not affect normal operation.



Key to timing diagram conventions

Timing diagrams sometimes show single-bit signals as HIGH and LOW at the same time and they look similar to the bus change shown in *Key to timing diagram conventions*. If a timing diagram shows a single-bit signal in this way then its value does not affect the accompanying description.

Signals

The signal conventions are:

- Signal level** The level of an asserted signal depends on whether the signal is active-HIGH or active-LOW. Asserted means:
- HIGH for active-HIGH signals.
 - LOW for active-LOW signals.
- Lower-case n** At the start or end of a signal name denotes an active-LOW signal.

Additional reading

This section lists publications by ARM and by third parties.

See Infocenter, <http://infocenter.arm.com> for access to ARM documentation.

See www.arm.com/cmsis for embedded software development resources including the *Cortex® Microcontroller Software Interface Standard (CMSIS)*.

See ARM mbed™ platform, <https://mbed.org/> for information on the mbed tools including mbed OS and online tools.

ARM publications

This book contains information that is specific to this product. See the following documents for other relevant information:

- *ARM® CoreLink™ SIE-200 System IP for Embedded Technical Reference Manual* (ARM DDI 0571).
- *ARM® Cortex®-M System Design Kit Technical Reference Manual* (ARM DDI 0479).

The following confidential books are only available to licensees or require registration with ARM:

- *ARM® CoreLink™ SSE-200 Subsystem Configuration and Integration Manual* (ARM 100224).
- *ARM®v8-M Architecture Reference Manual* (ARM DDI 0553).
- *ARM® Cortex®-M33 Processor Technical Reference Manual* (ARM 100230).
- *ARM® CoreSight™ Components Technical Reference Manual* (ARM DDI 0314).
- *AMBA® Low Power Interface Specification ARM Q-Channel and P-Channel Interfaces* (ARM IHI 0068).
- *ARM® Power Policy Unit Version 1.1 Specification* (not available).
- *ARM® Debug Interface v5 Architecture Specification* (ARM IHI 0031).
- *ARM® Embedded Trace Macrocell Architecture Specification* (ARM IHI 0014).
- *ARM® AMBA® 5 AHB Protocol Specification* (ARM IHI 0033).
- *ARM® AMBA® APB Protocol Specification Version 2* (ARM IHI 0024).

Feedback

ARM welcomes feedback on this product and its documentation.

Feedback on this product

If you have any comments or suggestions about this product, contact your supplier and give:

- The product name.
- The product revision or version.
- An explanation with as much information as you can provide. Include symptoms and diagnostic procedures if appropriate.

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If you have comments on content then send an e-mail to errata@arm.com. Give:

- The title.
- The number, ARM DDI 0574B.
- The page numbers to which your comments apply.
- A concise explanation of your comments.

ARM also welcomes general suggestions for additions and improvements.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

This chapter introduces the SSE-200. It contains the following sections:

- *About the SSE-200* on page 1-2.
- *Features of the SSE-200* on page 1-4.
- *Compliance* on page 1-6.
- *Product revisions* on page 1-7.

1.1 About the SSE-200

The SSE-200 is a collection of pre-assembled elements to use as the basis of an IoT SoC.

It is complemented by software libraries that are integrated with the mbed operating system. The SSE-200 is part of the CoreLink SDK-200 System Design Kit (SDK-200) which also contains the CoreLink SIE-200 System IP for Embedded product and other components. The SDK-200 provides components to quickly create systems based on Cortex-M processors.

The following diagram shows the major blocks present in the SSE-200.




Figure 1-1 SSE-200 subsystem elements

1.1.1 About IoT System on Chip implementations

The SSE-200 subsystem must be extended to create an IoT SoC. A complete system typically contains the following components:

Compute subsystem

The compute subsystem consists of two Cortex®-M33 processors and associated bus, debug, controller, peripherals, and interface logic supplied by ARM.

Reference system memory and peripherals

SRAM is part of the SSE-200, but a SoC will require additional memory, control, and peripheral components beyond the minimum subsystem components. Flash memory, for example, is not provided with the SSE-200.

Communication interface

The endpoint will have some way of communicating with other nodes or masters in the system. This could be WiFi, Bluetooth, or a wired connection.

Sensor or control component

To be useful as an endpoint, the reference design is typically extended by adding sensors or control logic such as, for example, temperature input or motor speed control output.

Software development environment

ARM provides a complete software development environment which includes the mbed operating system, ARM or GNU (GCC) compilers and debuggers, and firmware.

Custom peripherals typically require corresponding third-party firmware that can be integrated into the software stack.

IoT hardware and software

Figure 1-2 shows a block diagram of the hardware and software in an IoT system:




Figure 1-2 HW and SW solution

1.2 Features of the SSE-200

The SSE-200 contains the following components:

- Two Cortex®-M33 processors:
 - Optional FPU and DSP extensions (configurable).
 - Embedded Trace Macrocell (ETM).

For more information see the *ARM® Cortex®-M33 Processor Technical Reference Manual*.
- Cordio™ Bluetooth Radio (optional).
- CoreSight® debug system with configurable Secure Debug and Trace.
- Secure AMBA® interconnect:
 - AHB5 Bus Matrix.
 - AHB5 TrustZone® Memory Protection Controller (MPC).
 - AHB5 TrustZone Peripheral Protection Controller (PPC).
 - AHB5 Exclusive Access Monitor (EAM).
 - AHB5 Access Control Gates (ACG).
 - AHB5 to APB Bridges.
 - Expansion AHB5 master and slave buses (two each).
- Memory system:
 - AHB5 master bus to external code memory.
 - Static memory controllers.
 - Multiple banks of SRAM.
 - One bank of SRAM functions as *Tightly Coupled Memory* (TCM).
 - Instruction caches.
- Security components:
 - CryptoCell-312 (optional).
 - *Implementation Defined Attribution Unit* (IDAU).
 - Secure expansion ports.
 - System Security Controller.
 - System Controller.
- APB peripherals with security support:
 - Three general-purpose timers with configurable security. (One timer is on the 32KHz domain and two are on the SYSCLK PD_SYS domain).
 - A *Cortex-M System Design Kit* (CMSDK) dual timer with configurable security.
 - Three Watchdog timers with fixed security. One secure watchdog is on the 32KHz domain and one secure and one non-secure is on the SYSCLK PD_SYS domain.
 - Two *Message Handling Units* (MHUs) allow software to raise interrupts.
- Power-control components:
 - *Power Dependency Control Matrix* (PDCM).
 - *Power Policy Units* (PPU).
 - CoreLink LPD-500 Low Power Distributor.
 - Wakeup on interrupt from *External Wakeup Controllers* (EWC) and *Wakeup Interrupt Controllers* (WIC).

1.2.1 CoreLink SIE-200 components

The SSE-200 uses the following components from the CoreLink SIE-200 System IP for Embedded product:

- AHB5 to AHB5 Sync-down Bridge.
- AHB5 to AHB5 Sync-up Bridge.
- AHB5 Slave Multiplexer.
- AHB5 Master Multiplexer.
- AHB5 Bus Matrix.
- AHB5 to APB4 Synchronous Bridge.
- AHB5 to APB4 Asynchronous Bridge.
- AHB5 Access Control Gate.
- AHB5 Exclusive Access Monitor.
- AHB5 TrustZone® Memory Protection Controller.
- AHB5 to SRAM Interface.
- APB4 TrustZone® Peripheral Protection Controller.
- Power Dependency Control Matrix.

The following CoreLink SIE-200 components can be added to the SSE-200 by the system integrator:

- AHB5 GPIO.
- AHB5 Default Slave.
- AHB5 Example Slave.
- AHB5 to external SRAM interface.
- AHB5 to Flash interface modules.
- AHB5 to AHB5 and APB4 asynchronous bridge.
- AHB5 Downsizer.
- AHB5 Upsizer.

1.3 Compliance

The SSE-200 complies with, or includes components that comply with, the following specifications:

- [ARM Architecture](#).
- [Debug](#).
- [Interrupt controller architecture](#).
- [Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture](#).

This Technical Reference Manual complements the TRMs for included components, architecture reference manuals, architecture specifications, protocol specifications, and relevant external standards. It does not duplicate information from these sources.

1.3.1 ARM Architecture

The Cortex[®]-M33 processor in the SSE-200 implements the ARMv8-M architecture which executes the ARM-v8M T32 instruction set.

See the *ARMv8-M Architecture Reference Manual* for more information.

Security

The ARM[®] TrustZone[®] technology in the ARMv8-M architecture enables memory and peripheral spaces to be partitioned into secure and non-secure regions. No access to secure assets is possible from the non-secure world.

1.3.2 Debug

The SSE-200 implements the ARM CoreSight debug interface.

See the *ARM[®] CoreSight[™] Components Technical Reference Manual* for more information.

1.3.3 Interrupt controller architecture

The SSE-200 implements the following features:

- *ARM Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller (NVIC).*
- *ARM Wakeup Interrupt Controller (WIC).*

See the *ARM[®] Cortex[®]-M33 Processor Technical Reference Manual* for more information on the NVIC. See the *ARM[®] CoreLink[™] SIE-200 System IP for Embedded Technical Reference Manual* for more information on the WIC.

1.3.4 Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture

The SSE-200 complies with the:

- *Advanced High Performance Bus (AHB5) protocol.*
See the *ARM[®] AMBA[®] 5 AHB Protocol Specification*.
- *Advanced Peripheral Bus (APB4) protocol.*
See the *ARM[®] AMBA[®] APB Protocol Specification*.

The SSE-200 contains components that use ARM[®] TrustZone[®] technology that supports the ARMv8-M security extension for secure and non-secure states.

1.4 Product revisions

This section describes the differences in functionality between product revisions:

r0p0 First Beta release.

r1p0 First Beta release for the FPGA system.

Chapter 2

Functional description

This chapter describes the functionality of the SSE-200.

It contains the following sections:

- *Top-level system partitioning on page 2-2.*
- *Clocks on page 2-5.*
- *Resets on page 2-11.*
- *CPU elements on page 2-16.*
- *Base element on page 2-26.*
- *SRAM elements on page 2-32.*
- *System control element on page 2-33.*
- *Debug element on page 2-35.*
- *Power control infrastructure on page 2-43.*
- *Cordio Bluetooth Radio element on page 2-55.*
- *CryptoCell-312 element on page 2-56.*

2.1 Top-level system partitioning

This section describes the top-level partitioning of SSE-200 subsystem. It contains the following subsections:

- [Overview on page 2-5.](#)
- [Configuration options on page 2-3.](#)
- [Interface signals on page 2-4.](#)

2.1.1 Overview

The SSE-200 components are organized into the following blocks or elements:

- Base element.
- CPU elements.
- Debug element.
- System control element.
- SRAM elements.
- Cordio Bluetooth Radio element.
- CryptoCell security.

Note

The provided system components only form part of the finished SoC and ARM expects that the system designers will extend and customize the subsystem for their application requirements.

The top-level view of the subsystem elements and the AHB5 and APB bus interconnections is shown in the following figure. The following abbreviations are used in the figure:

ACG	AHB5/APB Access Control Gate.
EAM	AHB5 Exclusive Access Monitor.
MHU	Message Handling Unit.
MPC	AHB5 Memory Protection Controller.
MSC	Master Security Controller.
PCSM	Power Control State Machine.
PIK	Power Integration Kit.
PPC	AHB5/APB Peripheral Protection Controller.




Figure 2-1 Top-level element interconnections

2.1.2 Configuration options

Some processor and system options are set by configuration parameters, for example:

- Reset value for the vector table offset addresses for both processors.
- CPU IDs.
- Number of expansion interrupts for the processors and the wakeup controllers.
- Interrupt latencies.
- Presence of FPUs and support for DSP extension instructions.
- Debug resources.
- Clock divider values.

Note

- See the *ARM® CoreLink™ SSE-200 Subsystem Configuration and Integration Manual* for more configuration details.
 - This manual is only available to customers who have licensed the SSE-200 product.
-

2.1.3 Interface signals

The SSE-200 has the following interfaces at the boundary of subsystem to allow customers to customize the subsystem:

- Clock and reset. See [Clock, reset, and power control signals on page A-3](#).
- Processor-related signals:
 - Processor control and status. See [Clock, reset, and power control signals on page A-3](#).
 - Interrupts. See [Interrupt signals on page A-9](#).
 - Configuration signals. See [Miscellaneous top-level signals on page A-22](#).
- Base element:
 - AHB expansion. See [AHB expansion bus signals on page A-10](#).
- SRAM.
- System control:
 - Static configuration signals. See [Miscellaneous top-level signals on page A-22](#).
 - Power control expansion interfaces.
 - External Wakeup Controller interrupt inputs. See [Clock, reset, and power control signals on page A-3](#).
- Debug and Trace:
 - Debug access.
 - Timestamp.
 - Cross Trigger Channel.
 - Debug APB expansion.
 - ATB Trace.
 - Debug authentication.
 See [Debug and Trace signals on page A-13](#).
- CryptoCell: This element integrates the CryptoCell-312 into the system to provide cryptographic acceleration. This element is optional, if present the following interfaces are added:
 - NVM APB interface.
 - *Debug Control Unit* (DCU) signals.
 - *Life Cycle State* (LCS) signals.
 See [CryptoCell-312 signals on page A-25](#).
- Security. See [Security component interfaces on page A-17](#).
- Top-level static configuration signals. See [Miscellaneous top-level signals on page A-22](#).

2.2 Clocks

This section describes the clocks in the SSE-200 subsystem. It contains the following subsections:

- [Overview](#).
- [Clock generation and control on page 2-7](#).
- [External wakeup controller clocks on page 2-8](#).
- [Component clocks on page 2-9](#).

2.2.1 Overview

The following clocks are present in the SSE-200:

- The subsystem uses the clock **MAINCLK** input to derive:
 - **sysclk** which is the clock for the primary processor, bus matrix, most of the SRAMs, and peripherals.
 - **flclk** is used by the debug system, secondary processor, and the last SRAM. SRAM element 3 is also used for *Tightly Coupled Memory* (TCM) to provide higher performance for data accesses.
- A slow clock is used by some elements within the system control element. The **S32KCLK** clock is an asynchronous clock input that is used primarily to drive the **S32KWATCHDOG**, the **S32KTIMER**, and other logic that must be clocked at the lowest system power mode (hibernation).

All derived clocks are synchronous to the main input clock and a range of primary to secondary ratios are supported.

The generated clocks are locally clock gated within each element depending on which reset domain it is on, and the activity and power state of the dependent logic. The power state of dependent logic is typically the Power policy Units (PPU). Some of the gated clocks are output for expansion logic in the same clock, reset, and power domains.

The following diagram shows the interconnections for the clock signals:

In the diagram:

- The CC blocks are clock controllers for hierarchical clock gating.
- The CG blocks are clock gates.
- The PPU blocks are Power Policy Units.




Figure 2-2 Clock interconnection

The Clock Request Controller handshakes with the external clock generator to turn off the main clock when it is not required.

System control registers control the clock divider and multiplexing settings.

Q-Channel based clock control logic provides the following features:

- Access Control Gates can isolate clock domains and provide Q-Channel handshake interfaces.
- A clock controller in each domain connects to the domains and gates the clock when the domain is idle.

2.2.2 Clock generation and control

This section describes clock generation and control for **MAINCLK**, **FCLK**, and **SYSCLK** and clocks derived from them.

MAINCLK

The subsystem main input clock, **MAINCLK**, derives most other clocks within the subsystem. The following handshake signals control the clock state:

- **MAINCLKREQ** is the system request for **MAINCLK** to become active.
- **MAINCLKREADY** is the notification that **MAINCLK** is ready to be used.

MAINCLK is required in the following conditions:

- Any PPU is the system is in the ON state.
- Any External Wakeup Controller (EWC) is requesting that a core wakes up.
- Expansion logic uses the **EXP_CLK_REQ** and **EXP_CLK_ACK** handshake logic to request that ungated clocks are available.

Therefore, the only time **MAINCLK** turns off is when the system goes into the hibernate state and no other parts of the system, including from external expansion logic, requests the clocks to be available.

FCLK and SYSCLK

FCLK and **SYSCLK** are generated from **MAINCLK**:

- **FCLK** is generated by dividing down **MAINCLK**.
- **SYSCLK** is then generated by dividing down **FCLK**.
- The divider ratio can be set from configuration parameters and also by software. See [FCLK and SYSCLK](#).

The subsystem uses the **EXPCLKREQ** and **EXPCLKREADY** handshake signals to provide **SYSCLK** and **FCLK** on request from external hardware. The handshake follows the same protocol as the **MAINCLKREQ** and **MAINCLKREADY** handshake signals. When using the **EXPCLKREQ** and **EXPCLKREADY** handshake signals to request active clocks, the SSE-200 also requests that the **MAINCLK** clock is active.

Clock and reset outputs are provided for expansion of other power domains within the subsystem as follows:

- For the PD_SYS power domain, **SYSFCLK** and **SYSSYSCLK** are power-gated and hierarchical clock-gated versions of **FCLK** and **SYSCLK**. These are used for expansion logic that resides in the PD_SYS power domain. In addition **SYSSYSUGCLK** and **SYSFUGCLK** are the equivalent power gated, but not hierarchical clock gated, versions of **SYSCLK** and **FCLK**.
- For the PD_DEBUG power domain, **DEBUGFCLK** and **DEBUGSYSCLK** are hierarchical clock gated versions of **FCLK** and **SYSCLK**. These are used for debug expansion logic that resides in the PD_DEBUG power domain.
- The **HINTSYSCLKENCLK** and **DEBUGHINTSYSCLKENCLK** signals are clock pulses that are generated by the divider to indicate when, relative to the divided clock **FCLK** or **DEBUGFCLK**, an enable must be generated. These are used by expansion logic external to the subsystem to generate the enables locally so that they can be used with bridges or other equivalent logic for crossing between **FCLK** and **SYSCLK** clock domains. The enables would normally occur at the last **FCLK** cycle prior and up to the rising edge of **SYSCLK**. **HINTSYSCLKENCLK**, is used to generate the enable in the Always ON domain while **DEBUGHINTSYSCLKENCLK** is used in the debug power domain to do the same.

———— **Note** ————

All fast clock outputs, **FCLK**, **SYSFCLK** and **DEBUGFCLK** can be gated by **HINTSYSCLKENCLK** when CPU 1 in the system is turned off. To enable gating, set the **FCLKHINTGATE_ENABLE** bit in the **CLOCK_FORCE** register to HIGH.

This allows all logic that runs on the faster clock to run at the same clock speed as the rest of the system and reduce power consumption, but at the cost of slightly higher latency when accessing SRAM3,

2.2.3 External wakeup controller clocks

The capture flops in the EWC typically run on **S32KCLK**, and therefore **S32CLK** is expected to be always on. If however, the system designer replaces the interrupt capture flops in the EWC with latches, **S32KCLK** is not required by the EWC.

The wakeup request must be able to be generated from the capture flops or latches without any other clock running, other than **S32KCLK**, if flops are used instead of latches.

2.2.4 Power control expansion

Two clocks allow the system designer to add additional power control logic in the Always-On power domain:

- **CPUDEBUGPIKCLK** is a hierarchically gated version of **SYSCLK** clock that is related to the **nPORESETAON** reset domain.
The resynchronised reset signal for this clock is **nCPUDEBUGPIKRESET**.
A Q-Channel interface is also provided to allow expansion logic on this clock domain to influence the hierarchical gating of the clock.
This clock is typically used for power control logic that supports expansion of the CPU and Debug Elements.
- **BCRYPTOSPIKCLK** is a hierarchically gated version of **SYSCLK** that is related to the **nWARMRESETAON** reset domain.

The resynchronised reset signal for this clock is **nBCRYPTOSPIKRESET**.

A Q-Channel interface is provided to allow expansion logic on this clock domain to influence the hierarchical gating of the clock.

This clock is typically used for power control logic that supports expansion of the main system that is reset directly or indirectly by **nWARMRESETAON**.

2.2.5 Component clocks

The elements use the system clocks as follows:

SRAM element

Each SRAM runs on one clock. Most run on **SYSCLK**. Optionally one SRAM can run on **FCLK** instead of **SYSCLK**.

The clock used in the element is gated by the PPU for power management.

The SRAM element can locally implement dynamic clock control to further reduce the amount of time the clock is active when the element is idle.

CPU element

Each CPU element runs on a single clock:

- The primary core runs on **SYSCLK**.
- The secondary core runs on **FCLK**.

Because the Cortex-M33 processor has its own clock gating control, the Cortex-M33 cores require an ungated clock to be supplied to each core.

The PPU can gate the clock to the instruction cache and the ACG for power management. Additional dynamic clock control is combined with Cortex-M33 processor clock enable output to further reduce the amount of time the clock is active when the element is idle.

Base element

The base element requires both **FCLK** and **SYSCLK**.

Each clock is gated by the PPU for power management.

The base element locally implements dynamic clock control to further reduce the amount of time each clock is active when the element is idle. These clocks are available for expansion use as the **SYSFCLK**, **SYSSYSCLK** and **SYSSYSUGCLK** clock outputs.

Debug element

The debug element requires both **FCLK** and **SYSCLK**.

Each clock is gated by the PPU for power management.

The debug element does not implement dynamic clock control. The local clocks are running whenever the element is powered ON. These clocks are available for expansion use as the **DEBUGFCLK** and **DEBUGSYSCLK** clock outputs.

System control element

The system control element requires **S32KCLK**, **FCLK**, and **SYSCLK**.

Because the control element is in the always-on power domain, the element does not have a PPU to gate clocks.

The element implements dynamic clock control for **SYSCLK** to reduce the amount of time **SYSCLK** clock is active when the element is idle.

CryptoCell

The CryptoCell, if present, runs on **SYSCLK**.

For power control, this clock can be gated by the PPU to output the **CRYPTOSYSCLK** clock. This clock is available for use for CryptoCell NVM Interface expansion.

The element also implements dynamic clock control for **SYSCLK**, to reduce the amount of time **SYSCLK** is active when the element is idle.

Cordio element

The Cordio element, if present, has two parts:

- The *Link Layer Controller* (LLC) runs on the 32KHz **CLK32** clock and a 32MHz **CLK32M** clock that is supplied by external radio frequency IP.
- The *Link Control Interface* (LCI) runs on **SYSSYSCLK**.

For a full list of component clocks, see [Clock, reset, and power control signals on page A-3](#).

2.3 Resets

This section describes the resets in the SSE-200 subsystem. It contains the following subsections:

- [Overview](#).
- [Reset inputs and outputs on page 2-12](#).
- [nPORESET handling on page 2-13](#).
- [CPU reset handling on page 2-14](#).
- [nWARMRESETAON on page 2-14](#).

2.3.1 Overview

The SSE-200 reset infrastructure takes reset inputs and requests from external sources and from within the subsystem, and generates the resets that are distributed through the system.

The following figure shows the reset infrastructure.




Figure 2-3 Reset interconnection

2.3.2 Reset inputs and outputs

The following reset-related signals in the subsystem are from or to the Always On part of the subsystem:

nPORESET This is the Power on Reset input for the SSE-200. ARM recommends that this signal is one or more **S32CLK** cycles long.

nSRST

This signal, typically from an external debugger, is the system-wide reset request:

- This reset is applied to the subsystem on the falling edge of the **nSRST** signal and then removed, except for the **nSYSRESET** pin of each CPU Core.

- If **nSRST** is held low, all CPU cores are also stopped from booting.
- The **nSRST** input must be a minimum of three **S32KCLK** cycles long. **nSRST** can be held LOW while performing other debug related tasks to indefinitely prevent the CPU from execution. This might be done, for example, when inserting a debug certificate into the SRAM. After **nSRST** is de-asserted after its assertion, it must be held inactive for at least three **S32KCLK** cycles before being asserting again..

nWARMRESETAON

This signal performs a warm reset of the system. This signal:

- Must not be used to reset any debug-related logic.
- Is also asserted if **nPORESETAON** is asserted.
- Merges other reset sources that are required to cause system reset.
- Is asynchronous and must be re-synchronized before use.

nPORESETAON

The **nPORESETAON** reset output is the power-on reset signal intended for use by the expansion subsystem logic. This reset output merges other reset sources that are required to cause power-on reset. This reset output is asynchronous and is not required to be resynchronized before use.

RESETREQ

This allows external expansion logic to request a system reset:

- After it is asserted, the signal must be held HIGH until the reset occurs on **nPORESETAON**.
- The signal must be cleared as a result of the assertion of **nPORESETAON**.

The following signals are provided for expansion of other power domains in the subsystem:

nWARMRESETSYS

This is the system reset signal for expansion logic in the PD_SYS power domain. It supports logic retention and is not asserted if the PD_SYS power domain is entering retention state.

nPORESETDEBUG

This is the power on reset signal for debug expansion logic in the PD_DEBUG power domain.

For a full list of component reset signals, see [Clock, reset, and power control signals on page A-3](#).

2.3.3 nPORESET handling

nPORESET directly resets the Reset Syndrome registers and Mask register.

nPORESET is combined with the masked and combined reset requests from watchdog timers, the **RESETREQ** input, the SWRESETREQ register value, and the stretched **nSRST** to generate the internal combined power-on reset signal **nPORESETAON** which resets almost all logic within the system.

Note

In each power domain that is controlled by a PPU, the PPU is reset by **nPORESETAON**. The PPU then resets the other logic in the domain using its reset pins:

- **DEWARMRESETn** if the element does not support retention.
 - **DEVRESETn** if the element supports logic or full retention.
-

2.3.4 CPU reset handling

Because the Cortex-M33 core normally handles reset on its own, **nPORESETAON** is fed directly to the Cortex-M33 core. **nSYSRESET** of the Cortex-M33 core is generated from the local PPU as the PPU can handle warm reset of the core.

The reset from the PPU, **DEVRESETn**, is combined with **nSRST** to hold the core in reset until **nSRST** is de-asserted. This allows a debugger to hold the CPU core in reset while it uses the debug access port to perform debug operations

See [Certificate Access on page 2-37](#).

Boot after reset

After reset, both CPUs boot execute the instruction at the boot address from the vector offset address register in the System Control Registers.

Note

- Static top-level configuration parameters determine the contents of the vector offset address register in the System Control Registers. The default address is 0x00000000 and is statically mapped to code memory of the AHB Master Expansion Code interface.
 - Software can modify the boot addresses before a warm re-boot of the CPUs.
 - See [Top level static configuration signals on page A-22](#) and the *ARM® CoreLink™ SSE-200 Subsystem Configuration and Integration Manual*.
-

The TrustZone-M requirement for boot up is that execution starts from a secure memory space, and optionally automatically executes non-secure firmware after secure world initialization. At boot, the SRAM is Secure only. Software must change or restore the settings in the MPC to release memory for non-secure world use.

The **CPUWAIT** input can force the Cortex-M33 processor to wait before executing the instruction. Each CPU in the system as an associated **CPU_WAIT** register that controls if it will start running its boot code when it wakes.

See the *ARM® Cortex®-M33 Processor Technical Reference Manual*.

2.3.5 nWARMRESETAON

System reset is performed by the **nWARMRESETAON** signal generated by merging reset requests from the following sources, possibly after masking with the value in the **RESET_MASK** Register:

- **nPORESETAO**.
- The system reset request from the Cortex-M33 core.

nWARMRESETAON is provided to system designers for external components.

Note

In each power domain that is controlled by a PPU which is reset by **nWARMRESETAON**, the PPU generates the reset in each power domain including the **nWARMRESETAON** reset and the local power management reset. The PPU reset pin is either:

- **DEVWARMRESETn** if the element does not support retention.
 - **DEVRETRESETn** if the element supports logic or full retention.
-

2.4 CPU elements

This section describes the CPU elements. It contains the following subsections:

- [Overview](#).
- [Cortex-M33 configurations on page 2-17](#).
- [Instruction cache on page 2-20](#).
- [CPU_WAIT control on page 2-22](#).
- [Interrupts on page 2-22](#).
- [Power domains on page 2-24](#).
- [Clock domains on page 2-24](#).
- [Security on page 2-24](#).
- [External wakeup on page 2-25](#).

2.4.1 Overview

There are two Cortex-M33 cores in the SSE-200:

- The primary core in the CPU0 element is synchronous to main interconnect and runs the operating system.
- The secondary core in the CPU1 element contains an FPU and DSP. It is synchronous to the main clock, but runs N times faster.

The Cortex-M33 processor has the following features:

- Three-stage pipeline.
- ARMv8-M Mainline profile.
- TrustZone-M Security.
- Up to eight SAU entries each (configurable).
- Up to 16 MPU regions with eight secure and eight non-secure (configurable).
- IDAU defining high-level security memory mapping.

Each CPU has configuration parameters that can be set in the design stage to specify the processor features including:

- If the FPU is present.
- If the Digital Signal Processing extension instructions are included.
- If the coprocessor interface is present.
- The number of non-secure and secure MPU regions.
- The number of security attribution unit regions.
- The number of user interrupts
- The interrupt priority and interrupt latency implemented in the NVIC.
- Debug resources and trace support.

See [Cortex-M33 configurations on page 2-17](#) and the SSE-200 Configuration and Integration Manual for more details on system configuration options.

The following figure shows a block diagram of the Cortex-M33 processor logic and CoreSight SoC interface:




Figure 2-4 CPU element

2.4.2 Cortex-M33 configurations

Each CPU supports the following configuration with the following features:

Table 2-1 Core configurations

Parameter	CPU 0 option	CPU 1 option	CPU 0 default	CPU 1 default	Description
FPU	CPU0_FPU	CPU1_FPU	0	1	Define if <i>Floating Point Unit</i> (FPU) is present: 0: Not Present. 1: Present.
DSP	CPU0_DSP	CPU1_DSP	0	1	<i>Digital Signal Processing</i> (DSP) extension instructions are included. 0: Not included. 1: Included.
SEEXT	1	1	-	-	ARMv8-M security extension are always included.
CPIF	CPU0_CPIF	CPU1_CPIF	0	0	Coprocessor interface is included. 0: Not included. This is the only supported value. 1: Included. These are driven by top-level parameters.

Table 2-1 Core configurations (continued)

Parameter	CPU 0 option	CPU 1 option	CPU 0 default	CPU 1 default	Description
MPU_NS	CPU0_MPU_NS	CPU1_MPU_NS	8	8	Defines the number of Non-secure <i>Memory Protection Unit</i> (MPU) regions included. Options are: 0, 4, 8, 12, and 16.
MPU_S	CPU0_MPU_S	CPU1_MPU_S	8	8	Defines the number of Secure MPU regions included. Options are: 0, 4, 8, 12, and 16.
SAU	CPU0_SAU	CPU1_SAU	8	8	Defines the number of <i>Security Attribution Unit</i> (SAU) regions included. Options are: 0, 4, and 8.
NUMIRQ	CPU0_EXP_NUMIRQ + 32	CPU1_EXP_NUMIRQ + 32	64 + 32 = 96	64 + 32 = 96	Number of user interrupts implemented.
IRQLVL	CPU0_IRQ_LVL	CPU1_IRQ_LVL	4	4	Specifies the number of bits of interrupt priority implemented in the NVIC. Supports a range of 3-8. For example, a value of 3 results in eight levels of priority.
IRQLATENCY	IRQDIS[31:0]. IRQLATENCY[CPU0_EXP_NUMIRQ+31:31] = CPU0_IRQLATENCY	IRQLATENCY[31:0]. IRQLATENCY[CPU1_EXP_NUMIRQ+31:32] = CPU1_IRQLATENCY	-	-	Set interrupts to low latency.
IRQDIS	IRQDIS[31:0] depends on elements present. IRQDIS[CPU0_EXP_NUMIRQ+31:32] = CPU0_EXP_IRQDIS [CPU0_EXP_NUMIRQ-1:0]	IRQDIS[31:0] depends on elements present. IRQDIS[CPU1_EXP_NUMIRQ+31:32] = CPU1_EXP_IRQDIS [CPU1_EXP_NUMIRQ-1:0]	0xC8304100 when Crypto element is absent. 0xC8204000 when Crypto element is present.	0xC8304100 when Crypto element is absent. 0xC8204000 when Crypto element is present.	Disable support for interrupt. Each bit in IRQDIS corresponds to an interrupt. If the value of a bit in IRQDIS is 1, the corresponding IRQ is not present.
DBGVL	CPU0_DBGVL	CPU1_DBGVL	2	2	Specifies the number of debug resources included. The options are: 0: minimal debug. Not supported. 1: reduced set. Two watchpoint and four breakpoint comparators. 2 full set. Four watchpoint and eight breakpoint comparators. Debug monitor mode is always supported.

Table 2-1 Core configurations (continued)

Parameter	CPU 0 option	CPU 1 option	CPU 0 default	CPU 1 default	Description
ITM	1	1	-	-	Specifies the level of instrumentation trace supported. The options are: 0: No <i>Instrumentation Trace Macrocell</i> (ITM) trace included. DWT triggers and counters are not included. 1: Include DWT and ITM trace.
ETM	1	1	-	-	Specifies support for ETM trace. The options are: 0: No ETM trace included. 1: ETM is included.
MTB	0	0	-	-	Specifies support for MTB trace. The options are: 0: No MTB trace included. 1: MTB included.
MTBWIDTH	12	12	-	-	12-bit MTB RAM interface address width. Not used.
WIC	1	1	-	-	WIC included.
WICLINES	CPU0_EXP_NUMIRQ + 35	CPU1_EXP_NUMIRQ + 35	-	-	All interrupts are sensitive to WIC.
CTI	1	1	-	-	CTI included.
RAR	1	1	-	-	Only reset the architecturally required state.

Some of the Cortex-M33 processor options are determined by configuration signals from the SSE-200 as listed in the following table.

Table 2-2 Static configuration signals for the Cortex-M33 processor

Signal Name	Tie Value	Description
CFGBIGEND	0	Little-endian data endianness.
CFGSSSTCALIB[25:0]	0x200_0000	Secure Systick calibration configuration. No alternative reference clock is provided, and the frequency of clock arriving at the processor is not computable in hardware. CFGSSSTCALIB[25] NOREF = HIGH. CFGSSSTCALIB[25] SKEW = LOW. CFGSSSTCALIB[23] TENMS = 0x00_0000.
CFGNSSTCALIB[25:0]	0x200_0000	Non-secure Systick calibration configuration indicating that no alternative reference clock is provided, and the frequency of clock arriving at the processor is not computable in hardware. CFGNSSTCALIB[25] NOREF = HIGH. CFGNSSTCALIB[25] SKEW = LOW. CFGNSSTCALIB[23] TENMS = 0x00_0000.
CFGFPU	1	FPU hardware support enabled.

Table 2-2 Static configuration signals for the Cortex-M33 processor (continued)

Signal Name	Tie Value	Description
CFGDSP	1	DSP hardware support enabled.
CFGSECEXT	1	ARMv8-M security support enabled.
MPUNSDISABLE	0	Disables support for the Non-secure MPU. Set to LOW to not disable.
MPUSDISABLE	0	Disables support for the Secure MPU. Set to LOW to not disable.
SAUDISABLE	0	Disables support for the SAU. Set to LOW to not disable.

Both of the Cortex-M33 processors have a **LOCKSMPU** static configuration signal that has the following functions:

- When HIGH, the signal disables writes to the MPU_CTRL, MPU_RNR, MPU_RBAR, MPU_RLAR, MPU_RBAR_An and MPU_RLAR_An from software or from a debug agent connected to the processor.
- When asserted, this signal prevents changes to programmed secure MPU memory regions and all writes to the registers are ignored. Locking of the secure MPU is not supported.

2.4.3 Instruction cache

Each CPU element contains a single L1 instruction cache that is on the code AHB interface of the Cortex-M33 core. The cache:

- Reduces the code access fetches targeting the Flash memory and therefore reduces activity on the Flash and hence power.
- Reduces the overall latency of code access. This permits increasing the latency of the instruction fetch from memory which might be necessary to deal with long timing paths.

The cache has the following features:

- 2-way set associative.
- 16-Byte cache lines.
- Configurable size. The top level parameters CPU0_ICACHESIZE and CPU1_ICACHE_SIZE set the size.
- Configuration interface local to each CPU.
- Supports un-cached bypass operation.

Note

- The instruction code fetches in the region from 0x0000_0000 to 0x1FFF_FFFF are cached. All access to other memory region are not cached.
- Each cache includes a configuration interface that is only accessible to the CPU that is connected to it and it resides at address 0x5001_0000. This configuration interface is not accessible to other masters in the system.

The cache supports secure and non-secure segregation of contents by retaining the security attributes of the cached contents. If the SAU or the IDAU configurations change, the cache might contain contents that do not match the new security settings. To maintain security, you must therefore disable and invalidate the cache prior to modifying the SAU or IDAU.

Because this is an instruction cache, only read accesses are subject to caching. All write accesses bypass the cache. If INVMAT option of the cache is enabled, when a cacheable write access occurs to a line that exists in the cache, that cache line is invalidated.

———— **Note** ————

If a cache line exists in the cache that matches a non-cacheable write access, the invalidation does not occur. Therefore, when changing the attribute of an address region from cacheable to non-cacheable that the instruction cache accesses, you must invalidate the cache.

The following table lists the instruction cache configuration parameters.

Table 2-3 Instruction cache configurations

Parameter	Processor 0 configuration	Processor 1 configuration	Processor 0 default value	Processor 1 default value	Description
CSIZE	CPU0_ICACHESIZE	CPU1_ICACHESIZE	2KB	2KB	Define the cache size. Supported cache sizes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 9 = 512B. 10 = 1KB. 11 = 2KB. 12 = 4KB. 13 = 8KB. 14 = 16KB. Other = Reserved.
DMA	CPU0_ICACHEDMA	CPU1_ICACHEDMA	0	0	Defines the existence of micro DMA capability and line locking capability. When set to 1, the instruction cache provides cache line prefetch and locking capability.
INVMAT	CPU0_ICACHEINVMAT	CPU1_ICACHEINVMAT	0	0	Invalidate on Write Match. When set to 1, any cacheable writes to a line that also exists in the instruction cache results in the cache line being invalidated.
COFFSET	0	0	0	0	Cacheable Region Offset Upper bits to compare against. This parameter is fixed.
COFFSIZE	3	3	3	3	Cacheable Region Size. Value defines the number of upper address bits to compare. Therefore, the addressable space is $2^{(32-\text{COFFSIZE})}$.

Table 2-3 Instruction cache configurations (continued)

Parameter	Processor 0 configuration	Processor 1 configuration	Processor 0 default value	Processor 1 default value	Description
STATS	CPU0_ICACHESTATS	CPU1_ICACHESTATS	1	1	1 = include statistics functionality.
XOM	CPU0_XOM	CPU1_XOM	0	0	Enable Execute Only Memory support. When set to 1, the HRUSER[0] signal on the AHB5 Master Expansion Code Interface is used to indicate if current data being returned is Execute Only. If the data type access arriving at the Instruction Cache targets an XOM location, the Instruction Cache masks the data. When set to 0, this HRUSER[0] is ignored by the associated Instruction Cache.
REDUCE_READS	ICACHERRDS		1	1	Reduce Instruction Cache Tag Reads. When set to 1, it masks off an access to the TAG RAM if this set has been previously accessed and the RAM data is valid and does not need re-accessing.

2.4.4 CPU_WAIT control

Each core in the system as an associated CPU_WAIT register that controls if it starts running its boot code when it wakes.

Caution

As the only way for a core to enter a lower-power state is to at least enter into WFI:

- If after powering up, **CPU_WAIT** is held HIGH, The core will not be able to run code to enter WFI and the core will remain powered up.
To prevent the CPU from being on indefinitely, if **CPU_WAIT** is HIGH, ensure that there is at least another agent in the system that can clear this register to allow the core to start boot up.

2.4.5 Interrupts

The CPU element provides the following events that can generate interrupts in the system:

- Instruction Cache IRQ.
- PPU0/PPU1 IRQ.
- CTI IRQ [1:0].

In addition to the interrupts, the following events can be used to control instruction execution:

- RXEV (incoming event) is the event received by the Cortex-M33 processor and is connected to the TXEV of the other processor in the system.
- TXEV (outgoing event) is the event transmitted by Cortex-M33 processor and is connected to the RXEV of the other processor in the system.

The following table lists the interrupt sources for CPU0 and CPU1:

Table 2-4 Interrupt sources

Interrupt Input	CPU 0 and CPU 1 interrupt source
NMI	Combined Secure Watchdog, S32kwatchdog and NMI_Expansion
IRQ[0]	Non-secure Watchdog Reset Request
IRQ[1]	Non-secure Watchdog Interrupt
IRQ[2]	S32K Timer
IRQ[3]	Timer 0
IRQ[4]	Timer 1
IRQ[5]	Dual Timer
IRQ[6]	Message Handling Unit 0 CPU _n Interrupt
IRQ[7]	Message Handling Unit 1 CPU _n Interrupt
IRQ[8]	CryptoCell-312 (if CryptoCell is present)
IRQ[9]	MPC Combined (Secure)
IRQ[10]	PPC Combined (Secure)
IRQ[11]	MSC Combined (secure)
IRQ[12]	Bridge Error Combined Interrupt (Secure)
IRQ[13]	CPU _n Instruction Cache Interrupt
IRQ[14]	Reserved
IRQ[15]	SYS_PPU
IRQ[16]	CPU0_PPU
IRQ[17]	CPU1_PPU
IRQ[18]	CPU0DBG_PPU
IRQ[19]	CPU1CBG_PPU
IRQ[20]	Crypto PPU (if CryptoCell is present)
IRQ[21]	Reserved
IRQ[22]	RAM0_PPU
IRQ[23]	RAM1_PPU
IRQ[24]	RAM2_PPU
IRQ[25]	RAM3_PPU
IRQ[26]	DEBUG_PPU
IRQ[27]	Reserved
IRQ[28]	CPU _n CTIIRQ0
IRQ[29]	CPU _n CTIIRQ1

Table 2-4 Interrupt sources (continued)

Interrupt Input	CPU 0 and CPU 1 interrupt source
IRQ[30]	CORDIOTXCOMB (if Cordio is present)
IRQ[31]	CORDIORXCOMB (if Cordio is present)
IRQ[95:32]	Expansion Interrupt Inputs.

Note

- Unless specified, both cores receive the same interrupt signals.
- Each CPU only sees its own local instruction cache interrupt and CTIIRQ interrupts. Instruction cache and all PPU's interrupts must be handled as Secure interrupts.
- If because of the system configuration, an interrupt source does not exist, the unused interrupt pin is not used, and the interrupt is disabled and reserved.

The Non-secure watchdog interrupt signal and its reset request signal are both used to generate interrupts to the CPU. The reset request interrupt must be handled as a secure interrupt by the *Trusted Execution Environment* (TEE) so that it does not directly reset the system. To enable the non-secure watchdog reset of the system, set the NSWD_EN field in the RESET_MASK register to HIGH.

The Secure watchdog interrupt request and the S32K Watchdog interrupt request are merged to generate an internal Non-Maskable Interrupt that can be used to raise an NMI interrupt on CPU0 or CPU1.

The settings in the NMI_ENABLE register can be modified to allow software to route the watchdog interrupts to a single core. That core can then own the interrupt handling for the watchdog interrupt.

The NIM_ENABLE register has masks for the expansion external NMI interrupt inputs to allow software to determine if external NMI must be raised. These Interrupts must all be handled as secure interrupts.

There are two *Message Handling Units* (MHUs) in the system. If the system supports a *Trusted Execution Environment* (TEE), one MHU must be configured as a secure MHU and the other as a non-secure MHU.

2.4.6 Power domains

See [Power control infrastructure on page 2-43](#).

2.4.7 Clock domains

See [Clocks on page 2-5](#).

2.4.8 Security

The CPU element is TrustZone-M security aware. The Cortex-M33 core security extension is always enabled.

The security attributes of the memory map for a core are defined by the software controlled *Secure Attribution Unit* (SAU) and an *Implementation Defined Attribution Unit* (IDAU).

Implementation Defined Attribution Unit (IDAU) security values are defined as follows:

Table 2-5 CPU element IDAU definition

Address		Output					Note
From	To	IDAUNS	IDAUNSC	IDAUID	IDAUIDV	IDAUNCHK	
0x0000_0000	0x0FFF_FFFF	1	0	0	1	0	Non-secure
0x1000_0000	0x1FFF_FFFF	0	NSCCFG[0]	1	1	0	Secure (might be callable)
0x2000_0000	0x2FFF_FFFF	1	0	2	1	0	Non-secure
0x3000_0000	0x3FFF_FFFF	0	NSCCFG[1]	3	1	0	Secure (might be callable)
0x4000_0000	0x4FFF_FFFF	1	0	4	1	0	Non-secure
0x5000_0000	0x5FFF_FFFF	0	0	5	1	0	Secure
0x6000_0000	0x6FFF_FFFF	1	0	6	1	0	Non-secure
0x7000_0000	0x7FFF_FFFF	0	0	7	1	0	Secure
0x8000_0000	0x8FFF_FFFF	1	0	8	1	0	Non-secure
0x9000_0000	0x9FFF_FFFF	0	0	9	1	0	Secure
0xA000_0000	0xAFFF_FFFF	1	0	0xA	1	0	Non-secure
0xB000_0000	0xBFFF_FFFF	0	0	0xB	1	0	Secure
0xC000_0000	0xCFFF_FFFF	1	0	0xC	1	0	Non-secure
0xD000_0000	0xDFFF_FFFF	0	0	0xD	1	0	Secure
0xE000_0000	0xE00F_FFFF	1	0	0xE	1	1	Exempted
0xE010_0000	0xEFFF_FFFF	1	0	0xE	1	0	Non-secure
0xF000_0000	0xF00F_FFFF	0	0	0xF	1	1	Exempted
0xF010_0000	0xFFFF_FFFF	0	0	0xF	1	0	Secure

For the mapping of these regions against the main system memory map, see [Memory map on page 3-3](#).

2.4.9 External wakeup

See [Power control infrastructure on page 2-43](#).

2.5 Base element

This section describes the Base element. It contains the following subsections:

- [Overview](#).
- [Component sources](#) on page 2-27.
- [AHB5 bus matrix](#) on page 2-28.
- [SRAM](#) on page 2-28.
- [AHB5 TrustZone peripheral protection controllers](#) on page 2-29.
- [Message handling unit](#) on page 2-29.
- [Timers and watchdogs](#) on page 2-29.
- [Expansion ports](#) on page 2-30.
- [Security controller](#) on page 2-31.
- [Power control](#) on page 2-31.

2.5.1 Overview

The base element provides the following features:

- A multilayer AHB5 interconnect for all of the subsystem elements and expansion buses.
- A Memory Protection Controller for each SRAM element.
- AHB to APB bus converters and TrustZone Peripheral Protection Controllers for:
 - Two CMSDK Timers.
 - One CMSDK Dual Timer.
 - One CMSDK Watchdog timers.
 - Message Handling Units that can send messaging interrupts to each core.
- Two AHB5 slave expansion ports and three master expansion ports.
- A security controller with expansion support.
- A single voltage domain and power-gated region.
- Two synchronous clock domains.

The following figure shows a block diagram of the base element.

2.5.2 Component sources

- AHB5 interconnect.
- *Memory Protection Controllers* (MPC).
- AHB5 to APB bus converter.
- *APB Peripheral Protection Controller* (PPC).
- AHB5 slave mux.
- AHB5 master mux.
- AHB5 sync-up bridge.
- AHB5 sync-down bridge.
- *Access Control Gates* (ACG).

- Timers and dual timers.
- Watchdog timers.

- The security controller which implements both the Secure Privilege Control Register Block and the Non-Secure Privilege Register Block.
- Message handling units that allow messaging interrupts to be sent to each CPU core.

2.5.3 AHB5 bus matrix

The bus matrix connects AHB5 components through its slave and master ports.

The following table lists the bus matrix slave ports.

Table 2-6 AHB5 bus matrix slave ports

Port number	Slave port
S0	CPU0 Code AHB Interface
S1	CPU0 System AHB Interface
S2	CPU1 Code AHB Interface
S3	CPU1 System AHB Interface
S4	CryptoCell AHB interface
S5	Debug certificate AHB Interface
S6	Slave Expansion0 AHB Interface
S7	Slave Expansion1 AHB Interface

The following table lists the bus matrix master ports and their connections to the slave ports.

Table 2-7 AHB5 bus matrix master ports

Master port	S0	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7
AHB Master Expansion Code Interface	Y		Y		Y		Y	
AHB Master Expansion 0 Interface		Y		Y	Y		Y	Y
AHB Master Expansion 1 Interface		Y		Y			Y	Y
SRAM0 AHB Interface		Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SRAM1 AHB Interface		Y		Y	Y		Y	Y
SRAM2 AHB Interface		Y		Y	Y		Y	Y
SRAM3 AHB Interface		Y		Y	Y		Y	Y
CryptoCell code APB	Y		Y				Y	
CryptoCell configuration APB		Y		Y			Y	Y
Cordio LCI AHB		Y		Y			Y	Y
All other system control and peripherals		Y		Y			Y	Y

Note

Paths to CryptoCell only exist if the associated Cryptocell Element exists.

2.5.4 SRAM

This section describes the SRAM-related features of the base element.

Memory protection controller

Security for the SRAM regions is controlled by the MPCs in the base element.

One *Memory Protection Controller* (MPC) is included on the path to each SRAM block so that accesses can be blocked when a security violation occurs.

Each SRAM block is implemented within an SRAM element. Each MPC APB configuration interface is mapped to the following base addresses:

- 0x5008_3000 for SRAM Bank 0.
- 0x5008_4000 for SRAM Bank 1.
- 0x5008_5000 for SRAM Bank 2.
- 0x5008_6000 for SRAM Bank 3.

The `cfg_init_value` of each MPC is tied to 0 so that at boot, the SRAM is Secure only. Software must change or restore the settings in the MPC to release memory for Non-secure world use.

The `BLK_SIZE` configuration of each MPC, which defines the MPC block size is defined by the top level parameter `SRAM_MPC_BLK_SIZE`. This is set at a default value of 3 to select 256 byte blocks.

The **GATE_PRESENT** configuration signal of each MPC is tied to 0 to disable the MPC gating feature.

All SRAM MPCs reside in the PD_SYS power domain and are reset by **nWARMRESETSYS**.

See [SRAM element on page 3-57](#) and [SRAM elements on page 2-32](#).

Tightly-Coupled Memory

The AHB5 fabric is designed to keep an SRAM element, SRAM Bank 3, close to the secondary core, and to have both run at a higher clock speed. This allows the SRAM to function as *Tightly-Coupled Memory* (TCM) on the secondary processor data bus.

2.5.5 AHB5 TrustZone peripheral protection controllers

The peripheral protection controller gates transactions to peripherals based on whether or not there is a security violation. The Base element contains a single APB *Peripheral Protection Controller* (PPC) and a single AHB PPC. These PPCs do not have their own software accessible programming interface. Instead, control of this PPC resides in the Secure Privilege Control Block and Non-secure Privilege Control Block. See [Security Privilege Control Block on page 3-35](#) and [Non-secure Privilege Control Block on page 3-51](#).

See the *ARM® CoreLink™ SIE-200 System IP for Embedded Technical Reference Manual*.

2.5.6 Message handling unit

Two *Message Handling Units* (MHU) allow software to raise interrupts to the CPU cores.

See [Message handling unit on page 3-32](#),

2.5.7 Timers and watchdogs

This sections describes the timers and watchdogs in the Base element.

CMSDK APB Timers

The SSE-200 includes two instances of the CMSDK APB timers:

- CMSDK TIMER 0 in Non-secure region at 0x4000_0000 and in Secure region at 0x5000_0000.
- CMSDK TIMER 1 in Non-secure region at 0x4000_1000 and in Secure region at 0x5000_1000.

See the *ARM® Cortex®-M System Design Kit Technical Reference Manual*.

Dual Timer

The CMSDK APB dual-input timer consists of two programmable 32-bit down-counters that can generate interrupts when they reach zero. The operation of each timer module is identical.

The Base element contains one APB dual-input timer which is located in Non-secure region at 0x4000_2000 and in Secure region at 0x5000_2000.

See the *ARM® Cortex®-M System Design Kit Technical Reference Manual*.

Watchdog timers

The base element instantiates two APB watchdog timers connected to the internal APB bus

Each watchdog is permanently mapped to either a secure or a non-secure region of address space:

- Non-secure CMSDK Watchdog in the Non-secure region at 0x4008_1000.
The Non-secure Watchdog can raise an interrupt to both CPU cores. On a watchdog reset request event, a separate interrupt is raised but software can choose to allow it to directly reset the system.
- Secure CMSDK Watchdog in the Secure region at 0x5008_1000.
The Secure watchdog can raise a Non-Maskable Interrupt (NMI) to both CPU cores. In this case, a watchdog reset event resets the entire system.

See the *ARM® Cortex®-M System Design Kit Technical Reference Manual*.

All timers are aliased onto Secure and Non-secure regions and the Base element APB Peripherals Protection Controller controls the region that each timer actually resides in. Each timer is able to raise a common interrupt to both CPU cores. All timers and watchdog can be halted using CTI triggers from the debug subsystem.

2.5.8 Expansion ports

See also [AHB expansion bus signals on page A-10](#).

AHB slave expansion interfaces

Two expansion AMBA AHB5 slave interfaces are provided to allow the system integrator to add additional bus masters to the system. These interfaces are:

- AHB5 slave expansion 0 interface.
- AHB5 slave expansion 1 interface.

The SSE-200 also provides an AHB5 master expansion code interface. This master interface is provided primarily to provide access to code memory.

Each of these interfaces supports the following features:

- 32-bit address.
- 32-bit data width.
- TrustZone-ARMv8M security support, with **HNONSEC** signal.
- **HPROT** signal indicates the access property, including if the access is privileged.
- Exclusive access support to SRAM memory.

AHB5 slave expansion 0 interface can access the entire system memory map. The AHB5 slave expansion 1 interface can access the entire system memory map but it cannot access the AHB5 master expansion code interface.

AHB master expansion interfaces

Two expansion AMBA AHB5 master interfaces are provided to allow the system integrator to add additional slave peripherals to the system. These interfaces are:

- AHB5 master expansion 0 interface.
- AHB5 master expansion 1 interface.

The SSE-200 also provides an AHB5 master expansion code interface. This master interface is provided primarily to provide access to code memory.

Each of these interfaces supports the following features:

- 32-bit address bus for both AHB5 Master Expansion 0 and AHB5 Master Expansion 1 interfaces, with each access providing the full 32bit address.
29-bit address bus for the AHB5 Master Expansion Code interface.
- 32-bit data width.
- TrustZone Security support, with the inclusion of **HNONSEC** and **HPROT** signals.
- Exclusive access support. However, for exclusive accesses to function correctly, the slave memory device in the expansion system that supports exclusive accesses must implement exclusive access monitoring.

———— Note ————

In the expansion system, ARM expects the system integrator to insert a *Memory Protection Controller* (MPC) on the path to code memory, on the AHB5 Master Expansion Code Interface. The MPC provides security access gating, for the aliased memory region that this interface supports.

2.5.9 Security controller

The Security Controller contains the Secure Privilege Control Register Block and the Non-Secure Privilege Register Block. These implement program-visible states that allow software to control security gating units within the design. The block provides additional expansion security control signals to support additional security gating units in the expansion logic.

See [Security Privilege Control Block on page 3-35](#).

2.5.10 Power control

See [Power control infrastructure on page 2-43](#).

2.6 SRAM elements

This section describes the power-control features. It contains the following subsections:

- [Overview](#).
- [SRAM banks](#).
- [AHB5 Exclusive Access Monitor](#).

2.6.1 Overview

The SSE-200 supports 4 SRAM elements. Each SRAM element has the following features:

- One bank of single port SRAM.
- Zero clock cycle latency.
- ON/OFF/MEM_RET power policy support.
- Exclusive access support.

A Memory Protection Controller in the base element manages secure access. See [Memory protection controller on page 2-29](#).

2.6.2 SRAM banks

There are up to four banks of contiguous SRAM. Each SRAM has the following features:

- Configurable 8KB, 16KB, 32KB, or 64KB.
- Exclusive Access Monitor (EAM).
- Independent memory power control.

The last bank of SRAM is the *Data Tightly Coupled Memory* (DTCM) that provides high throughput because it runs at the same speed as secondary core.

Note

Each SRAM element has a Memory Protection Controller associated with it and is implemented within the Base element.

2.6.3 AHB5 Exclusive Access Monitor

The EAM monitors access to slaves downstream of it. The component implements the EAM feature described in the AHB5 specification.

See the *ARM® CoreLink™ SIE-200 System IP for Embedded Technical Reference Manual*.

2.7 System control element

The system control element provides the following features:

- System Information Register Block.
- System Control Register Block.
- Always ON Watchdog. This CMSDK Watchdog timer runs on **S32KCLK**.
- Always ON Timer. This CMSDK timer runs on **S32KCLK**.
- Power Policy Units for power domain control.

2.7.1 System Information Register Block

The System Information Register Block provides information on the system configuration and identity. See [System information registers on page 3-59](#) for information about the registers that this block implements.

2.7.2 System Control Register Block

The System Control Register Block implements registers for power, clocks, resets and other general system control. See [System Control Register block on page 3-62](#) for information about the registers that this block implements.

2.7.3 Timers and watchdogs

The SSE-200 implements a single CMSDK Timer and a single CMSDK Watchdog that runs of **S32KCLK**.

The timers are aliased onto Secure and Non-secure regions. The System Control element APB Peripherals Protection Controller controls the region that each timer resides in. The timer can raise an interrupt to both processor cores and the watchdog timer can raise a Non-Maskable Interrupt to both processor cores. When the watchdog reset event occurs, it resets the entire system. See [Resets on page 2-11](#).

The timer and watchdog can be halted using CTI triggers from the debug subsystem. See [Debug element on page 2-35](#).

2.7.4 Peripheral Protection Controller

The System Control element contains a single APB *Peripheral Protection Controller* (PPC). This PPC does not have its own software accessible programming interface. Instead control of this PPC resides in the Secure Privilege Control Block and Non-Secure Privilege Control Block. See [Security Privilege Control Block on page 3-35](#) and [Non-secure Privilege Control Block on page 3-51](#).

2.7.5 Power Policy Units

The System Control element also provides access to *Power Policy Units* (PPUs) that are used to control power domains in the system. All PPU reside in the always on power domain, PD_AON, and are reset by **nPORESETAON**.

The following table lists the configuration of all PPUs in the system. Note the M is 0 for CPU 0 and 1 for CPU 1 if it exist, and N is 0 to the number of SRAM Banks minus 1.

Table 2-8 Power Policy Units configurations

PPU configuration	PD_SYS	PD_CPU <M>CORE	PD_CPU <M>DBG ^a	PD_DEBUG	PD_SRAM<N>	PD_CRYPTO
PPU name	SYS_PPU	CPU<M>_PPU	CPU<M>DBG_PPU	DEBUG_PPU	RAM<N>_PPU	CRYPTO_PPU
Device interface type	P-Channel	P-Channel	Q-Channel	Q-Channel	Q-Channel	Q-Channel
Default Power Policy (DEF_PWR_POLICY)	ON	OFF ^b	OFF	ON	ON	ON
Default Power mode dynamic transition enable (DEF_PWR_DYN_EN)	OFF	ON	ON	OFF	OFF	OFF
Dynamic support	ON, FULL_RET ^c , OFF	ON, FULL_RET ^c , WARM_RST, OFF	ON, OFF	ON, OFF	ON, MEM_RET OFF	-
Static support	ON, FULL_RET ^d , WARM_RST ^d , OFF ^d	ON ^d , FULL_RET ^d , WARM_RST ^d , OFF ^d	ON, OFF ^d	ON, WARM_RST ^d , OFF ^d	ON, MEM_RST ^d , WARM_RST ^d , OFF ^d	ON, WARM_RST ^d , OFF
PWR_MODE_ENTRY_DEL_CFG				0		
SW_DEV_DEL_CFG				0		
LOCK_CFG				0		
MEM_RET_RAM_REG_CFG				0		
FULL_RET_RAM_REG_CFG				0		
FUNC_RET_RAM_REG_CFG				0		
STA_POLICY_PWR_IRQ_CFG				0		
STA_POLICY_OP_IRQ_CFG				0		
Operating Mode support				None		

- If separate CPU debug power domain is not present, then this column is invalid. Instead for each core the PD_CPU<M>DBG power domain is merged into the PD_CPU<M>CORE power domain and controlled as if it is just a PD_CPU<M>CORE power domain.
- While the default dynamic power mode of these PPU is set to OFF, at powerup reset, **nSRST** reset, watchdog resets, reset request on **RESETREQ** input or reset caused by a register write to SWRESET, the SSE-200 requests for the CPU to powerup depending on the CPUWAIT register values. AIRCR.SYSRESETREQ based reset request does not depend on CPUWAIT. See [System boot when powering up on page 2-48](#) for more information.
- Logic Retention support for both the PD_SYS and PD_CPU<M>CORE are configuration options. If Logic Retention is not supported then the Dynamic Support and Static Support for FULL_RET does not exist.
- The PPU must not be programmed to use static power state because they can cause system deadlocks. And any attempt to write to the PPU_PWPR.OP_DYN_EN register to change to static power mode for each PPU results in a bus error being returned and the write being blocked.

2.8 Debug element

This section describes the Debug element. It contains the following subsections:

- *Overview.*
- *Debug access* on page 2-36.
- *Timestamps* on page 2-39.
- *Cross trigger* on page 2-40.
- *CoreSight debug ROM tables* on page 2-41.

2.8.1 Overview

The following figure shows a block diagram of the Debug element.




Figure 2-6 Debug element block diagram

The Debug element provides the following features and interfaces:

- Single *Debug Access Port* (DAP) shared between both processors and other system level debug logic.

- Combining all trace sources within the system to a single shared ATB trace output to support a single TPIU trace output.
- CTM and CTI.
- Timestamp distribution from expansion logic to the debug logic of both processors.
- Granular Power Requester to allow the debugger to selectively request parts of the SSE-200 to turn on.

In [Figure 2-6 on page 2-35](#), the example debug expansion logic shows a SWJ-DP being used. The SWJ-DP is a combined JTAG-DP and SW-DP that enables you to connect either an SWD or JTAG probe to a target. It is a standard CoreSight debug port.

The expansion example also shows the use of a single TPIU to bridge the ATB output to a trace output. The debug logic also provides an APB interface to allow the external debug logic to be controlled through the single DAP interface.

Note

The default example implementation reuses the TPIU and SWJ/DP from the CPU package. This configuration is sufficient for basic use.

For more sophisticated multi-processor debug solution, a full CoreSight SoC IP solution can be licensed and implemented. If the CoreSight SoC option is selected, the TPIU and SWJ/DP blocks and corresponding interface signals are not present.

See also [Debug and Trace signals on page A-13](#).

2.8.2 Debug access

The Debug element provides a DAP Bus input that connects to the following independent APs:

- AHB-AP for CPU 0 debug access and certificate access.
- AHB-AP for CPU 1 debug access.
- APB-AP for System debug access.

An external DAP, such as the JTAG DAP for example, in the expansion subsystem is required to drive the Debug Access Interface.

CPU Debug Access

To provide Debug access to each CPU core, An AHB-AP is provided along with a single bit *Granular Power Requester* (GPR) to allow the debugger to request the CPU core to power up. A Debug ROM is also provided to point to both the internal Debug ROM and the GPR of the CPU. The GPR power request handshake signal will connect to all PPU's in each CPU element to allow debugger to request the CPU to power up.

The AHB-AP, for each CPU, is always accessible regardless of the debug authentication settings. It is the Cortex-M33 core that performs the task of gating access depending on the debug authentication signals settings.

System Debug Access

All other debug logic in the Debug element is accessed by an APB-AP. Access is controlled by the **NIDEN** debug authentication signal to determine if debug is allowed. Connected to the APB Debug are:

- System Debug ROM that describes all debug components in the Debug element accessible from this APB-AP. This includes a pointer to an external Expansion debug ROM at address location 0xF008_0000.
- A Trace Funnel
- A Trace FIFO
- A Cross Trigger Interface that support trigger to and from:
 - The Trace FIFO
 - Timers and Watchdogs in the system to implement halt on trigger.
- The Debug APN Expansion Interface allows customers to add additional Debug components to the system.

A *Cross trigger Matrix* (CTM) is included in the Debug element so that all CTIs, including those in the CPU cores and in the expansion subsystem, can trigger each other.

Timestamp must be provided from the expansion subsystem so that it can be used with other trace sources outside the subsystem.

Certificate Access

The Debug element provides an access path from the Debug AHB Access Interface to enable it to write to an 8KB window at address location 0x3000_0000 to 0x3000_1FFF at initial system boot. This is a write-only path by default after power-on reset. Read access to the same 8KB window can be enabled using a control register bit CERTREADEN. The CERTDISABLE control register can disable this access port, and therefore disabling access to this window.

This certification access piggybacks onto the CPU 0 AHB-AP. Prior to using the certificate path, the CPU 0 must first be powered up using the CPU 0 GPR controls which indirectly also wake the base element.

This allows a debugger to deposit a debug certificate or a request for data into the memory location at boot while the CPU is held off from booting by holding the **nSRST** reset input. If **nSRST** is not supported by the debugger, the firmware can add debugger wait cycles to allow the debug software to write the SOC ID request to memory prior to boot, and also provides time to write in the certificate.

When the CPU is allowed to boot, the secure boot code can then check if the content in memory is a certificate or a request:

- If it is a request for information, the secure boot code can write the requested data into the SRAM WINDOW before enabling read access for the debugger to the window by using CERTREADEN.
- If the content is a certificate, after the certificate is checked, the CPU can setting CERTDISABLE to disable access from the debugger to this window. After CERTDISABLE is asserted, the CPU must check that the corresponding CERTDISABLED output is also HIGH, which indicates that the window is now closed, before continuing with the boot process.

For a system that already has debug authentication signals all tied LOW by default, or with fuses, can override the debug authentication settings using the payload in a valid certificate to re-enable debug or Secure debug.

To generate the certificate, it might be necessary to use the read capability of the path to request information about the system. The following rules must be followed if using the certification path:

- When the CPU core 0 wakes, if the content of the SRAM window is a certificate, before it can proceed with any certification check or continue with the boot process, it must close the certification path by writing to the CERTDISABLE register and wait for the CERTDISABLED status to go HIGH.
- PD_SYS, PD_CPU0CORE, and PD_SRAM0 must remain in the ON state prior to assertion of CERTDISABLED. This means that CPU0 must not enter WFI and DEEPSLEEP state.
- If a certification check is performed after closing the window, the CPU must wipe the certificate 8 KB window in SRAM before allowing software to execute from the SRAM window.
- Before enabling read access, the content of the SRAM window must be wiped before it is used.
- When using the certificate window, the secure firmware or the debugger must not request a system reset from any CPU AIRCR register.

Once CERTDISABLE is set HIGH, it is not possible to later re-enable the certification path except through the use of powerup reset or **nSRST**.

The following example sequence lists events that a debugger can use to request for identity information from the subsystem:

- 1- The SoC is reset by nSRST being pulled low, and nSRST is held low to prevent the CPU cores from booting
- 2- The debugger writes a pattern into the SRAM carve out to request for information to be returned, which can be a request for this SoC ID. (secure write is needed!!!)
- 3- nSRST is de-asserted, allowing the CPU to boot.
- 4- The CPU boot code checks the SRAM carve out window, discovers the request
- 5- The CPU wipes the content of SRAM Carve-out window to all zeros.
- 6- The CPU writes the System or SoC identity data into the window followed by a flag to indicate that the data is ready,
- 7- The CPU writes control register (CERTREADEN) to enable SRAM window read access.
- 8 - The CPU then enters an infinite loop or WFI with interrupts disabled. This essentially halts the CPU.
- 9- The debugger polls the SRAM carve out area until the flag is set and then reads the identity data from SRAM.

The following example sequence list events that a debugger can use to request the identity information from the subsystem:

1. The SoC is reset by pulling **nSRST** LOW, and **nSRST** is held LOW to prevent the processor cores from booting.
2. The debugger writes a pattern into the SRAM carve out to request for information to be returned, which can be a request for this SoC ID. A Secure write is required.
3. **nSRST** is deasserted, allowing the processor to boot.
4. The processor boot code checks the SRAM carve out window, and discovers the request.
5. The processor wipes the content of SRAM Carve-out window to all zeros.
6. The processor writes the System or SoC identity data into the window followed by a flag to indicate that the data is ready,
7. The processor write control register (CERTREADEN) to enable SRAM window read access.
8. The processor then enters an infinite loop or WFI with interrupts disabled. This essentially halts the processor.
9. The debugger polls the SRAM carve out area until the flag is set and then reads the identity data from SRAM.

Note

This approach is designed primarily for certificate insertion or communication during and right after the assertion of **nSRST**. It is not designed to provide a mechanism for the debugger to do the same after boot or during normal execution.

Debug element clock and power control

The Debug element is primarily running on **DEBUGSYSCLK**, except for the ATB Trace bus, which uses the faster clock, **DEBUGFCLK**. After the Debug element is turned on, **DEBUGSYSCLK** and **DEBUGFCLK** are expected to start running.

The Debug element contains a Power Policy Unit that oversees the sequencing of clock, resets, and power control. The PPU can be forced by Software to turn ON or OFF the debug element. However, the main intended use will be to configure the PPU to support Dynamic transition between ON and OFF depending on PD_DEBUG Power Q-Channel interface. This interface is expected to be used by the external Debug Access Port (DAP) to request for power to turn on, and also for the expansion system to ensure that power is only removed when the expansion subsystem is ready for power down.

After the Debug subsystem is powered up and running, the Granular Power Requesters in the debug power domain can be used to wake each CPU core. Waking a CPU core indirectly also wakes the base element power domain.

2.8.3 Timestamps

The SSE-200 provides a single timestamp input, **TSVALUEB[63:0]**, that is used by any debug logic in the subsystem that requires a timestamp. The timestamp input is 64-bits wide and is synchronous to **DEBUGSYSCLK** and therefore synchronous also to **SYSCLK**.

The part of the subsystem on the potentially faster **FCLK** also uses this timestamp for Trace generation without interpolators to increase the granularity of the timestamp. Therefore as **FCLK** to **SYSCLK** ratio increase, especially beyond 10:1, the timestamp granularity is degraded which reduces the ability to accurately determine traced events timings between the two clock domains.

2.8.4 Cross trigger

The Debug element implements a Cross Trigger Matrix (CTM) and a single Cross Trigger Interface (CTI) Block.

These allow timers and watchdog timers in the SSE-200 subsystem to be halted and restarted using trigger sources from any of the cores and also from trigger sources external to the subsystem from the Cross Trigger Channel Interface. The following table shows the interconnections between the Cross Trigger inputs and outputs of the CTI Block:

Table 2-9 Cross trigger interconnections

Timer	Timer address	Timer halt CTI trigger signal	Timer restart CTI trigger signal
TIMER 0	0x4000_0000, 0x5000_0000	CTITRIGOUT[0]	CTITRIGOUT[1]
TIMER 1	0x4000_1000, 0x5000_1000	CTITRIGOUT[0]	CTITRIGOUT[1]
DUAL TIMER	0x4000_2000, 0x5000_2000	CTITRIGOUT[0]	CTITRIGOUT[1]
NON-SECURE WATCHDOG	0x4008_1000	CTITRIGOUT[0]	CTITRIGOUT[1]
SECURE WATCHDOG	0x5008_1000	CTITRIGOUT[0]	CTITRIGOUT[1]
S32KTIMER	0x4002_F000, 0x5002_F000	CTITRIGOUT[2]	CTITRIGOUT[3]
S32KWATCHDOG	0x5002_E000	CTITRIGOUT[2]	CTITRIGOUT[3]

The SSE-200 subsystem expects the use of handshake pulse triggers for halting and restarting timers:

- When halting timers, no trigger acknowledgment is returned. Therefore, the timer halt trigger signals **CTITRIGOUT[0]** or **CTITRIGOUT[2]** remain HIGH and must be cleared individually by writing to the CTIINTACK register.
- When restarting timers using **CTITRIGOUT[1]** or **CTITRIGOUT[3]**, trigger acknowledgement will be returned on their respective trigger acknowledgement signals **CTITRIGOUTACK[1]** or **CTITRIGOUTACK[3]**.

All **TODBGENSELCTI** signals of the CTI block are tied to LOW. Therefore when LOW, the debug authentication signal **DBGEN** masks these triggers. This disables the ability of the CTI to halt and restart timers and watchdog timers.

All **TINIDENSELCTI** signals of the CTI blocks are also tied LOW. Therefore when LOW, the debug authentication signal **NIDEN** masks all triggers inputs of the CTI block.

2.8.5 CoreSight debug ROM tables

There are three CoreSight ROM tables implemented within the SSE-200 subsystem in addition to those in the processor core.

Debug system CoreSight ROM table

The debug system CoreSight ROM is only accessible from the debug system Access APB-AP. It is located at address 0xF000_0000.

The following table lists the contents of the ROM table. The PID values are dependent on the value of the **TARGETIDSYS[31:0]** static configuration signal, which by default is set to 0x0743_0477.

Table 2-10 Debug system ROM table

Address offset	Value	Description
0x000	0x0000_1003	Entry points to the debug element trace funnel.
0x004	0x0000_2003	Entry points to the debug element CTI.
0x008	0x0008_0003	Entry points to an external ROM on the APB expansion region.
0x00C-0xE FC	0x0000_0000	Unused ROM entries.
0xF00-0xF C8	0x0000_0000	Reserved.
0xFCC	0x0000_0000	MEMTYPE register.
0xFD0	0x0000_0004	Peripheral ID, PIDR4. PIDR4[3:0] is the JEP106 continuation code, which is set by TARGETIDSYS[11:8] .
0xFD4	0x0000_0000	Peripheral ID, PIDR5
0xFD8	0x0000_0000	Peripheral ID, PIDR6
0xFDC	0x0000_0000	Peripheral ID, PIDR7
0xFE0	0x0000_0043	Peripheral ID, PIDR0. PIDR0[7:0] is the Part Number bits [7:0], which is set by TARGETIDSYS[23:16] .
0xFE4	0x0000_00B7	Peripheral ID, PIDR1. PIDR1[3:0] is the Part Number [11:8], which is set by TARGETIDSYS[27:24] . PIDR1[7:4] is the JEP106 Identity Code [3:0], which is set by TARGETIDSYS[4:1] .
0xFE8	0x0000_000B	Peripheral ID, PIDR2. PIDR2[2:0], is the JEP106 Identity Code [6:4], which is set by TARGETIDSYS[7:5] . PIDR2[3] is the JEDEC identifier. PIDR2[7:4] is the Revision Code, which is set by TARGETIDSYS[31:28] .
0xFEC	0x0000_0000	Peripheral ID, PIDR3
0xFF0	0x0000_000D	Component ID, CID0
0xFF4	0x0000_0010	Component ID, CID1
0xFF8	0x0000_0005	Component ID, CID2
0xFFC	0x0000_00B1	Component ID, CID3

CPU access CoreSight ROM table

There up to two CPU System CoreSight ROMs, one for each CPU. Each ROM is accessible through its associated CPU Access APB-AP. It is located at address 0xF000_8000.

The following table lists the contents of the ROM table.

Table 2-11 CPU access ROM table

Address offset	Value	Description
0x000	0x0000_1003	Entry points to the Granular Power Controller.
0x004	0x0000_2003	Entry points to the internal ROM table for the CPU.
0x008-0xEFC	0x0000_0000	Unused ROM entries.
0xF00-0xFC8	0x0000_0000	Reserved.
0x00C	0x0000_0000	Unused ROM entries.
0xFCC	0x0000_0000	MEMTYPE register.
0xFD0	0x0000_0004	Peripheral ID, PIDR4
0xFD4	0x0000_0000	Reserved.
0xFD8	0x0000_0000	Reserved.
0xFDC	0x0000_0000	Reserved.
0xFE0	0x0000_0043	Peripheral ID, PIDR0
0xFE4	0x0000_00B7	Peripheral ID, PIDR1
0xFE8	0x0000_000B	Peripheral ID, PIDR2
0xFEC	0x0000_0000	Peripheral ID, PIDR3
0xFF0	0x0000_000D	Component ID, CID0
0xFF4	0x0000_0010	Component ID, CID1
0xFF8	0x0000_0005	Component ID, CID2
0xFFC	0x0000_00B1	Component ID, CID3

2.9 Power control infrastructure

This section describes the power-control features. It contains the following subsections:

- [Overview](#).
- [Power domains and PPUs on page 2-45](#).
- [CPU power domains on page 2-47](#).
- [System boot when powering up on page 2-48](#).
- [External wakeup controllers on page 2-48](#).
- [Power Dependency Control Matrix on page 2-49](#).
- [System and CPU power states on page 2-50](#).
- [Entering lower CPU power states on page 2-52](#).
- [Hibernation on page 2-52](#).
- [Wake From Hibernation using PD_SYS power control Q-Channel interface on page 2-53](#).

2.9.1 Overview

Low-power operation is essential for IoT endpoint devices which might rely on a battery or on harvested energy. SSE-200 uses two key methods to reduce the overall power of the system:

- Dynamic hierarchical clock control to reduce dynamic power. See [Clocks on page 2-5](#).
- Multiple power gated regions in the design to reduce leakage power.

Each power domain contains a *Power Integration Kit* (PIK) that performs the following:

- Integrates a *Power Policy Unit* (PPU) that provides technology-independent power control of the domain.
- Integrates Q-Channel and P-Channel infrastructure components to bring together the quiescent status and control of key IP blocks within the power domain to the PPU.

The PIK of each domain is primarily designed to deal with the power control of its associated power domain. However, some power domains need to be aware of the power state of other power domains, to maintain the correct operation of the system. The *Power Dependency Control Matrix* (PDCM) enables configuring the relationship between each power domain.

The following figure shows the power control infrastructure of SSE_200, containing multiple power domains, each with its associated PIK and how they are connected to the PDCM.




Figure 2-7 Power Dependency Control Matrix

For power-management signals, see [Clock, reset, and power control signals](#) on page A-3.

SSE-200 subsystem defines the following power domains:

- PD_SYS, system power domain.
- PD_DEBUG, debug power domain.
- PD_SRAM<N>, SRAM macros power domains.
- PD_CPU0CORE, CPU 0 core power domain.
- PD_CPU1CORE, CPU 1 core power domain (if CPU 1 is present).
- PD_CPU0DBG, CPU 0 debug power domain.

- PD_CPU1DBG, CPU 1 debug power domain (if CPU 1 is present).
- PD_CRYPT0. CryptoCell power domain (if CryptoCell is present).
- PD_CORDIO. Cordio power domain (if Cordio is present).
The Cordio LLC directly controls an always-on domain, a single power gated logic domain, and other SRAM and RAM power domains within the PD_CORDIO domain.
- PD_AON, which is the AON domain.
Anything that is not in the other domains, is in the PD_AON power domain

If a separate CPU debug power domain is not supported, then PD_CPU0DBG and PD_CPU0CORE power domain are merged into PD_CPU0CORE, and PD_CPU1DBG and PD_CPU1CORE power domain are merged into PD_CPU0CORE.

The following figure shows how the power domains map onto the elements.




Figure 2-8 SSE-200 power domains

2.9.2 Power domains and PPU

PPUs control all power domains in the SSE-200, except for the always on PD_AON and PD_CORDIO domains.

Each PPU uses the following control signals to power the domain up or down:

- All power Q-Channel interfaces from within the power domain.
- Access Control Gates ACG access request into power domain.
- All other power dependency controls that are configured by the Power Dependency Control Matrix (PDCM) Register Settings.
- Debug system power-up requests for the domain if they exist.

The PPU allows software to do the following:

- Perform static power control. For example, turning the power domain permanently on or off, or putting the domain into a retention state.

———— **Caution** ————

If software sets any key power domains, such as for example, PD_CPU0_CORE, or PD_SYS, to OFF or to retention, the system might not be able to power up, boot, or execute code. This can cause a system lockup, so avoid using static power control except for PD_CRYPT0 domain.

- Enable or disable dynamic power transitions and set a minimum power state. It supports a subset of the following transitions:
 - ON to OFF
 - OFF to ON
 - ON to RET (Memory only or Full Retention depending on the requirements of each domain)
 - RET to ON
 - ON to WARM Reset
 - WARM Reset back to ON.

Each PPU therefore uses a Q-Channel or P-Channel interface to:

- Determine if it can bring the power domain to a required static power mode programmed by software.
- If dynamic power transition is enabled, determine if the power domain must transition to a different power state.

In addition to internal Q-Channel and P-Channel, some power domains are able to perform power transition to ON using requests from the following:

- The ACG at the boundary of the power domain when an access request arrives at the boundary of the domain.
- The GPR in the debug element to power up.
- One of the external wakeup controllers.
- One of the power control Q-Channel expansion interface signals.

The following table lists the types of request that can wake each domain.

Table 2-12 Domains and wake-up requests

Power domain	Access Control Gate	GPR or DAP	EWC	Q-Channel expansion
PD_SYS	No	Yes. CPU0 GPR or CPU1 GPR.	Yes. CPU0 EWC or CPU1 EWC.	Yes
PD_CPU0DBG	No	Yes. CPU0 GPR.	Yes. CPU0 EWC.	No
PD_CPU0CORE	No	Yes. CPU0 GPR.	Yes. CPU0 EWC.	No
PD_CPU1DBG	No	Yes. CPU1 GPR	Yes. CPU0 EWC.	No
PD_CPU1CORE	No	Yes. CPU1 GPR.	Yes. CPU0 EWC.	No
PD_DEBUG	No	Yes. DAP	No	Yes
PD_SRAM0	Yes	No	No	No
PD_SRAM1	Yes	No	No	No
PD_SRAM2	Yes	No	No	No
PD_SRAM3	Yes	No	No	No
PD_CRYPT0	No	No	No	No

Note

- PD_CRYPT0 only supports static power control.
- Although wake up of PD_SYS from OFF is supported using the PD_SYS Power Control Q-Channel interface, ARM recommends that you must use an IRQ to wake the system, especially if external ACGs use **ACG_WAIT**. If the processor is not woken by an interrupt, and there are no other masters able to clear the ACG_WAIT registers to unblock access into the system, this can potentially cause the system to deadlock. Interrupts are not required for wake from Retention.
- PD_CPU0DBG and PD_CPU1DBG power domains do not exist if there is no support for separate CPU debug power domain.

2.9.3 CPU power domains

Each Cortex-M33 processor in the system can have either:

- A single power domain, PD_CPU<N>CORE, that gates both the core and the debug logic of the processor.
- Two power domains, with PD_CPU<N>CORE that gates the core, and a separate debug logic power domain, PD_CPU<N>DBG.

The Cortex-M33 core internally controls, by its Q-Channel, the power state relationship between different power domains of the core. As a result, if the SSE-200 supports a separate processor debug power domain, then whenever PD_CPU<N>DBG power domain is ON, it requests its Q-Channel interface to turn PD_CPU<N>CORE ON. If a separate processor debug power domain is not supported, then both debug and core exist in one power domain, so that any attempt to wake the debug logic also wakes the core, and any attempt to wake the core also wakes the debug logic.

2.9.4 System boot when powering up

The power mode of the PPU, along with its integration, ensures that the following domains can power up immediately after power-on reset:

- PD_CPU0CORE.
- PD_CPU1CORE.
- PD_SYS.
- PD_CRYPTO.
- PD_SRAM0 to PD_SRAM3.

The automatic powering up of PD_CPU0CORE and PD_CPU1CORE is also dependent on the settings of the CPU0_WAIT and CPU1_WAIT respectively in CPUWAIT register:

- If a bit in CPUWAIT is set to HIGH, out of Power ON reset, **nSRST** reset, Watchdog reset, RESETREQ based reset, or a request done from the SWRESET register, the associated CPU will not power up.
This allows you to control which of the processors power up after any of these reset conditions.
- The use of the CPUWAIT register to control powering up is in addition to the other functionality of CPUWAIT, which is to delay the boot of each associated processor after powering up or reset.
- The reset values of CPU0_WAIT and CPU1_WAIT is set by the parameters CPU0WAIT_RST and CPU1WAIT_RST respectively.

AIRCR.SYSRESETREQ based reset requests do not depend on CPUWAIT.

After a core has been powered up and powered down, without reapplying a reset that depends on the settings in CPUWAIT, the CPUWAIT register is not involved in delaying the power up of the cores.

2.9.5 External wakeup controllers

Each Cortex-M33 core in SSE-200 subsystem is configured to have a Wakeup Interrupt Controller (WIC). These WICs:

- Allow each Cortex-M33, during DEEPSLEEP, to go into a lower power mode, where the core and the NVIC clocks are turned off and optionally placed into Retention.
- Store the interrupt masks from the NVIC in the WIC, holding any outstanding interrupts.
- Raise a request to wake the core if the masks allow it.

This WIC however does not support waking the Cortex-M33 core if power to the core and the NVIC are turned OFF.

To support waking the Cortex-M33 cores from an OFF state, SSE-200 subsystem implements an External Wakeup Controller (EWC) for each CPU core. The EWC uses the interrupt mask already stored in the WIC, and holds any pulse-type interrupts on behalf of the WIC and NVIC when the CPU clocks are OFF. It also wakes the CPU if the masks allow it.

Before allowing a processor to move to the OFF state, with the intention to use interrupts to wake it later, you must:

1. Enable its associated WIC using the WICCTRL register.

2. Use the EWCTRL register to enable its associated EWC.
3. After the processor re-awakes and has boot to a point to be able to handle interrupts, the associated EWC<N>EN_CLR must then be used to clear the EWC.

Note

- If a processor is powered down without enabling its associated EWC, the processor cannot be powered up by interrupts. To force a processor in this state to power up, you must either:
 - Write to the PPU and set its power policy register to ON.
 - Use the external debugger to wake the processor with the associated GPR.
 This feature allows you to more permanently leave the secondary core powered off, but still allows you to bring the secondary core back into use if required later.
 - The EWC does not deal with the event interface and therefore does not support waking the core from an OFF state using events.
 - If any EWC wakes its associated CPU, it also wakes the main system (PD_SYS).
-

2.9.6 Power Dependency Control Matrix

The SSE-200 subsystem defines a control matrix that allows the power mode (ON state) of one domain to affect another power domain.

Table 2-13 shows how this matrix is structured.

Table 2-13 PDCM structure

Domain	PD_SYS	PD_SRAM0	PD_SRAM1	PD_SRAM2	PD_SRAM3
PD_SYS PPUHWSTATE_ON	Conf	Conf	Conf	Conf	Conf
PD_CPU0CORE PPUHWSTATE_ON	Yes	Conf	Conf	Conf	Conf
PD_CPU1CORE PPUHWSTATE_ON	Yes	Conf	Conf	Conf	Conf
PD_SRAM0 PPUHWSTATE_ON	Yes	Conf	-	-	-
PD_SRAM1 PPUHWSTATE_ON	Yes	-	Conf	-	-
PD_SRAM2 PPUHWSTATE_ON	Yes	-	-	Conf	-
PD_SRAM3 PPUHWSTATE_ON	Yes	-	-	-	Conf
PD_CRYPT0 PPUHWSTATE_ON	Yes	-	-	-	-
PDEXP0	Conf	Conf	Conf	Conf	Conf
PDEXP1	Conf	Conf	Conf	Conf	Conf
PDEXP2	Conf	Conf	Conf	Conf	Conf
PDEXP3	Conf	Conf	Conf	Conf	Conf

The left column of the table lists the power dependency inputs while the heading row lists the power domains that are being controlled. The power dependency inputs are either:

- The ON state of each power domain in the system

- Expansion power control dependency signals, **PDEXP0** to **PDEXP3**, that are driven by expansion logic outside the subsystem indicating the ON state of external power domains.

If a power domain is sensitive to a dependency input, after the controlled power domain is ON, the power domain remains ON while any of the dependency inputs is ON or true. Therefore the PDCM is used primarily to define when a power domain should not enter a lower power state. It is not designed to support powering up of any power domain.

The power control matrix interactions have the following features:

- For the PD_SYS power domain:
 - It can be requested to turn ON either by any GPR, by any EWC or by its associated Power Q-Channel Interface. PD_SYS is will remain ON when any of the other power domains in the system not related to debug is ON.
 - PD_SYS can be configured to remain ON when any of the Expansion Power Dependency inputs are ON.
 - If PD_SYS is configured to be sensitive to itself, then once it is ON, it will stay ON.
- Each CPU power domain can be requested to turn ON either by its associated GPR or EWC.
- PD_DEBUG can be request to turn on by the debug DAP or by its associated power Q-Channel interface for each SRAM power domain.
- For any PD_SRAM<n>:
 - Each can be woken by sending access to the SRAM.
 - Each can be configured to remain ON depending on the CPU power state, the PS_SYS power state, or any of the Expansion Power Dependency inputs are ON.
 - If each is configured to be sensitive to itself, then once it is ON, it stays ON.

The PDCM and sensitivity inputs for each power domain allows, as much as possible, for the power control of the system to be primarily performed using only dynamic power transitions. This reduces the amount of software interactions required for system management and therefore improves its responsiveness and contributes to further power reduction.

2.9.7 System and CPU power states

Even though each power domain is relatively independent, because of the relationship defined in the PDCM and by other request signals, it is possible to define several of sensible system level power states that the system as a whole supports:

Table 2-14 System and CPU power states

System power state	PD_SYS	PD_CPU<N>CORE	PD_CPU<N>DBG ^a	PD_DEBUG	PD_CRYPT0	PD_SRAM<N>	Main clock ^b
OFF	OFF	OFF ^c	OFF	OFF	OFF	OFF	OFF
HIBERNATION	OFF	OFF ^d OFF – DEEPSLEEP WITH WIC + EWC	OFF	OFF/ON	OFF	OFF/ MEM_RET	OFF/ON ^e

Table 2-14 System and CPU power states (continued)

System power state	PD_SYS	PD_CPU<N>CORE	PD_CPU<N>DBG ^a	PD_DEBUG	PD_CRYPT0	PD_SRAM<N>	Main clock ^b
SYS_RET	RET	OFF ^f OFF – DEEPSLEEP WITH WIC + EWC RET ^g – DEEPSLEEP WITH WIC	OFF	OFF/ON	OFF	OFF/MEM_RET	ON
SYS_ON	ON	OFF ^f OFF – DEEPSLEEP WITH WIC + EWC RET ^{gh} – DEEPSLEEP WITH WIC ON - DEEPSLEEP WITH WIC ON - SLEEP ON	OFF	OFF/ON	OFF/ON	ON/OFF/MEM_RET	ON

- a. The PD_CPU<N>DBG column is not used if there is no support for separate processor debug power domain.
- b. Main clock is active as requested by the subsystem. Exclude activity request with the **EXP_CLK_REQ** and **EXP_CLK_ACK** signals.
- c. All CPUs must be OFF.
- d. This entry is similar to footnote e except that at least one core is expected to be in OFF – DEEPSLEEP WITH WIC + EWC state. If all cores are in the OFF state without enabling EWC, then expansion hardware must request the system to power up using the PD_SYS Power Control Q-Channel interface or using the GPR of the Debug Element.
- e. When in HIBERNATION state, if PD_DEBUG is ON, then **MAINCLK** is running. Otherwise **MAINCLK** is OFF.
- f. These entries allow one or more of the CPU core to be turned off and not used. A CPU in this state cannot be woken using its interrupts and instead can only be woken by the PDCM, or by another entity writing to the PPU for the CPU if the system is in the SYS_ON state.
- g. Logic Retention support for PD_SYS and PD_CPU<M>CORE are configuration options. If logic retention is not supported, SYS_RET System Power State does not exist, and RET– DeepSleep with WIC power state of any of the PD_CPU<N>CORE also do not exist.
- h. If Logic Retention is not supported, any attempt to enter this state, and hence enter retention with the processor, results in the processor remaining ON, giving the impression that the processor state is still being retained.

————— Note —————

All domains, including the PD_SYS and PD_CPU<N>CORE power domains, are independent power domains with relationships enforced by the PDCM.

When any PD_CPU<N>CORE is turned ON, the PD_SYS also turns ON. PD_SYS might take longer to turn ON compared to the CPU, therefore the system might be in a temporary state where the PD_SYS is OFF while PD_CPU<N>CORE is ON.

The implementer must ensure that during physical implementation this is taken into consideration, especially when dealing with signal isolation.

2.9.8 Entering lower CPU power states

For each CPU to enter a lower power state, the CPU must enter SLEEP or DEEPSLEEP state. When entering DEEPSLEEP, different combinations of WIC and EWC enabled then determine the different CPU power state being entered. The following shows the key power states of the CPU that the subsystem supports:

- When the PD_CPU<N>CORE is entering the OFF – DEEPSLEEP WITH WIC + EWC state from the ON state, the CPU must first enable its WIC, followed by handshaking to enable its associated EWC, then enabling DEEPSLEEP before entering WFI.
This is the only state that actually supports CPU power being fully turned off with the ability to wake the CPU core from interrupts.
- When the PD_CPU<N>CORE is entering the OFF – DEEPSLEEP WITH WIC state, RET – DEEPSLEEP WITH WIC or ON – DEEPSLEEP WITH WIC from the ON state, the CPU must first enable its WIC, then enable DEEPSLEEP before entering WFI.
DEEPSLEEP WITH WIC can only support the CPU core in retention, or ON with simply the core and NVIC clock turned OFF.
- When the PD_CPU<N>CORE is entering the OFF state, WIC and EWC is not enabled before the CPU enters WFI.
OFF state means that the CPU cannot be woken from interrupts, and the only way to wake the CPU is by writing to the PPU to manually turn ON the CPU.
- When the PD_CPU<N>CORE power domain is entering the ON – SLEEP state from the ON state, the CPU must first enable its WIC, and enable SLEEP before entering WFI.
When in CPU SLEEP, the CPU is still ON and the NVIC will be clocking with the rest of the core clock turned off.

Note

- The EWC does not support waking the CPU with events.
 - WFE must not be used with WIC and EWC to enter the CPU into OFF state if the intention is to wake using the Event interface of the CPU.
 - Because the FPU is now part of the CPU main core power domain, before the CPU is able to enter an OFF state, the FPU must be made unavailable by both setting the CP10 field of the CPACR Register in the CPU to 0b00 and setting the SU10 field of CPPWR Register in the CPU to 1.
If the FPU in the CPU is not disabled, and the CPU is allowed to start entering an OFF state without enabling the WID or EWC, the CPU could deadlock.
-

2.9.9 Hibernation

Hibernation state is the lowest power state of the system that SSE-200 supports. When in this state, most of the system that supports power gating are turned off, with the exception of PD_SRAM<n> in either OFF or MEM_RET, and the PD_DEBUG in either ON or OFF. In this state, normally the **MAINCLK** is also turned off to save power.

To enter the hibernation state, the following conditions must be met:

- All PD_SRAM<n> domains must be configured to dynamically enter OFF or Memory Retention state.

- Any SRAM that is expected to be used immediately after exiting hibernation, for example, for holding stack pointers, must either:
 - Have its PDCM configuration sensitivity, prior to entering hibernation, set to be sensitive to any of the PD_CPU<n>CORE power ON states that is associated to the core that wakes and uses that SRAM. This ensures that once the SRAM powers up after leaving hibernation, it stays powered until the associated CPU turns OFF.
 - Set that SRAM lowest power state to retention so that the SRAM content is always retained even if the SRAM turns off momentarily while waiting for the processor to start accessing memory.

This ensures that after the SRAM powers up at first access after leaving hibernation, it stays powered until the system or its associated CPU turns OFF.

- All GPR in the debug domain are turned off. Otherwise, one or more CPUs cannot power down.
- If you have expansion logic interfaced to the PD_SYS power control Q-Channel interface, ensure that the expansion logic is not active and can enter a quiescent state..
- If you have other expansion power domains in the system that are expected to stay ON or or to be turned on and starting accesses when the system is still in hibernation, you must make some changes during the integration phase for the expansion region.
You must provide gates that use the **ACCWAIT** signal to temporarily block access from these regions.
You must set **ACC_WAITN_RST** parameter to LOW. This ensures that when the system restarts, any access from these power domains are held off until the security configurations of the system can be reinstated. After security considerations have been reinstated, secure software can set the **ACCWAIT** register flags to allow access from these power domains to proceed.
- All CPU must enter OFF state, with at least one CPU in the DEEPSLEEP WITH WIC and EWC enabled if the intention is that the system will be woken by the EWC, or with expansion logic able to drive the PD_SYS power control Q-Channel interface to wake the system..

The system will always leave Hibernation state when a CPU is woken from OFF state. When a EWC request wakes a CPU, it will always also request **MAINCLK** to start running. After the CPU has booted, and has restored security state, the CPU must set the **ACC_WAITN** register to allow all other masters to access the system.

2.9.10 Wake From Hibernation using PD_SYS power control Q-Channel interface

In addition to using EWC to wake a system, expansion blocks outside the subsystem can use the PD_SYS power control Q-Channel interface to wake the system from hibernation.

Waking the system using the interface does not however directly wake the CPU cores or any other domains in this system unless accesses to the system result in a wake interrupt on an EWC or a SRAM wake request while accessing SRAM.

————— **Note** —————

- The system **SYSCCLK**, and therefore also the **MCLK**, coming into the system might not be running during hibernation. A wake request on **SYSPWRQACTIVE** input automatically results in a request for **MAINCLK** to be active so that the Q-Channel handshake can be performed..

- When the base system in the PD_SYS power domain wakes from hibernation, all registers in the domain are in reset state and all peripherals that reside behind the PPC and MPC default to secure access only. There is typically a requirement to also wake and boot a CPU to configure the system before allowing access for other masters to the system.

ARM recommends that you do not depend on the PD_SYS power control Q-Channel interface to wake the system from hibernation and instead use interrupt signals on the EWC. This allows a request to wake a CPU core which then in turn wakes the system and configures it before allowing other masters to access it.

To delay access from other masters in the system, you must also deploy access control gates at slave expansion interfaces of the base system. The subsystem provides the ACC_WAITN register and the ACCWAITN signal to control access..
- If you require the ability to wake and access the base system from the expansion interfaces without also waking any CPU core, you must ensure the master accessing the system is a secure master, or that you only allow non-secure master to access a strictly control region of memory that you are sure is non-secure and does not pose a security risk.

When the system wakes without a CPU restoring the configuration of all MPCs and PPCs settings in the system, your secure master will see all non-secure memory space as secure memory space.

You must ensure that if any of these non-secure memories support retention, these memory locations are not use for code execution.

2.10 Cordio Bluetooth Radio element

The Cordio RTL IP is a Bluetooth 5 and/or 802.15.4-2006 modem, protocol processing logic and link and/or MAC layer controller. The element has the following features:

- Optimized for low-power with support for Bluetooth 5 and 802.15.4 standards.
- RTL for modem, link-layer, and protocol processor.
- Narrow digital interface to RF front end (RF interface).
- Flexible architecture to support different memories for firmware.
- Designed as an AMBA peripheral.
- Bluetooth Qualified components for C50/B50/B42.
- Easy integration with Zigbee/Thread compliant platforms for C50/E154.

For more information on the Cordio element, see the documentation provided with the product.

———— **Note** ————

You must have a licence for the Cordio Naples IP to access the product documentation.

2.11 CryptoCell-312 element

The CryptoCell-312 element provides the following features:

- Cryptographic acceleration for the protection of data-in-transit (communication protocols) and data-at-rest.
- Protection of various assets belonging to the IC or device manufacturer, service operators providing services over the target device and the user itself. These asset protection features include:
 - Image verification at boot/during runtime.
 - Authenticated debug.
 - Random number generation.
 - Lifecycle management.
 - Provisioning of assets.

The CryptoCell-312 implements a number of key interfaces that are visible to software:

- Two APB4 interfaces, and both interface to the base system through Access Control gates and reside at the following address in the main memory map:
 - APB Configuration Interface at aliased address regions 0x4008_8000-0x4008_BFFF and 0x5008_8000-0x5008_BFFF. This interface provides access to programmer visible registers within CryptoCell-312, and CryptoCell-312 itself handles security checking of accesses to its registers on its own.
 - APB Code Interface at aliased addresses 0x0E00_0000-0x0E00_1FFF and 0x1E00_0000-0x1E00_1FFF. This interface provides access to the NVM memory, with word address of 0x00A0-0x1FFC. Note the address offset of 0xA0 being applied to the APB address.
- A single AHB bus master interface that connects to the base system using an ACG, and has access only to the following address spaces:
 - Code AHB5 Master Expansion Interfaces, at addresses 0x0000_0000-0x0DFF_FFFF and 0x1000_0000-0x1DFF_FFFF.
 - All implemented SRAM blocks with the areas 0x2000_0000-0x20FF_FFF and 0x3000_0000-0x30FF_FFF.
 - AHB5 Master Expansion Interface 0, at addresses 0x2800_0000-0x2FFF_FFFF, 0x3800_0000-0x3FFF_FFFF, and 0x6000_0000-0x7FFF_FFFF.

For more information on the CryptoCell-312 element, see the documentation provided with the product.

————— Note —————

You must have a licence for the CryptoCell-312 IP to access the product documentation.

2.11.1 Persistent storage

If the CryptoCell element exists, then the SSE-200 implements a Persistent State Storage Block that resides in the PD_AON power domain. It implements registers that store key state information on behalf of CryptoCell. See the *ARM® CoreLink™ SSE-200 Subsystem Configuration and Integration Manual* for more information.

Warm Reset Interactions

The CryptoCell Element in general is reset by both Warm reset and powerup reset. However, the persistent state storage values are reset to zeros only by powerup reset. If a system Warm reset is triggered, the contents in the persistent state storage are not cleared. Cryptocell, when restarting, then discovers that the persistent state values are populated and does not try to regenerate it from the OTP values. Therefore, if trusted firmware decides to lock particular fields in the persistent state storage, it is not possible to unlock it through Warm reset, and that, depending in your use, might cause problems at boot.

In addition, since Warm reset conceptually can be triggered at any time, it could interfere with, and cause corruption of data during writing of the persistent state storage.

Warm reset can only be triggered by each CPU writing to its AIRCR.SYSRESETREQ control. The hardware requests are then gated by the SYSRSTREQ0_EN and SYSRSTREQ1_EN values in the RESET_MASK register. To avoid problems with persistent state storage, by default, these gating values are set to LOW using the input parameters SYSRSTREQ0_EN_RST and SYSRSTREQ1_EN_RST to disable Warm reset. Secure firmware can allow it at a later stage after checking that it is safe to allow Warm reset, for example, if:

- There are no persistent state storage values set that will cause problems during system reboot.
- There are no expected changes occurring in the persistent state storage.

Chapter 3

Programmers Model

This chapter describes the SSE-200 memory regions and registers, and provides information on how to program a SoC that contains an implementation of the SSE-200.

It contains the following sections:

- *About the programmers model on page 3-2.*
- *Memory map on page 3-3.*
- *CPU element on page 3-13.*
- *Base element on page 3-25.*
- *SRAM element on page 3-57.*
- *System control element on page 3-58.*
- *Debug and trace element on page 3-80.*

3.1 About the programmers model

The following information applies to all registers:

- Do not attempt to access reserved or unused address locations. Attempting to access these locations can result in unpredictable behavior.
- Unless otherwise stated in the accompanying text:
 - Do not modify undefined register bits.
 - Ignore undefined register bits on reads.
 - Unless otherwise specified, all register bits are reset to a logic 0 by a system or power up reset.
- The following describes the access type:

RW	Read and write.
RO	Read-only.
WO	Write-only.

3.2 Memory map

This section describes the memory maps for the SSE-200. It contains the following subsections:

- [Memory map overview.](#)
- [SRAM overview on page 3-7.](#)
- [CPU overview on page 3-8.](#)
- [Base peripheral overview on page 3-9.](#)
- [System control overview on page 3-10.](#)

3.2.1 Memory map overview

An overview of the SSE-200 system memory map is shown in the following figure:




Figure 3-1 SSE-200 top-level memory map

TABLE TBD shows the high level view of the memory map defined by SSE-200. This memory map is divided into Secure and Non-secure regions. The memory alternates between Secure and Non-secure regions on 256Mbyte regions, with only a few address areas exempted from security mapping because they are related to debug functionality.

To provide memory blocks and peripherals that can be mapped either as Secure or Non-secure using software, a number of address regions are aliased as shown in TABLE TBD. Software can then choose to allocate each memory block or peripheral as Secure or Non-secure using protection controllers. The *Implementation Define Attribution Unit* (IDAU) region column in the table specifies each area's Security along with ID and each region's *Non-Secure Callable* (NSC) settings.

Except when stated, all access to unmapped regions of the memory result in a bus-error response. An exception to that is when accessing unmapped address space within a regions taken by a peripheral, the access is Read As Zero and Write Ignored (RAZWI). Any accesses that result in security violations, either RAZWI or result in a bus error response as defined by the SECRESPCFG register setting.

Some regions of memory map are reserved to maintain compatibility with future subsystems. Other areas are mapped to AHB Master Expansion 0 interface and AHB Master Expansion 1 interfaces.

All accesses targeting populated SRAM regions within 0x2000_0000 to 0x20FF_FFFF and 0x3000_0000 to 0x30FF_FFFF support exclusive accesses since they implement exclusive access monitoring, provided the accesses are from:

- The CPUs.
- From expansion masters that has their corresponding EXP_SYS_ID_PRESENT bit matching the Master ID set to HIGH.

Exclusive accesses are not supported for other regions implementing within the subsystem. For regions that reside in user expansion areas, exclusive access support is defined by the user expansion logic. Note that if an exclusive access targets regions that does not support exclusive accesses, or have Master IDs that does not have the corresponding EXP_SYS_ID_PRESENT bit set to 1, these accesses are not monitored for exclusive access and might still update their target memory locations regardless of their associated exclusive responses.

The following table lists the main regions in the memory map:

Table 3-1 Memory map overview

ID (alias)	Address		Size	Region name	Description	IDAU security ^a	IDAU ID	IDAU NSC
	From	To						
1 (4)	0x0000_0000	0x00FF_FFFF	224MB	Code Memory ^b	Maps to AHB5 master expansion code interface.	NS	0	0
2 (5)	0x0E00_0000	0x0E00_1FFF	8KB	NVM code ^c	CryptoCell APB code interface for NVM.			
3	0x0E00_2000	0x0FFF_FFFF	32MB	Reserved	Reserved.			
4 (1)	0x1000_0000	0x10FF_FFFF	224MB	Code Memory ^b	Maps to AHB5 master expansion code interface.	S	1	CODENSC ^d

Table 3-1 Memory map overview (continued)

ID (alias)	Address		Size	Region name	Description	IDAU security ^a	IDAUID	IDAU NSC
	From	To						
5 (2)	0x1E00_0000	0x1E00_1FFF	8KB	NVM code	CryptoCell APB code interface for NVM.	S		
6	0x1E00_2000	0x1FFF_FFFF	32MB	Reserved	Reserved.			
7 (10)	0x2000_0000	0x20FF_FFFF	16MB	Internal SRAM	Internal SRAM area.	NS	2	0
8	0x2100_0000	0x27FF_FFFF	112MB	Reserved	Reserved.			
9	0x2800_0000	0x2FFF_FFFF	128MB	Expansion 0	Maps to AHB5 master expansion 0 interface.			
10 (7)	0x3000_0000	0x30FF_FFFF	16MB	Internal SRAM	Internal SRAM Area.	S	3	RAMNSC ^d
11	0x3100_0000	0x37FF_FFFF	112MB	Reserved	Reserved.			
12	0x3800_0000	0x3FFF_FFFF	128MB	Expansion 0	Maps to AHB5 master expansion 0 interface.			
13	0x4000_0000	0x4000_FFFF	64KB	Base Peripheral	Base Element peripheral region.	NS	4	0
14 (21)	0x4001_0000	0x4001_FFFF	64KB	Private CPU	CPU Element peripheral region.			
15 (22)	0x4002_0000	0x4003_FFFF	128KB	System Control	System Control Element peripheral region.			
16	0x4004_0000	0x4004_FFFF		Reserved	Reserved.			
17	0x4005_0000	0x4007_FFFF		Reserved	Reserved.			
18	0x4008_0000	0x400F_FFFF	512KB	Base Peripheral	Base Element peripheral region.			
19	0x4010_0000	0x4FFF_FFFF	255MB	Expansion 1	Maps to AHB5 master expansion 1 interface.			

Table 3-1 Memory map overview (continued)

ID (alias)	Address		Size	Region name	Description	IDAU security ^a	IDAUID	IDAU NSC
	From	To						
20	0x5000_0000	0x5000_FFFF	64KB	Base Peripheral	Base Element peripheral region.	S	5	0
21 (14)	0x5001_0000	0x5001_FFFF	64KB	Private CPU	CPU Element peripheral region.			
22 (15)	0x5002_0000	0x5003_FFFF	128KB	System Control	System Control Element peripheral region.			
23	0x5004_0000	0x5000_FFFF		Reserved	Reserved.			
24	0x5001_0000	0x5007_FFFF		Reserved	Reserved.			
25	0x5008_0000	0x500F_FFFF	512KB	Base Peripheral	Base Element peripheral region.			
26	0x5010_0000	0x5FFF_FFFF	255MB	Expansion 1	Maps to AHB5 master expansion 1 interface.			
27	0x6000_0000	0x6FFF_FFFF	256MB	Expansion 0	Maps to AHB5 master expansion 0 interface.	NS	6	0
28	0x7000_0000	0x7FFF_FFFF	256MB	Expansion 0	Maps to AHB5 master expansion 0 interface.	S	7	0
29	0x8000_0000	0x8FFF_FFFF	256MB	Expansion 1	Maps to AHB5 master expansion 1 interface.	NS	8	0
30	0x9000_0000	0x9FFF_FFFF	256MB	Expansion 1	Maps to AHB5 master expansion 1 interface.	S	9	0
31	0xA000_0000	0xAFFF_FFFF	256MB	Expansion 1	Maps to AHB5 master expansion 1 interface.	NS	A	0
32	0xB000_0000	0xBFFF_FFFF	256MB	Expansion 1	Maps to AHB5 master expansion 1 interface.	S	B	0
33	0xC000_0000	0xCFFF_FFFF	256MB	Expansion 1	Maps to AHB5 master expansion 1 interface.	NS	C	0
34	0xD000_0000	0xDFFF_FFFF	256MB	Expansion 1	Maps to AHB5 master expansion 1 interface.	S	D	0
35	0xE000_0000	0xE00F_FFFF	1MB	PPB	Private Peripheral Bus. Local to Each CPU.	Exempt		

Table 3-1 Memory map overview (continued)

ID (alias)	Address		Size	Region name	Description	IDAU security ^a	IDAUID	IDAU NSC
	From	To						
36	0xE010_0000	0XEFFF_FFFF	255MB	Expansion 1	Maps to AHB5 master expansion 1 interface.	NS	E	0
37	0xF000_0000	0XF00F_FFFF	1MB	System debug	System debug.	Exempt		
38	0xF010_0000	0XFFFF_FFFF	255MB	Expansion 1	Maps to AHB5 master expansion 1 interface.	S	F	0

- The IDAU security value does not define privileged or unprivileged accessibility. That is defined by the MPC, PPC, or register blocks mapped to each area.
- Note that even though these regions are not aliased at the interface, they are expected to be aliased in the expansion system to support Non-secure and Secure shared code memory. In addition you must use Memory Protection Controllers externally to selectively map each block of memory between Secure and Non-secure memory regions.
- This region is reserved and responds with bus error if CryptoCell element does not exist.
- The IDAU NSC values are defined by registers in the Secure Privilege Control registers.

3.2.2 SRAM overview

The subsystem supports four SRAM elements.

All SRAMs are of the same size and all SRAMs form a contiguous area of memory. Collectively they are mapped into both the secure and non-secure regions. The remainder of the regions are reserved. A memory protection controller then determines how the memory locations within the SRAM are actually mapped to the secure and non-secure regions.

The following table shows an example configuration of four memory banks of 32KB each.

Table 3-2 Internal SRAM regions

ID (alias)	Address		Size	Region name	Description	Security
	From	To				
1 (6)	0x2000_0000	0x2000_7FFF	32KB	SRAM Bank 0	Maps to Internal SRAM Bank 0.	NS-MPC
2 (7)	0x2000_8000	0x2000_FFFF	32KB	SRAM Bank 1	Maps to Internal SRAM Bank 1.	NS-MPC
3 (8)	0x2001_0000	0x2001_7FFF	32KB	SRAM Bank 2	Maps to Internal SRAM Bank 2.	NS-MPC
4 (9)	0x2001_8000	0x2001_FFFF	32KB	SRAM Bank 3	Maps to Internal SRAM Bank 3.	NS-MPC
5	0x2002_0000	0x20FF_FFFF		Reserved	Reserved.	
6 (1)	0x3000_0000	0x3000_7FFF	32KB	SRAM Bank 0	Maps to Internal SRAM Bank 0.	S-MPC

Table 3-2 Internal SRAM regions (continued)

ID (alias)	Address		Size	Region name	Description	Security
7 (2)	0x3000_8000	0x3000_FFFF	32KB	SRAM Bank 1	Maps to Internal SRAM Bank 1.	S-MPC
8 (3)	0x3001_0000	0x3001_7FFF	32KB	SRAM Bank 2	Maps to Internal SRAM Bank 2.	S-MPC
9 (4)	0x3001_8000	0x3001_FFFF	32KB	SRAM Bank 3	Maps to Internal SRAM Bank 3.	S-MPC
10	0x3002_0000	0x30FF_FFFF		Reserved	Reserved.	

Note

- For NS-MPC, any Secure access targeting this region is blocked. Non-secure access to this region is controlled by an MPC.
- For S-MPC, any Non-secure access targeting this region is blocked. Secure access targeting this region is controlled by an MPC.

3.2.3 CPU overview

This section describes memory and registers associated with the Cortex-M33 processors.

Private CPU regions

Each of the two processor elements in the SSE-200 can only see its own implementation of the Private CPU Region within the CPU element.

This region consists of a Secure region from 0x4001_000-0x4001_FFFF, and a Non-secure region from 0x5001_0000-0x5001_FFFF, as shown in the following table.

Table 3-3 Private core regions

ID (alias)	Address		Size	Region name	Description	Security
	From	To				
-	0x4001_0000	0x4001_EFFF	-	Reserved	Reserved.	-
1 (4)	0x4001_F000	0x4001_FFFF	4KB	CPU_IDENTITY	CPU Identity Unit.	NS
2	0x5001_0000	0x5001_0FFF	4KB	ICACHE	Local instruction cache.	SP
3	0x5001_1000	0x5001_1FFF	4KB	CPUSECCTRL	CPU Local Security Control.	SP
-	0x5001_2000	0x5001_EFFF	-	Reserved	Reserved.	-
4 (1)	0x5001_F000	0x5001_FFFF	4KB	CPU_IDENTITY	CPU Identity Unit.	S

Note

- These regions are not accessible from any other master in the system, including the expansion slave interfaces. An external debugger can however access the regions through the Debug AHB access interface.

- Only 32-bit writes are supported.
- NS indicates Non-secure access only.
- SP indicates Secure privilege access only.
- S indicates Secure access only.

PPB regions

The Private Peripheral Bus (PPB) provides access to the internal processor resources. See [PPB regions on page 3-20](#).

3.2.4 Base peripheral overview

Base peripheral region is where most peripherals within the subsystem reside. There are four regions in total, two Secure and two Non-secure regions:

- 0x4000_0000-0x4000_FFFF which is a Non-secure region.
- 0x4008_0000-0x400F_FFFF which is a Non-secure region.
- 0x5000_0000-0x5000_FFFF which is a Secure region.
- 0x5008_0000-0x500F_FFFF which is a Secure region.

Some peripherals in the base element are aliased to both Secure and Non-secure regions. The final mapping to both the Secure or Non-secure regions, and Privileged or Non-Privileged access support is determined by *Peripheral Protection Controllers* (PPCs).

Table 3-4 Base peripheral regions

ID (alias)	Address		Size	Region name	Description	Security
	From	To				
1 (10)	0x4000_0000	0x4000_0FFF	4KB	TIMER 0	CMSDK Timer.	NS-PPC
2 (11)	0x4000_1000	0x4000_1FFF	4KB	TIMER 1	CMSDK Timer.	NS-PPC
3 (12)	0x4000_2000	0x4000_2FFF	4KB	DUAL TIMER	CMSDK Dual Timer.	NS-PPC
4 (13)	0x4000_3000	0x4000_3FFF	4KB	MHU 0	Message Handling Unit 0.	NS-PPC
5 (14)	0x4000_4000	0x4000_4FFF	4KB	MHU 1	Message Handling Unit 1.	NS-PPC
-	0x4000_5000	0x4000_FFFF	-	-	RAZ/WI.	-
6	0x4008_0000	0x4008_0FFF	4KB	NSPCTRL	Non-Secure Privilege Control Block.	NSP
7	0x4008_1000	0x4008_1FFF	4KB	NON-SECURE WATCHDOG	Non-Secure CMSDK Watchdog.	NSP
-	0x4008_2000	0x4008_7FFF	-	Reserved	Reserved.	-
8	0x4008_8000	0x4009_8FFF	16KB	CryptoCell	CryptoCell-312 (if present) ^a	NS
-	0x4009_C000	0x400F_FFFF	-	Reserved	Reserved.	-
10 (21)	0x5000_0000	0x5000_0FFF	4KB	TIMER 0	CMSDK Timer.	S-PPC
11 (22)	0x5000_1000	0x5000_1FFF	4KB	TIMER 1	CMSDK Timer.	S-PPC
12 (3)	0x5000_2000	0x5000_2FFF	4KB	DUAL TIMER	CMSDK Dual Timer.	S-PPC

Table 3-4 Base peripheral regions (continued)

ID (alias)	Address		Size	Region name	Description	Security
	From	To				
13 (4)	0x5000_3000	0x5000_3FFF	4KB	MHU 0	Message Handling Unit 0.	S-PPC
14 (5)	0x5000_4000	0x5000_4FFF	4KB	MHU 1	Message Handling Unit 1.	S-PPC
	0x5000_5000	0x5000_FFFF	-	-	RAZ/WI	-
15	0x5008_0000	0x5008_0FFF	4KB	SPCTRL	Secure Privilege Control Block.	SP
16	0x5008_1000	0x5008_1FFF	4KB	SECURE WATCHDOG	Secure CMSDK Watchdog.	SP
	0x5008_2000	0x5008_2FFF	-	Reserved	Reserved.	
17	0x5008_3000	0x5008_3FFF	4KB	SRAM0MPC	SRAM 0 Memory Protection Controller.	SP
18	0x5008_4000	0x5008_4FFF	4KB	SRAM1MPC	SRAM 1 Memory Protection Controller.	SP
19	0x5008_5000	0x5008_5FFF	4KB	SRAM2MPC	SRAM 2 Memory Protection Controller.	SP
20	0x5008_6000	0x5008_6FFF	4KB	SRAM3MPC	SRAM 3 Memory Protection Controller.	SP
	0x5008_7000	0x5008_7FFF	-	-	RAZ/WI	-
21 (8)	0x5008_8000	0x5008_8FFF	16KB	CryptoCell	CryptoCell-312 (if present) ^a	S
	0x5008_C000	0x5008_FFFF	4KB	-	Reserved.	-
22	0x5009_0000	0x500F_FFFF	64KB	-	Reserved.	-

a. These regions only exist if the CryptoCell element exists. Otherwise, these regions are reserved and when accessed they respond with bus error.

Note

- For NS_PPC, any Secure access targeting this region is blocked. Non-secure access to this region is controlled by a PPC.
- For S_PPC, any Non-secure access targeting this region is blocked. Secure access targeting this region is controlled by a PPC.
- NSP indicates Non-secure private access only.
- SP indicates Secure privilege access only.
- S indicates Secure access only.

3.2.5 System control overview

The System Control region contains the peripherals in the System Control element. The System control region occupies two areas:

- 0x4002_0000-0x4003_FFFF, which is Non-secure.
- 0x5002_0000-0x5003_FFFF, which is Secure.

Table 3-5 shows the System control regions.

Table 3-5 System control regions

Row ID (alias)	Address		Size	Region name	Description	Security
	From	To				
1 (5)	0x4002_0000	0x4002_0FFF	4KB	SYSINFO	System Information Registers Block.	NS
2	0x4002_1000	0x4002_EFFF	-	-	Reserved, RAZ/WI.	-
3 (18)	0x4002_F000	0x4002_FFFF	4KB	S32KTIMER	CMSDK Timer running on S32KCLK .	NS-PPC
4	0x4003_0000	0x4003_FFFF	-	-	Reserved.	-
5 (1)	0x5002_0000	0x5002_0FFF	4KB	SYSINFO	System Information Registers Block.	S
6	0x5002_1000	0x5002_1FFF	4KB	S_SYSCONTROL	System Control Registers Block.	SP
7	0x5002_2000	0x5002_2FFF	4KB	SYS_PPU	System Power Policy Unit.	SP
8	0x5002_3000	0x5002_3FFF	4KB	CPU0CORE_PPU	CPU 0 Core Power Policy Unit.	SP
9	0x5002_4000	0x5002_4FFF	4KB	CPU0DEBUG_PPU ^a	CPU 0 Debug Power Policy Unit.	SP
10	0x5002_5000	0x5002_5FFF	4KB	CPU1CORE_PPU	CPU 1 Core Power Policy Unit.	SP
11	0x5002_6000	0x5002_6FFF	4KB	CPU1DBG_PPU ^a	CPU 1 Debug Power Policy Unit.	SP
	0x5002_7000	0x5002_8FFF	4KB	-	Reserved, RAZ/WI.	-
12	0x5002_9000	0x5002_9FFF	4KB	DBG_PPU	System Debug Power Policy Unit.	SP
13	0x5002_A000	0x5002_AFFF	4KB	RAM0_PPU	SRAM Bank 0 Power Policy Unit.	SP
14	0x5002_B000	0x5002_BFFF	4KB	RAM1_PPU	SRAM Bank 1 Power Policy Unit.	SP
15	0x5002_C000	0x5002_CFFF	4KB	RAM2_PPU	SRAM Bank 2 Power Policy Unit.	SP
16	0x5002_D000	0x5002_DFFF	4KB	RAM3_PPU	SRAM Bank 3 Power Policy Unit.	SP
17	0x5002_E000	0x5002_EFFF	4KB	S32KWATCHDOG	CMSDK Watchdog on S32KCLK .	SP
18 (3)	0x5002_F000	0x5002_FFFF	4KB	S32KTIMER	CMSDK Timer on S32KCLK .	S-PPC
19	0x5003_0000	0x5003_FFFF	-	-	Reserved.	-

a. CPU0DBG_PPU and CPU1DBG_PPU regions do not exist if separate CPU debug power domains are not supported.

Note

- For NS_PPC, any Secure access targeting this region is blocked. Non-secure access to this region is controlled by a PPC.
- For S_PPC, any Non-secure access targeting this region is blocked. Secure access targeting this region is controlled by a PPC.
- NSP indicates Non-secure private access only.
- SP indicates Secure privilege access only.
- S indicates Secure access only.

- Reserved regions respond with RAZWI when accessed. The System Information Registers Block is mapped to both the Secure and Non-secure region and is visible to both without any security protection.

See [System control element](#) on page 3-58.

3.3 CPU element

This section lists memory locations related to the processor. It contains the following subsections:

- [Processor L1 cache registers.](#)
- [Processor L1 cache programming on page 3-18.](#)
- [Ensuring the cache handles memory modifications on page 3-19.](#)
- [CPU Local Security Control Register Block on page 3-19.](#)
- [PPB regions on page 3-20.](#)
- [Interrupts on page 3-21.](#)
- [Wakeup Interrupt Controller \(WIC\) on page 3-24.](#)

3.3.1 Processor L1 cache registers

The following table lists the cache registers. All registers are Secure privileged access only.

Table 3-6 Summary of processor L1 cache registers

Offset	Register name	Access	Reset value	Full name
0x000	ICHWPARAMS	RO	Depends on configuration.	Hardware Parameter register, ICHWPARAMS on page 3-14
0x004	ICCTRL	RW	0x0	Instruction Cache Control Register, ICCTRL on page 3-14
0x008- 0x0FC	-	-	-	Reserved.
0x100	ICIRQSTAT	RO	0x0	Interrupt Request Status register, see Instruction Cache Interrupt Registers, ICIRQSTAT, ICIRQSCLR, and ICIRQEN on page 3-15
0x104	ICIRQSCLR	WO	0x0	Interrupt Status Clear register
0x108	ICIRQEN	RW	0x0	Interrupt Enable register
0x10C	ICDBGFILLERR	RO	0x0	Debug Fill Error Register, ICDBGFILLERR on page 3-16
0x200- 0x2FC	-	-	-	Reserved.
0x300	ICSH	RO	0x0	Instruction Cache Statistic Hit register, ICSH on page 3-16
0x304	ICSM	RO	0x0	Instruction Cache Statistic Miss Count register, ICSM on page 3-17
0x308	ICSUC	RO	0x0	Instruction Cache Statistic Uncached Count register, ICSUC on page 3-17
0x30C- 0xFCC	-	-	-	Reserved.
0xFD0	PIDR4	RO	0x04	Product ID Register 4.
0xFD4	PIDR5	RO	0x0	Product ID Register 5.
0xFD8	PIDR6	RO	0x0	Product ID Register 6.
0xFDC	PIDR7	RO	0x0	Product ID Register 7.
0xFE0	PIDR0	RO	0x57	Product ID Register 0.
0xFE4	PIDR1	RO	0xB8	Product ID Register 1.
0xFE8	PIDR2	RO	0x0B	Product ID Register 2.

Table 3-6 Summary of processor L1 cache registers (continued)

Offset	Register name	Access	Reset value	Full name
0xFEC	PIDR3	RO	0x00	Product ID Register 3.
0xFF0	CIDR0	RO	0x0D	Component ID Register 0.
0xFF4	CIDR1	RO	0xF0	Component ID Register 1.
0xFF8	CIDR2	RO	0x05	Component ID Register 2.
0xFFC	CIDR3	RO	0xB1	Component ID Register 3.

Hardware Parameter register, ICHWPARAMS

The ICHWPARAMS is a read only register that describes the instruction cache configuration.

Table 3-7 ICHWPARAMS register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:16]	COFFSET	RO	0x0	Cacheable Offset Address. Set the top address 31:16 of the cacheable address region.
[15:12]	COFFSIZE	RO	0x3	Cacheable Block Size. Sets the block size of the cacheable region and also indicates the number of top address bits on an access that is not used in cache lookup but is compared against the top bits of COFFSET, for example: 0x0: 4GB 0x1: 2GB 0x2: 1GB 0x3: 512MB
[11:7]	Reserved	RO	-	Reserved.
[6]	INVMAT	RO	Configuration dependent	Indicates invalidate cache line on write match is enabled. This bit depends on CPU0_ICACHEINVMAT for CPU0, or CPU1_ICACHEINVDMA for CPU1.
[5]	DMA	RO	0x0	Presence of DMA Engine: 0 = Instruction cache does not support prefetch and locking. 1 = Instruction cache supports prefetch and locking.
[4]	STATS	RO	0x1	Presence of Statistic Functionality.
[3:0]	CSIZE	RO	Parameterized	Cache size. Defines the size of the instruction cache: 9: 512 byte 10: 1 KB 11: 2 KB 12: 4 KB 13: 8 KB 14: 16 KB Other value reserved.

Instruction Cache Control Register, ICCTRL

The ICCTRL register allows software to control the cache. This includes enabling or disabling the cache, starting invalidations and configuring what must be cached or un-cached based on the **HHINT** signal from the processor.

For write accesses, this register only support 32bits writes. Any write that is not 32bits is ignored.

Table 3-8 ICCTRL register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:6]	Reserved	RO	0x0	-
5	HALLOC	RW	0x0	<p>Enable Handler Allocation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> When set to LOW, all incoming handler code fetches are not allocated a cache line if a miss occurs. If the fetch results in a hit in the cache, the access is treated as if it is cached. <p>HALLOC LOW allows handler code accesses to be more deterministic. It also avoids cache trashing if there are a large number of interrupt service routines.</p> <p>HALLOC has no effect on DMA fetches and line locking.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> When HALLOC is set to HIGH, then handler code access will be treated like any other code access arriving at its interface.
4	STATC	WO	0x0	Clear Statistic values. Writing a 1 to this register triggers the instruction cache to start clear all cache statistic counters.
3	STATEN	RW	0x0	Enable Statistic function. When set to HIGH, cache statistic counters are enabled. When set to LOW cache statistic counters are disabled.
2	FINV	WO	0x0	Full Cache Invalidate. Writing a 1 to this register triggers the instruction cache to start invalidating all cache lines.
1	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
0	CACHEEN	RW	0x0	Enable Cache. When set to HIGH, caching is enabled. When set to LOW, all accesses will bypass the cache.

Instruction Cache Interrupt Registers, ICIRQSTAT, ICIRQSCLR, and ICIRQEN

The Instruction Cache Interrupt Registers allow software to determine the source of an interrupt coming from the instruction cache. They also allow software to clear, disable or enable the interrupts:

- ICIRQSTAT is read-only (RO). The Instruction Cache Interrupt Status register holds the status of all interrupts prior to being masked.
- ICIRQSCLR is write-only (WO). The Instruction Cache Interrupt Clear register allows the status of active interrupts to be cleared by writing a 1 to its associated field.
- ICIRQEN is read/write (RW). The Instruction Cache Interrupt Masks register allows the each interrupt status to be enabled or disabled from driving the Instruction Cache interrupt signal.

All interrupt registers share the same fields, as [Table 3-9 on page 3-16](#) shows.

Note

When enabling an interrupt it is possible to receive an interrupt immediately on the disable event if that interrupt event occurred before the programming event.

Table 3-9 Instruction cache interrupt registers

Bits	Name	Reset value	Description
[31:6]	-	0x0	Reserved.
[5]	SS	0	Statistics Saturated IRQ. Indicates that the internal statistic counters have saturated.
[4]	SV	0	Security violation IRQ. Indicates that a security violation has occurred while filling a cache line.
[3]	CFE	0	Cache Fill Error IRQ. Indicates that a bus error occurred while filling a cache line.
[2]	CEC	0	Cache Enable Complete IRQ. Indicates that a request to enable the cache has been completed.
[1]	CDC	0	Cache Disable Complete IRQ. Indicates that a request to disable the cache has been completed.
[0]	IC	0	Invalidate Complete IRQ. Indicates that a cache invalidation process has been completed.

Debug Fill Error Register, ICDBGFILLERR

The ICDBGFILLERR register allows software to discover the address that is involved in a recent fill error.

Table 3-10 DBGFILLERR register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:29]	Reserved	-	0b000	-
[28:0]	ERRADDR	RO	0x0	Address where the latest fill error was seen.

Note

The address might change between the associated interrupt and the read by the processor, and is therefore intended only as a crude debug assist.

The two least significant bits of this register always return zeros.

Instruction Cache Statistic Hit register, ICSH

The ICSH register allows software to read the instruction cache hit counter value.

This register counts the number of read access that results in cache hits since the last counter clear operation. This register ignores write accesses.

Table 3-11 ICSH register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:0]	CSHR	RO	0x0	Cache Hit Counter register.

Instruction Cache Statistic Miss Count register, ICSM

The ICSM register allows software to read the instruction cache miss counter value. This register counts the number of read access that results in cache misses since the last counter clear operation. This register ignores write accesses.

Table 3-12 ICSM register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:0]	CSM	RO	0x0	Cache Miss Counter Register.

Instruction Cache Statistic Uncached Count register, ICSUC

The ICSUC register allows software to read the instruction cache Uncached access counter value. This register counts the number of uncached read accesses seen by the instruction cache since the last counter clear operation. This register ignores write accesses.

Table 3-13 ICSUC register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:0]	CSUC	RO	0x0	Uncached access Counter Register.

CIDRx, PIDRx

The CIDR and PIDR registers are statically configured at compile time. PIDR3 is specified from a static register to allow ECO modifications to the identity. The default values are listed in the following tables:

Table 3-14 Product and component ID registers

Name	Function	Access	Reset value	Description
PIDR0	Part number	RO	0x57	Product ID Register 0.
PIDR1	Part number	RO	0xB8	Product ID Register 1.
PIDR2	Part revision	RO	0x0B	Product ID Register 2.
PIDR3	Revision number	RO	0x00	Product ID Register 3.
PIDR4	Reserved	RO	0x04	Product ID Register 4.
PIDR5	Reserved	RO	0x00	Product ID Register 5.
PIDR6	Reserved	RO	0x00	Product ID Register 6.
PIDR7	Reserved	RO	0x00	Product ID Register 7.
CIDR0	Preamble	RO	0x0D	Component ID Register 0.
CIDR1	Preamble	RO	0xF0	Component ID Register 1.
CIDR2	Preamble	RO	0x05	Component ID Register 2.
CIDR3	Preamble	RO	0xB1	Component ID Register 3.

3.3.2 Processor L1 cache programming

This section describes the recommended practice for programming the processor L1 cache. It is not however, intended as an exhaustive guide on writing driver software.

Initialization

After power and reset have been applied, the cache starts up in a disabled state and begins its invalidation process. Because the cache is disabled, all accesses arriving at the cache are not cached and bypass the cache. During the invalidation process, you can always enable the cache by setting the CACHEEN control bit to 1. However, all accesses through the cache are still treated as uncached and bypass the cache until the cache invalidation process completes.

At the end of the cache invalidation process, the IC_STATUS interrupt status is asserted, and if that interrupt is already enabled or is enabled at a later stage, an interrupt is raised. If caching of code fetches is important, you can poll this status register, or wait for this interrupt to be raised before continuing the rest of your code execution.

Cache disable

You can disable the cache at anytime by clearing the CACHEEN control bit. If there are outstanding access occurring, these are completed before the cache is disabled. Therefore, if software needs to know when the cache is finally disabled, it can either poll the CDC_STATUS register or enable the CDC interrupt and wait for the interrupt to arrive, after clearing the CACHEEN bit.

Cache invalidation

You can invalidate the cache at anytime by setting FINV. Setting either of these bits triggers a full cache invalidation, since the cache does not support Locked Lines. During cache invalidation, all accesses through the cache are still treated as uncached and bypass the cache until the cache invalidation process completes. At the end of the cache invalidation process, the IC_STATUS interrupt status is asserted and if that interrupt is already enabled or is enabled at a later stage, an interrupt is raised.

Performance targets

The cache aims to improve the average performance of the connected processor by holding a local copy of previously accessed or specified memory locations.

With zero-cycle access time on address hits, the design should improve performance on average by an unspecified amount. This amount is not possible to be determined precisely as it affected by many design parameters, code behaviors, and system considerations.

The cache can actively reduce processor performance in the following scenarios:

Uncacheable memory

For an uncacheable memory location, the cache adds a cycle of latency to the transaction.

Writes Any writes are treated as uncacheable, and incur an extra cycle of bus latency.

Cache misses

A cache miss causes a fetch to occur, and causes an extra cycle of bus latency for the initial data.

Subsequent transactions are also stalled while the rest of the fetch process occurs. The extra latency is determined by the time it takes for the memory subsystem to return the rest of the WRAP4 transaction.

3.3.3 Ensuring the cache handles memory modifications

The instruction cache does not support the ability to maintain coherency between an external code location with a corresponding cache line that is already in the cache. If the external location is to be modified, the system software must invalidate the cache. Having Secure cached lines in the cache that are not coherent to those in external code memory is a security issue that must be avoided. To maintain coherency when code space contents need to be modified:

1. Disable the ICache.
2. Manually invalidate the full ICache.
3. Modify the code space content.
4. Re-enable the ICache.

If SAU or MPC is modified so that a region in memory that is recently cached has moved from one security setting to another, because the ICache maintains the security attribute, it will not allow a hit on the cached line using the new security attribute and results in a cache miss. Therefore, this can result in Secure and Non-secure versions of the same memory location residing in the cache and reducing its efficiency. It can also potentially pose a security risk if the older cache line is accessed again with the original access attribute when it is no longer intended to be available in that world. Therefore, ARM recommends that you invalidate the cache to avoid this risk. To maintain coherency and security when code space contents security attributes need to be modified:

1. Disable the ICache.
2. Manually invalidate the ICache.
3. Reprogram and reconfigure the code area contents and security behavior.
4. Enable the ICache.

3.3.4 CPU Local Security Control Register Block

Each CPU Element contains a register block that contains registers to allow the security locks of each CPU to be configured. Each register block reside in the same reset and power domain as its associated CPU core so that when a CPU is powered down, they are also powered down and are cleared when powered back up.

Table 3-15 CPU Local Security Configuration register map

Offset	Register name	Access	Reset value	Full name
0x000	CPUSECCFG	RW	0x0	CPU Local Security Configuration register, CPUSECCFG on page 3-20
0x004- 0xFC8	-	-	-	Reserved.
0xFD0	PIDR4	RO	0x04	Product ID Register 4.
0xFD4	PIDR5	RO	0x0	Product ID Register 5.
0xFD8	PIDR6	RO	0x0	Product ID Register 6.
0xFDC	PIDR7	RO	0x0	Product ID Register 7.
0xFE0	PIDR0	RO	0x59	Product ID Register 0.
0xFE4	PIDR1	RO	0xB8	Product ID Register 1.

Table 3-15 CPU Local Security Configuration register map (continued)

Offset	Register name	Access	Reset value	Full name
0xFE8	PIDR2	RO	0x0B	Product ID Register 2.
0xFEC	PIDR3	RO	0x00	Product ID Register 3.
0xFF0	CIDR0	RO	0x0D	Component ID Register 0.
0xFF4	CIDR1	RO	0xF0	Component ID Register 1.
0xFF8	CIDR2	RO	0x05	Component ID Register 2.
0xFFC	CIDR3	RO	0xB1	Component ID Register 3.

CPU Local Security Configuration register, CPUSECCFG

The CPUSECCFG register allows software to set security lock bits at the interface of each associated processor.

Table 3-16 CPUSECCFG register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:2]	-	-	0x0	Reserved
[1]	LOCKSAU	Write one to set	0	Controls the LOCKSAU signal on the processor. When set to 1, disables writes to the SAU_CTRL, SAU_RNR, SAU_RBAR, and SAU_RLAR registers from software or from a debug agent connected to the processor. Once set to 1, it cannot be cleared until reset.
[0]	LOCKSVTAIRCR	Write one to set	0	Controls the LOCKSVTAIRCR signal on the processor. When set to 1, disables writes to the VTOR_S, AIRCR.PRIS, and AIRCR.BFHFNMINS registers. Once set to 1, it cannot be cleared until reset.

3.3.5 PPB regions

The *Private Peripheral Bus* (PPB) includes the following regions that provides access to the processor core internal processor resources:

- The *Instrumentation Trace Macrocell* (ITM) if included.
- The *Data Watchpoint and Trace* (DWT) if included.
- The *Flashpatch and Breakpoint* (FPB) if included.
- The *System Control Space* (SCS) which includes the *Memory Protection Unit* (MPU) and the *Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller* (NVIC).
- The *Embedded Trace Macrocell* (ETM) if included.
- The *Cross Trigger Interface* (CTI), if included.
- The debug ROM table.

This memory region is as defined in the *ARM®v8-M Architecture Reference Manual* and the *ARM® Cortex®-M33 Processor Integration and Implementation Manual*.

3.3.6 Interrupts

This section describes the (*Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller*) NVIC and the interrupt signal map. The NVIC supports:

- An implementation-defined number of interrupts in the range 4-240.
- A programmable priority level of 0-255 for each interrupt. A higher level corresponds to a lower priority, so level 0 is the highest interrupt priority.
- Level and pulse detection of interrupt signals.
- Dynamic re-prioritization of interrupts.
- Grouping of priority values into group priority and sub-priority fields.
- Interrupt tail-chaining.
- An external *Non-Maskable Interrupt* (NMI)
- Optional External Wake Up Controllers that provide ultra-low power sleep mode support.

Interrupt signals

This section describes interrupt signals and exceptions.

Table 3-17 Interrupt signals

Interrupt input	CPU 0 interrupt source	CPU 1 interrupt source
NMI	Combined SECURE WATCHDOG, S32KWATCHDOG and NMI_Expansion	Combined SECURE WATCHDOG, S32KWATCHDOG and NMI_Expansion.
IRQ[0]	NON-SECURE WATCHDOG Reset Request	NON-SECURE WATCHDOG Reset Request.
IRQ[1]	NON-SECURE WATCHDOG Interrupt	NON-SECURE WATCHDOG Interrupt.
IRQ[2]	S32K Timer	S32K Timer.
IRQ[3]	TIMER 0	TIMER 0.
IRQ[4]	TIMER 1	TIMER 1.
IRQ[5]	DUAL TIMER	DUAL TIMER
IRQ[6]	Message Handling Unit 0 CPU0 Interrupt	Message Handling Unit 0 CPU1 Interrupt
IRQ[7]	Message Handling Unit 1CPU0 Interrupt	Message Handling Unit 1 CPU1 Interrupt.
IRQ[8]	Reserved	Reserved.
IRQ[9]	MPC Combined (Secure)	MPC Combined (Secure).
IRQ[10]	PPC Combined (Secure)	PPC Combined (Secure).
IRQ[11]	MSC Combined (Secure)	MSC Combined (Secure).
IRQ[12]	Bridge Error Combined Interrupt (Secure)	Bridge Error Combined Interrupt (Secure).
IRQ[13]	CPU 0 Instruction Cache Invalidation Interrupt	CPU 1 Instruction Cache Invalidation Interrupt.
IRQ[14]	Reserved	Reserved.
IRQ[15]	SYS_PPU	SYS_PPU.

Table 3-17 Interrupt signals (continued)

Interrupt input	CPU 0 interrupt source	CPU 1 interrupt source
IRQ[16]	CPU0_PPU	CPU0_PPU.
IRQ[17]	CPU1_PPU	CPU1_PPU.
IRQ[18]	CPU0DBG_PPU	CPU0DBG_PPU.
IRQ[19]	CPU1DBG_PPU	CPU1DBG_PPU.
IRQ[20]	Reserved	Reserved.
IRQ[21]	Reserved	Reserved.
IRQ[22]	RAM0_PPU	RAM0_PPU.
IRQ[23]	RAM1_PPU	RAM1_PPU.
IRQ[24]	RAM2_PPU	RAM2_PPU.
IRQ[25]	RAM3_PPU	RAM3_PPU.
IRQ[26]	DEBUG_PPU	DEBUG_PPU.
IRQ[27]	Reserved	Reserved.
IRQ[28]	CPU0CTIIRQ0	CPU1CTIIRQ0.
IRQ[29]	CPU0CTIIRQ1	CPU1CTIIRQ1.
IRQ[31:30]	Reserved	Reserved.
IRQ[95:32]	Expansion Interrupt Inputs	Expansion Interrupt Inputs.

Interrupt controller registers

A summary of the interrupt controller registers are listed in the following table.

Table 3-18 Summary of interrupt controller registers

Address	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
0xE000E004	ICTR	RO	-	Interrupt Controller Type Register.
0xE000E100 – 0xE000E11C	NVIC_ISER0-NVIC_ISER7	RW	0	Interrupt Set Enable Registers.
0xE000E180 – 0xE000E19C	NVIC_ICER0-NVIC_ICER7	RW	0	Interrupt Clear Enable Registers.
0xE000E200 – 0xE000E21C	NVIC_ISPR0-NVIC_ISPR7	RW	0	Interrupt Set Pending Registers.
0xE000E280 – 0xE000E29C	NVIC_ICPR0-NVIC_ICPR7	RW	0	Interrupt Clear Pending Registers.
0xE000E300 – 0xE000E31C	NVIC_IABR0-NVIC_IABR7	RO	0	Interrupt Active Bit Registers.
0xE000E400 – 0xE000E41F	NVIC_IPRO-NVIC_IPR7	RW	0	Interrupt Priority Registers.

For more information on the interrupt controller, see the following documents:

- *ARM® Cortex®-M33 Processor Technical Reference Manual.*
- *ARM® ARMv7M Architecture Reference Manual.*

CPU0 interrupt registers

The CPU 0 Interrupt registers, CPU0INTR_STAT, CPU0INTR_SET and CPU0INTR_CLR, allow software to raise an interrupt, clear an interrupt and also check the value written that is used to raise the interrupt to CPU 0.

Separate Set and Clear registers allow individual bit of the interrupt status to be set and cleared, therefore it supports SW using each bit to represent an event that can be independently set and cleared.

The following table lists the status bits.

Table 3-19 CPU0INTR_STAT register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:4]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
[3:0]	CPU0INTR_STAT	RO	0x0	CPU 0 Interrupt Status. When any bit is set to 1, the MHU interrupt signal to CPU 0 is set HIGH.

The following table lists the set bits.

Table 3-20 CPU0INTR_SET Register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:4]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
[3:0]	CPU0INTR_SET	WO	0x0	CPU 0 Interrupt Set. If a 1 is written to CPU0INTR_SET[n], the corresponding CPU0INTR_STAT[n] is set HIGH.

The following table lists the clear bits.

Table 3-21 CPU0INTR_CLR Register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:4]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
[3:0]	CPU0INTR_CLR	WO	0x0	CPU 0 Interrupt Clear. If 1 is written to CPU0INTR_CLR[n], the corresponding CPU0INTR_STAT[n] is set LOW.

CPU1 interrupt registers

There are two processors in the SSE-200, so a second set of CPU interrupt registers have the same names and function as the CPU0 registers CPU0INTR_STAT, CPU0INTR_SET and CPU0INTR_CLR (except for the name change to CPU1INTR_STAT, CPU1INTR_SET and CPU1INTR_CLR).

3.3.7 Wakeup Interrupt Controller (WIC)

The *Wakeup Interrupt Controller* (WIC) is a peripheral that can detect an interrupt and wake the processor from deep sleep mode. The WIC is enabled only when the system is in deep sleep mode.

The WIC is not programmable, and does not have any registers or user interface. It operates entirely from hardware signals.

When the WIC is enabled and the processor enters deep sleep mode, the power management unit in the system can power down most of the processor. When the WIC receives an interrupt, it takes a number of clock cycles to wakeup the processor and restore its state to enable it to process the interrupt. This means interrupt latency is increased in deep sleep mode.

Note

Unlike in the standard Cortex-M33 processor, the IoT System WIC is implemented by latches. This means that **FCLK** can be gated completely during WIC based deep sleep. This is not a standard Cortex-M33 processor feature.

For more information on the WIC, see the *ARM® Cortex®-M33 Processor Technical Reference Manual*.

3.4 Base element

This section describes control registers associated with the following base element components:

- [CMSDK timer](#).
- [CMSDK dual timer on page 3-26](#).
- [CMSDK watchdog timers on page 3-28](#).
- [AHB5 TrustZone Memory Protection Controller on page 3-29](#).
- [Message handling unit on page 3-32](#).
- [Security Privilege Control Block on page 3-35](#).
- [Non-secure Privilege Control Block on page 3-51](#).

3.4.1 CMSDK timer

The base element has two CMSDK Timers:

- CMSDK TIMER 0 is located in non-secure region at 0x4000_0000 and in secure region at 0x5000_0000.
- CMSDK TIMER 1 is located in non-secure region at 0x4000_1000 and in secure region at 0x5000_1000.

The timer can be halted by CTI triggers from the debug subsystem.

———— Note ————

The **EXTIN** input of the timers is connected to the CTI debug halt logic, and it is used to stop the timer counter logic if there is a debug halt access.

To enable this functionality the **EXTIN** must be enabled by writing to the CTRL register:

- CTRL bit[2] = 0.
- CTRL bit[1] = 1.

The timer resides in the PD_SYS power domain and is reset by **nWARMRESETSYS**.

A summary of the registers in the timer is listed below:

See the *ARM® Cortex®-M System Design Kit Technical Reference Manual* for register details.

Table 3-22 Summary of CMSDK Timer registers

Offset	Name	Access	Width	Reset value	Description
0x000	CTRL	RW	4	0x0	3: Interrupt enable. 2: Select external input as clock. 1: Select external input as enable. 0: Enable.
0x004	VALUE	RW	32	0x0	Current value.
0x008	RELOAD	RW	32	0x0	Reload value. A write to this register sets the current value.
0x00C	INTSTATUS INTCLEAR	RW	1	0x0	Timer interrupt. Write 1 to clear.
0xFD0	PID4	RO	8	0x04	Peripheral ID register 4.
0xFD4	PID5	RO	8	0x0	Peripheral ID register 5.

Table 3-22 Summary of CMSDK Timer registers (continued)

Offset	Name	Access	Width	Reset value	Description
0xFD8	PID6	RO	8	0x0	Peripheral ID register 6.
0xFDC	PID7	RO	8	0x0	Peripheral ID register 7.
0xFE0	PID0	RO	8	0x22	Peripheral ID register 0. [7:0]: Part number[7:0].
0xFE4	PID1	RO	8	0xB8	Peripheral ID register 1. [7:4]: jep106_id_3_0. [3:0]: Part number[11:8].
0xFE8	PID2	RO	8	0x0B	Peripheral ID register 2. [7:4]: Revision. [3]: jedec_used. [2:0]: jep106_id_6_4.
0xFEC	PID3	RO	8	0x0	Peripheral ID register 3 [7:4]: ECO revision number. [3:0]: Customer modification number.
0xFF0	CID0	RO	8	0x0D	Component ID register 0.
0xFF4	CID1	RO	8	0xF0	Component ID register 1.
0xFF8	CID2	RO	8	0x05	Component ID register 2.
0xFFC	CID3	RO	8	0xB1	Component ID register 3.

3.4.2 CMSDK dual timer

The timers can be halted by CTI triggers from the debug subsystem.

The timers resides in the PD_SYS power domain and is reset by **nWARMRESETSYS**.

The base element has a single CMSDK DUAL TIMER in non-secure region at 0x4000_2000 and in secure region at 0x5000_2000.

See the *ARM® Cortex®-M System Design Kit Technical Reference Manual* for register details for the dual timer.

Table 3-23 Summary of CMSDK Dual Timer registers

Offset	Name	Access	Width	Reset value	Description
0x00	TIMER1LOAD	RW	32	0x0	The value from which the counter is to decrement.
0x04	TIMER1VALUE	RO	32	0xFFFFFFFF	The current value of the decrementing counter.
0x08	TIMER1CONTROL	RW	8	0x20	Timer interrupt and enable control.
0x0C	TIMER1INTCLR	WO	-	-	Any write clears the interrupt output from the counter.
0x10	TIMER1RIS	RO	1	0x0	Indicates the raw interrupt status from the counter.
0x14	TIMER1MIS	RO	1	0x0	Indicates the masked interrupt status from the counter.

Table 3-23 Summary of CMSDK Dual Timer registers (continued)

Offset	Name	Access	Width	Reset value	Description
0x18	TIMER1BGLOAD	RW	32	0x0	Contains the value from which the counter is to decrement.
0x20	TIMER2LOAD	RW	32	0x0	The value from which the counter is to decrement.
0x24	TIMER2VALUE	RO	32	0xFFFFFFFF	The current value of the decrementing counter.
0x28	TIMER2CONTROL	RW	8	0x20	Timer interrupt and enable control.
0x2C	TIMER2INTCLR	WO	-	-	Any write clears the interrupt output from the counter.
0x30	TIMER2RIS	RO	1	0x0	Indicates the raw interrupt status from the counter.
0x34	TIMER2MIS	RO	1	0x0	Indicates the masked interrupt status from the counter.
0x38	TIMER2BGLOAD	RW	32	0x0	Contains the value from which the counter is to decrement.
0xF00	TIMERITCR	RW	1	0x0	Enables integration test mode. When in this mode, the Integration Test Output Set Register directly controls the masked interrupt outputs.
0xF04	TIMERITOP	WO	2	0x0	When in integration test mode, the values directly drive the enabled interrupt outputs.
0xFD0	TIMERPERIPHID4	RO	8	0x04	Peripheral ID Register 4: [7:4]: Block count. [3:0]: jep106_c_code.
0xFD4	TIMERPERIPHID5	RO	8	0x00	Peripheral ID Register 5.
0xFD8	TIMERPERIPHID6	RO	8	0x00	Peripheral ID Register 6.
0xFDC	TIMERPERIPHID7	RO	8	0x00	Peripheral ID Register 7.
0xFE0	TIMERPERIPHID0	RO	8	0x23	Peripheral ID Register 0: [7:0]: Part number[7:0].
0xFE4	TIMERPERIPHID1	RO	8	0xB8	Peripheral ID Register 1: [7:4]: jep106_id_3_0.[3:0]: Part number[11:8].
0xFE8	TIMERPERIPHID2	RO	8	0x1B	Peripheral ID Register 2: [7:4]: Revision. [3]: jedec_used. [2:0]: jep106_id_6_4.
0xFEC	TIMERPERIPHID3	RO	8	0x00	Peripheral ID Register 3: [7:4]: ECO revision number. [3:0]: customer modification number.
0xFF0	TIMERPCELLID0	RO	8	0x0D	Component ID Register 0.
0xFF4	TIMERPCELLID1	RO	8	0xF0	Component ID Register 1.
0xFF8	TIMERPCELLID2	RO	8	0x05	Component ID Register 2.
0xFFC	TIMERPCELLID3	RO	8	0xB1	Component ID Register 3.

3.4.3 CMSDK watchdog timers

The Base element has two CMSDK watchdog timers:

- Non-secure CMSDK watchdog in the non-secure region at 0x4008_1000
- Secure CMSDK watchdog in the secure region at 0x5008_1000

Each watchdog is permanently mapped to either a secure or a non-secure region of address space:

- The non-secure watchdog can raise an interrupt to both CPU cores. On a watchdog reset request event, a separate interrupt is raised instead, but software can also choose to allow it to directly reset the system.
- The secure watchdog can raise a Non-Maskable Interrupt (NMI) to both CPU cores. However, in this case, a watchdog reset event resets the entire system.

The timers can be halted by CTI triggers from the debug subsystem.

The timers resides in the PD_SYS power domain and is reset by **nWARMRESETSYS**.

The following table shows a summary of the CMSDK watchdog registers.

Table 3-24 Summary of Watchdog registers

Offset	Name	Access	Width	Reset value	Description
0x00	WDOGLOAD	RW	32	0xFFFFFFFF	Contains the value from which the counter is to decrement.
0x04	WDOGVALUE	RO	32	0xFFFFFFFF	Contains the current value of the decrementing counter.
0x08	WDOGCONTROL	RW	2	0x0	Enables the software to control the watchdog unit.
0x0C	WDOGINTCLR	WO	-	-	A write of any value register clears the watchdog interrupt, and reloads the counter from the value in WDOGLOAD.
0x10	WDOGRIS	RO	1	0x0	Indicates the raw interrupt status from the counter.
0x14	WDOGMIS	RO	1	0x0	Indicates the masked interrupt status from the counter.
0xC00	WDOGLOCK	RW	32	0x0	Disables write accesses to all other registers.
0xF00	WDOGITCR	RW	1	0x0	Enables integration test mode.
0xF04	WDOGITOP	WO	2	0x0	When the WDOGITOP Register is in integration test mode, the values in this register directly drive the enabled interrupt output and reset output.
0xFD0	WDOGPERIPHID4	RO	8	0x04	Peripheral ID Register 4: [7:4]: Block count. [3:0]: jep106_c_code.
0xFD4	WDOGPERIPHID5	RO	8	0x0	Peripheral ID Register 5.
0xFD8	WDOGPERIPHID6	RO	8	0x0	Peripheral ID Register 6.
0xFDC	WDOGPERIPHID7	RO	8	0x0	Peripheral ID Register 7.
0xFE0	WDOGPERIPHID0	RO	8	0x24	Peripheral ID Register 0: [7:0]: Part number[7:0].

Table 3-24 Summary of Watchdog registers (continued)

Offset	Name	Access	Width	Reset value	Description
0xFE4	WDOGPERIPHID1	RO	8	0xB8	Peripheral ID Register 1: [7:4]: jep106_id_3_0. [3:0]: Part number[11:8].
0xFE8	WDOGPERIPHID2	RO	8	0x1B	Peripheral ID Register 2: [7:4]: Revision. [3]: jedec_used. [2:0]: jep106_id_6_4.
0xFEC	WDOGPERIPHID3	RO	8	0x0	Peripheral ID Register 3: [7:4]: ECO revision number. [3:0]: Customer modification number.
0xFF0	WDOGPCCELLID0	RO	8	0x0D	Component ID Register 0.
0xFF4	WDOGPCCELLID1	RO	8	0xF0	Component ID Register 1.
0xFF8	WDOGPCCELLID2	RO	8	0x05	Component ID Register 2.
0xFFC	WDOGPCCELLID3	RO	8	0xB1	Component ID Register 3.

See the *ARM® Cortex®-M System Design Kit Technical Reference Manual* for register details of the watchdog timer.

3.4.4 AHB5 TrustZone Memory Protection Controller

The base element implements a memory protection controller for each SRAM block. Each MPC APB configuration interface is mapped to the following base addresses:

- 0x5008_3000 for SRAM Bank 0.
- 0x5008_4000 for SRAM Bank 1.
- 0x5008_5000 for SRAM Bank 2.
- 0x5008_6000 for SRAM Bank 3.

See *ARM® CoreLink™ SIE-200 System IP for Embedded Technical Reference Manual* for more information on the AHB5 TrustZone Memory Protection Controller.

The configuration registers are listed in the following table:

Table 3-25 Summary of MPC registers

Offset	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
0x000	CTRL	RW	0x0	bit[0]: Reserved. bit[2:1]: Reserved bit[4]: Security error response configuration (CFG_SEC_RESP) -> 0:RAZ-WI, 1: Bus Error. bit[5]: Reserved. bit[6]: Data interface gating request. bit[7]: Data interface gating acknowledge (RO). bit[8]: Auto-increment. bit[30:9]: Reserved. bit[31]: Security lockdown.
0x004 – 0x00C	RSVD	RO	0x0	Reserved.
0x010	BLK_MAX	RO	-	Maximum value of block based index register.
0x014	BLK_CFG	RO	-	Bit[3:0] Block size: 0: 32 Bytes 1: 64 Bytes ... Block size = $1 \ll (\text{BLK_CFG} + 5)$ Bit[30:4]: Reserved. Bit[31]: Initialization in progress.
0x018	BLK_IDX	RW	0x0	Index value for accessing block based look up table
0x01C	BLK_LUT[n]	RW	- (implementation defined)	Block based gating Look Up Table (LUT): Access to block based look up configuration space pointed to by BLK_IDX. Bit[31:0]: each bit indicate one block: If BLK_IDX is 0, bit[0] is block #0, bit[31] is block #31. If BLK_IDX is 1, bit[0] is block #32, bit[31] is block #63. ... For each configuration bit, 0 indicates secure, 1 indicates non-secure. A full word write or read to this register automatically increments the BLK_IDX by one.
0x020	INT_STAT	RO	0x0	bit[0]: mpc_irq triggered. bit[31:1]: Reserved.
0x024	INT_CLEAR	WO	0x0	bit[0]: mpc_irq clear (cleared automatically). bit[31:1]: Reserved.
0x028	INT_EN	RW	0x0	bit[0]: mpc_irq enable. Bits are valid when mpc_irq triggered is set.
0x02C	INT_INFO1	RO	0x0	haddr[31:0] when the first mpc_irq triggered. Bits are valid when mpc_irq triggered is set.

Table 3-25 Summary of MPC registers (continued)

Offset	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
0x030	INT_INFO2	RO	0x0	Various debug bits when the first mpc_irq triggered; Bit [15:0]: hmaster. Bit [16]: hnonsec. Bit [17]: cfg_ns. Bit [31:18]: Reserved. Bits are valid when mpc_irq triggered is set.
0x034	INT_SET	WO	0x0	bit[0]: mpc_irq set. Debug purpose only. bit[31:1]: Reserved.
0x038 – 0xFCC	RSVD	RO	0x0	Reserved.
0xFD0	PIDR4	RO	0x04	Peripheral ID 4 [7:4]: block count. [3:0]: jep106_c_code.
0xFD4	PIDR5	RO	0x0	Peripheral ID 5 (not used).
0xFD8	PIDR6	RO	0x0	Peripheral ID 6 (not used).
0xFDC	PIDR7	RO	0x0	Peripheral ID 7 (not used).
0xFE0	PIDR0	RO	0x60	Peripheral ID 0 (Part number [7:0].)
0xFE4	PIDR1	RO	0xB8	Peripheral ID 1 [7:4]: jep106_id_3_0. [3:0]: Part number.
0xFE8	PIDR2	RO	0x0B	Peripheral ID 2 [7:4]: revision, [3]: jedec_used, [2:0]: jep106_id_6_4.
0xFEC	PIDR3	RO	0x0	Peripheral ID 3 [7:4]: ECO revision number, [3:0]: Customer modification number.
0xFF0	CIDR0	RO	0x0D	Component ID 0.
0xFF4	CIDR1	RO	0xF0	Component ID 1 (PrimeCell class).
0xFF8	CIDR2	RO	0x05	Component ID 2.
0xFFC	CIDR3	RO	0xB1	Component ID 3.

Look Up Table (LUT) examples

The contents of the LUT can be accessed in several ways that might require different configurations of the autoincrement function of the BLK_IDX register.

To dump the full contents of the LUT:

1. Set the autoincrement enable bit, CTRL[8], to 0x1.
2. Read the BLK_MAX register. This has a value 0xN which represents the last address in the LUT.

3. Write 0x0 to the BLK_IDX register.
4. Read the BLK_LUT register to 0xN times to read the complete LUT.

To rewrite the full contents of the LUT:

1. Set autoincrement enable bit, CTRL[8], to 0x1.
2. Read the BLK_MAX register. This has a value 0xN which represents the last address in the LUT.
3. Write 0x0 to the BLK_IDX register.
4. Write the new values to the BLK_LUT register 0xN times to fill the complete LUT.

To read-modify-write:

1. Set autoincrement enable bit, CTRL[8], to 0x0.
2. Write the required address to the BLK_IDX.
3. Read the current contents of the LUT.
4. Write the new contents to the LUT.

Note

Even byte accesses can be used to update only the required byte of the register without reading the full contents:

Configuration lockdown

The AHB5 TrustZone MPC provides a configuration lockdown feature that prevents malicious software from changing the security configuration. Writing 0x1 to the security lockdown bit, CTRL[31], enables the configuration lockdown feature.

After the configuration lockdown feature is enabled:

- It can only be disabled by a component reset which resets CTRL[31] to 0.
- The following registers are read-only:
 - CTRL.
 - BLK_LUT.
 - INT_EN.

Note

ARM recommends that you write 0x1 to the LUT auto-increment bit, CTRL[8] before enabling the configuration lockdown feature.

When the feature is enabled, only LUT dumping is available which is simpler when BLK_IDX increments automatically during the dump.

3.4.5 Message handling unit

Two *Message Handling Units* (MHU) allow software to raise interrupts to the CPU cores. Each MHU is mapped to a secure and a non-secure area as follows:

- MHU0 in non-secure region at 0x4000_3000 and secure region at 0x5000_3000.
- MHU1 in non-secure region at 0x4000_4000 and secure region at 0x5000_4000.

The APB PPC can control which area the MHU reside in.

For write access to these registers, only 32-bit writes are supported. Any Byte and Half word writes will result in its write data ignored.

See [CPU0 interrupt registers on page 3-23](#).

Each MHU has the following register map:

Table 3-26 Summary of MHU registers

Offset	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
0x000	CPU0INTR_STAT	RO	0x0	CPU 0 Interrupt Status Register.
0x004	CPU0INTR_SET	WO	0x0	CPU 0 Interrupt Set Register.
0x008	CPU0INTR_CLR	WO	0x0	CPU 0 Interrupt Clear Register.
0x00C	Reserved	-	0x0	Reserved.
0x010	CPU1INTR_STAT	RO	0x0	CPU 1 Interrupt Status Register.
0x014	CPU1INTR_SET	WO	0x0	CPU 1 Interrupt Set Register.
0x018	CPU1INTR_CLR	WO	0x0	CPU 1 Interrupt Clear Register.
0x01C – 0xFC8	Reserved	-	0x0	Reserved.
0xFD0	PIDR4	RO	0x0000_0004	Peripheral ID 4.
0xFD4 – 0xFDC	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
0xFE0	PIDR0	RO	0x0000_0056	Peripheral ID 0.
0xFE4	PIDR1	RO	0x0000_00B8	Peripheral ID 1.
0xFE8	PIDR2	RO	0x0000_000B	Peripheral ID 2.
0xFEC	PIDR3	RO	0x0000_0000	Peripheral ID 3.
0xFF0	CIDR0	RO	0x0000_000D	Component ID 0.
0xFF4	CIDR1	RO	0x0000_00F0	Component ID 1.
0xFF8	CIDR2	RO	0x0000_0005	Component ID 2.
0xFFC	CIDR3	RO	0x0000_00B1	Component ID 3.

CPU 0 interrupt registers

The CPU 0 Interrupt registers, CPU0INTR_STAT, CPU0INTR_SET and CPU0INTR_CLR, allow software to raise an interrupt, clear an interrupt and also check the value written that is used to raise the interrupt to CPU 0. Separate Set and Clear registers allow individual bit of the interrupt status to be set and cleared, therefore it supports SW using each bit to represent an event that can be independently set and cleared.

Table 3-27 CPU0INTR_STAT register

Bits	Name	Access	Width	Reset value	Description
[31:4]	Reserved	RO	28	0x000000	Reserved
[3:0]	CPU0INTR_STAT	RO	4	0x0	CPU 0 Interrupt Status. When any bit is set to HIGH, the MHU interrupt signal to CPU 1 will be set to HIGH.

Table 3-28 CPU0INTR_SET register

Bits	Name	Access	Width	Reset value	Description
[31:4]	Reserved	RO	28	0x000000	Reserved
[3:0]	CPU0INTR_SET	WO	4	0x0	CPU 0 Interrupt Set. When a 1 is written to CPU0INTR_SET[n], the corresponding CPU0INTR_STAT[n] is set to HIGH.

Table 3-29 CPU0INTR_CLR register

Bits	Name	Access	Width	Reset value	Description
[31:4]	Reserved	RO	28	0x000000	Reserved
[3:0]	CPU0INTR_CLR	WO	4	0x0	CPU 0 Interrupt Set. When a 1 is written to CPU0INTR_CLR[n], the corresponding CPU0INTR_STAT[n] is set to LOW.

CPU 1 interrupt registers

The CPU 1 Interrupt registers, CPU1INTR_STAT, CPU1INTR_SET and CPU1INTR_CLR, allow software to raise an interrupt, clear an interrupt and also check the value written that is used to raise the interrupt to CPU 1. Separate Set and Clear registers allow individual bit of the interrupt status to be set and cleared, therefore it supports SW using each bit to represent an event that can be independently set and cleared.

— Note —

In a single CPU system, these registers will not exist. And therefore any access to these registers will result in RZWI

Table 3-30 CPU1INTR_STAT register

Bits	Name	Access	Width	Reset value	Description
[31:4]	Reserved	RO	28	0x000000	Reserved
[3:0]	CPU1INTR_STAT	RO	4	0x0	CPU 1 Interrupt Status. When any bit is set to HIGH, the MHU interrupt signal to CPU 1 will be set to HIGH.

Table 3-31 CPU1INTR_SET register

Bits	Name	Access	Width	Reset value	Description
[31:4]	Reserved	RO	28	0x000000	Reserved
[3:0]	CPU1INTR_SET	WO	4	0x0	CPU 1 Interrupt Set. When a 1 is written to CPU1INTR_SET[n], the corresponding CPU1INTR_STAT[n] is set to HIGH.

Table 3-32 CPU1INTR_CLR register

Bits	Name	Access	Width	Reset value	Description
[31:4]	Reserved	RO	28	0x000000	Reserved
[3:0]	CPU1INTR_CLR	WO	4	0x0	CPU 1 Interrupt Set. When a 1 is written to CPU1INTR_CLR[n], the corresponding CPU1INTR_STAT[n] is set to LOW.

3.4.6 Security Privilege Control Block

The Secure Privilege Control Block implements program-visible states that allow software to control security gating units within the design.

Writes to the registers must be 32-bits wide. Attempted byte and half word writes are ignored.

Reads are only permitted from secure privileged access. All registers reside in the PD_SYS power domain and are reset by **nWARMRESETSYS**.

The register block base address is 0x5008_0000. The following table lists the privilege control registers.

Table 3-33 Summary of Secure Privilege Control registers

Offset	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
0x000	SPCSECCTRL	RW	0x0	Secure Privilege Controller Secure Configuration Control register.
0x004	BUSWAIT	RW	Parameterized	Bus Access wait control after reset.
0x008	Reserved	-	0x0	Reserved.

Table 3-33 Summary of Secure Privilege Control registers (continued)

Offset	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
0x010	SECRESPCFG	RW	0x0	Security Violation Response Configuration register.
0x014	NSCCFG	RW	0x0	Non Secure Callable Configuration for IDAU.
0x018	Reserved	-	0x0	Reserved.
0x01C	SECMPCINTSTATUS	RO	0x0	Secure MPC Interrupt Status.
0x020	SECPPCINTSTAT	RO	0x0	Secure PPC Interrupt Status.
0x024	SECPPCINTCLR	WO	0x0	Secure PPC Interrupt Clear.
0x028	SECPPCINTEN	RW	0x0	Secure PPC Interrupt Enable.
0x02C	Reserved	-	0x0	Reserved.
0x030	SECMSCINTSTAT	RO	0x0	Secure MSC Interrupt Status.
0x034	SECMSCINTCLR	RW	0x0	Secure MSC Interrupt Clear.
0x038	SECMSCINTEN	RW	0x0	Secure MSC Interrupt Enable.
0x03C	Reserved	-	0x0	Reserved.
0x040	BRGINTSTAT	RO	0x0	Bridge Buffer Error Interrupt Status.
0x044	BRGINTCLR	WO	0x0	Bridge Buffer Error Interrupt Clear.
0x048	BRGINTEN	RW	0x0	Bridge Buffer Error Interrupt Enable.
0x04C	Reserved	-	0x0	Reserved.
0x050	AHBNSPPC0	RW	0x0	Non-Secure Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control #0. Defines the Non-secure access settings for peripherals in the Base element.
0x054 – 0x05C	Reserved	-	0x0	Reserved.
0x060	AHBNSPPCEXP0	RW	0x0	Expansion 0 Non_Secure Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the non-secure access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow non-secure access. 0: Dis-allow non-secure access. Resets to 0.
0x064	AHBNSPPCEXP1	RW	0x0	Expansion 1 Non_Secure Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the non-secure access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow non-secure access. 0: Dis-allow non-secure access. Resets to 0.
0x068	AHBNSPPCEXP2	RW	0x0	Expansion 2 Non_Secure Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the non-secure access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow non-secure access. 0: Dis-allow non-secure access. Resets to 0.

Table 3-33 Summary of Secure Privilege Control registers (continued)

Offset	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
0x06C	AHBNSPPCEXP3	RW	0x0	Expansion 3 Non_Secure Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the non-secure access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow non-secure access. 0: Dis-allow non-secure access. Resets to 0.
0x070	APBNSPPC0	RW	0x0	Non-Secure Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control #0.
0x074	APBNSPPC1	RW	0x0	Non-Secure Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control #1. This register controls the PPC within the System Control element.
0x078 – 0x07C	Reserved	-	0x0	Reserved.
0x080	APBNSPPCEXP0	RW	0x0	Expansion 0 Non_Secure Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the non-secure access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow non-secure access. 0: Dis-allow non-secure access. Resets to 0.
0x084	APBNSPPCEXP1	RW	0x0	Expansion 1 Non_Secure Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the non-secure access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow non-secure access. 0: Disallow non-secure access. Resets to 0.
0x088	APBNSPPCEXP2	RW	0x0	Expansion 2 Non_Secure Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the non-secure access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow non-secure access. 0: Disallow non-secure access. Resets to 0.
0x08C	APBNSPPCEXP3	RW	0x0	Expansion 3 Non_Secure Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the non-secure access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow non-secure access. 0: Disallow non-secure access. Resets to 0.
0x090	AHBSPPC0	RO	0x0	Secure Unprivileged Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control #0.
0x094 – 0x09C	Reserved	-	0x0	Reserved.

Table 3-33 Summary of Secure Privilege Control registers (continued)

Offset	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
0x0A0	AHBSPPPCEXP0	RW	0x0	Expansion 0 Secure Unprivileged Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow secure unprivileged access. 0: Dis-allow secure unprivileged access. Resets to 0.
0x0A4	AHBSPPPCEXP1	RW	0x0	Expansion 1 Secure Unprivileged Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow secure unprivileged access. 0: Dis-allow secure unprivileged access. Resets to 0.
0x0A8	AHBSPPPCEXP2	RW	0x0	Expansion 2 Secure Unprivileged Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow secure unprivileged access. 0: Dis-allow secure unprivileged access. Resets to 0.
0x0AC	AHBSPPPCEXP3	RW	0x0	Expansion 3 Secure Unprivileged Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow secure unprivileged access. 0: Dis-allow secure unprivileged access. Resets to 0.
0x0B0	APBSPPPC0	RW	0x0	Secure Unprivileged Access APB slave Peripheral. Protection Control #0. This register control the PPC within the Base element.
0x0B4	APBSPPPC1	RW	0x0	Secure Unprivileged Access APB slave Peripheral. Protection Control #1. This register controls the PPC within the System Control element.
0x0B8 – 0x0BC	Reserved	-	0x0	Reserved.
0x0C0	APBSPPPCEXP0	RW	0x0	Expansion 0 Secure Unprivileged Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow secure unprivileged access. 0: Dis-allow secure unprivileged access. Resets to 0.
0x0C4	APBSPPPCEXP1	RW	0x0	Expansion 1 Secure Unprivileged Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow secure unprivileged access. 0: Dis-allow secure unprivileged access. Resets to 0

Table 3-33 Summary of Secure Privilege Control registers (continued)

Offset	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
0x0C8	APBSPPPCEXP2	RW	0x0	Expansion 2 Secure Unprivileged Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow secure unprivileged access. 1: Allow secure unprivileged access. 0: Dis-allow secure unprivileged access. Resets to 0.
0x0CC	APBSPPPCEXP3	RW	0x0	Expansion 3 Secure Unprivileged Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each field defines the secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral: 1: Allow secure unprivileged access. 0: Dis-allow secure unprivileged access. Resets to 0.
0x0D0	NSMSCEXP	RO	0x0	Expansion MSC Non-Secure Configuration. Each field defines if a Master connected to an Expansion Master Security Controller is secure or non-secure: 1: Master is Non-secure, 0: Master is Secure.
0x0D4 – 0xFCC	Reserved	-	0x0	Reserved
0xFD0	PID4	RO	0x0000_0004	Peripheral ID 4
0xFD4	PID5	RO	0x0	Reserved
0xFD8	PID6	RO	0x0	Reserved
0xFDC	PID7	RO	0x0	Reserved
0xFE0	PID0	RO	0x0000_0052	Peripheral ID 0
0xFE4	PID1	RO	0x0000_00B8	Peripheral ID 1
0xFE8	PID2	RO	0x0000_000B	Peripheral ID 2
0xFEC	PID3	RO	0x0	Peripheral ID 3
0xFF0	CID0	RO	0x0000_000D	Component ID 0
0xFF4	CID1	RO	0x0000_00F0	Component ID 1
0xFF8	CID2	RO	0x0000_0005	Component ID 2
0xFFC	CID3	RO	0x0000_00B1	Component ID 3

SPCSECCTRL

The Security Privilege Controller Security Configuration Control register implements the security lock register.

Table 3-34 SPCSECCTRL register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:1]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
0	SPCSECCFGLOCK	write one to set	0x0	<p>Active High control to disable writes to security related control registers in the Secure Privilege Control register block. After being set to HIGH, it can no longer be cleared to zero except by reset or the base system powering down. Registers that can no longer be modified when SPCSECCFGLOCK is set to HIGH are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NSCCFG • AHBNSPPC0 • AHBNSPPCEXP<N> • APBNSPPC0 • APBNSPPC1 • APBNSPPCEXP<N> • AHBSPPPC0 • AHBSPPPCEXP<N> • APBSPPPC0 • APBSPPPC1 • APBSPPPCEXP<N> • NSMSCEXP.

BUSWAIT

The Bus Access Wait register allows software to gate access entering the Base element from specific masters in the system, causing them to stall so that the CPU can complete the configuration of the MPCs or other Security registers in the system prior to the stalled accesses commencing.

Table 3-35 BUSWAIT register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:17]	Reserved	RO	-	Reserved

Table 3-35 BUSWAIT register (continued)

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
16	ACC_WAITN_STATUS	RW	0x0	Request gating units in the system to block bus access to system: 1: allow access. 0: block access. This control only affects the ACG in the system that feeds into the main AHB fabric, and it excludes access from both CPU cores. It also drives the output signal ACCWAITN .
[15:1]	Reserved	RO	-	Reserved
0	ACC_WAITN	RW	ACC_WAITN_RST	This status register indicates the current status of any gating units that are used to block bus access to the system: 1: allow access. 0: block access. This register reflects the values on ACCWAITNSTATUS .

SECRESPCFG

The Security Violation Response Configuration register is used to define a slave response to an access that causes security violation on the Bus Fabric.

Table 3-36 SECRESPCFG register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:1]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
0	SECRESPCFG	RW	0x0	This field configures the slave response in case of a security violation: 0: Read-Zero Write Ignore 1: bus error <div style="text-align: center;"> Note </div> Some slaves, for example the system MPCs, provide their own control registers to configure their response. These slaves do not depend on this control bit.

NSCCFG

The Non-Secure Callable Configuration register allows software to define if the Secure Code region 0x1000_0000 to 0x1FFF_FFFF and the Secure RAM region 0x3000_0000 to 0x3FFF_FFFF are Non-secure Callable regions of memory.

Table 3-37 NSCCFG register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:2]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
1	RAMNSC	RW	0x0	Configures if the RAM region (0x3000_0000 to 0x3FFF_FFFF) is Non-secure Callable: 0: Not Non-secure Callable 1: Non-secure Callable.
0	CODENSC	RW	0x0	Configures if the CODE region (0x1000_0000 to 0x1FFF_FFFF) is Non-secure Callable: 0: Not Non-secure Callable 1: Non-secure Callable.

SECMPCINTSTATUS

The interrupt signals from all *Memory Protection Controllers* (MPC), both within the SSE-200 subsystem and in the expansion logic are merged and sent to the Cortex-M33 NVIC on a single Interrupt signal. The Secure MPC Interrupt Status Register therefore provides secure software with the ability to check which one of the MPC is causing the interrupt. After the source of the interrupt is identified, you must use the MPC register interface to clear the interrupt.

Table 3-38 SECMPCINTSTATUS register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:16]	S_MPCEXP_STATUS	RO	0x0	Interrupt Status for Expansion Memory Protection Controller. Each bit <i>n</i> shows the status of input signal S_MPCEXP_STATUS[<i>n</i>]. The parameter MPCEXP_DIS defines if each bit within this register is implemented such that if MPCEXP_DIS[<i>i</i>] = 1 then S_MPCEXP_STATUS[<i>i</i>] is disabled and always reads as zeros.
[15:4]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
3	S_MPCSRAM3_STATUS	RO	0x0	Interrupt Status for Memory Protection Controller of SRAM BANK 3. If BANK 3 does not exist, this area is reserved and Read as zeros.

Table 3-38 SECMPINTSTATUS register (continued)

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
2	S_MPCSRAM2_STATUS	RO	0x0	Interrupt Status for Memory Protection Controller of SRAM BANK 2. If BANK 2 does not exist, this area is reserved and Read as zeros.
1	S_MPCSRAM1_STATUS	RO	0x0	Interrupt Status for Memory Protection Controller of SRAM BANK 1. If BANK 1 does not exist, this area is reserved and Read as zeros.
0	S_MPCSRAM0_STATUS	RO	0x0	Interrupt Status for Memory Protection Controller of SRAM BANK 0.

SECPPCINTSTAT, SECPPCINTCLR and SECPPCINTEN

When access violations occur on any Peripheral Protection Controller, a level interrupt is raised from a combined interrupt to the Cortex-M33 NVIC. The PPC Secure PPC Interrupt Status, Clear and Enable Registers allow software to determine source of the interrupt, Clear the interrupt, and enable or disable (Mask) the interrupt.

The following table describes the bits used in the SECPPINSTAT register:

Table 3-39 PPC SECPPCINTSTAT register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:24]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
[23:20]	S_AHBPPCEXP_STATUS	RO	0x0	Interrupt Status of Expansion Peripheral Protection Controller for AHB slaves. Each bit <i>n</i> shows the status of input signal S_AHBPPCEXP_STATUS[<i>n</i>]
[19:16]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
[15:8]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
[7:4]	S_APBPPCEXP_STATUS	RO	0x0	Interrupt Status of Expansion Peripheral Protection Controller for APB slaves. Each bit <i>n</i> shows the status of input signal S_APBPPCEXP_STATUS[<i>n</i>].
[3:2]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
1	S_APBPPC1PERIP_STATUS	RO	0x0	Interrupt Status of Peripheral Protection Controller for APB slaves within the System Control element.
0	S_APBPPC0PERIP_STATUS	RO	0x0	Interrupt Status of Peripheral Protection Controller for APB slaves within the Base element.

The following table describes the bits used in the SECPPINCLR register:

Table 3-40 SECPPCINTCLR Register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:24]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
[23:20]	S_AHBPPCEXP_CLR	WO	0x0	Interrupt Clear of Expansion Peripheral Protection Controller for AHB slaves. Each bit <i>n</i> drives the output signal S_AHBPPCEXP_CLEAR[<i>n</i>].
[19:16]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
[15:8]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
[7:4]	S_APBPPCEXP_CLR	WO	0x0	Interrupt Clear of Expansion Peripheral Protection Controller for APB slaves. Each bit <i>n</i> drives the output signal S_APBPPCEXP_CLEAR[<i>n</i>].
[3:2]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
1	S_APBPPC1PERIP_CLR	WO	0x0	Interrupt Clear of Peripheral Protection Controller for APB slaves within the System Control element. Write 1 to clear.
0	S_APBPPC0PERIP_CLR	WO	0x0	Interrupt Clear of Peripheral Protection Controller for APB slaves within the Base element. Write 1 to clear.

The following table describes the bits used in the SECPPINEN register:

Table 3-41 SECPPCINTEN Register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:24]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
[23:20]	S_AHBPPCEXP_EN	RW	0x0	Interrupt Enable of Expansion Peripheral Protection Controller for AHB slaves. Each bit <i>n</i> Enables or disable an interrupt from S_AHBPPCEXP_STATUS[<i>n</i>]
[19:16]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
[15:8]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
[7:4]	S_APBPPCEXP_EN	RW	0x0	Interrupt Enable of Expansion Peripheral Protection Controller for APB slaves. Each bit <i>n</i> Enables or disable an interrupt from S_APBPPCEXP_STATUS[<i>n</i>]
[3:2]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
1	S_APBPPC1PERIP_EN	RW	0x0	Interrupt Enable of Peripheral Protection Controller for APB slaves within the System Control element. Write 1 to enable and 0 to mask this interrupt source.
0	S_APBPPC0PERIP_EN	RW	0x0	Interrupt Enable of Peripheral Protection Controller for APB slaves within the Base element. Write 1 to enable and 0 to mask this interrupt source.

SECMSCINTSTAT, SECMSCINTCLR and SECMSCINTEN

When security violation occurs at any Master Security Controller (MSC) in the SSE-200 and also in the expansion logic, an interrupt is raised from a combined interrupt to the CPU NVIC. The Secure MSC Interrupt Status Clear Register and Enable Register allow software to determine source of the interrupt, clear the interrupt, and enable or disable (Mask) the interrupt.

The following table describes the bits used in the SECMSCINTSTAT register:

Table 3-42 SECMSCINTSTAT register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:16]	S_MSCEXP_STATUS	RO	0x0	Interrupt Status for Expansion MSC. Each bit n shows the status of input signal SMSCEXPSTATUS[n]. The parameter MSCEXP_DIS defines if each bit within this register is implemented such that if MSCEXP_DIS[i] = 1, then S_MSCEXP_STATUS[i] is disabled and always reads as zeros.
[15:1]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
0	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.

The following table describes the bits used in the SECMSCINTCLR register:

Table 3-43 SECMSCINTCLR Register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:16]	S_MSCEXP_CLR	WO	0x0	Interrupt Clear for Expansion MSC. Each bit n drives the output signal SMSCEXPCLR[n]. The parameter MSCEXP_DIS defines if each bit within this register is implemented such that if MSCEXP_DIS[i] = 1, then S_MSCEXP_CLR[i] is disabled and any writes to it are ignored.
[15:1]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
0	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.

The following table describes the bits used in the SECMSCINTEN register:

Table 3-44 SECMSCINTEN Register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:16]	S_MSCEXP_EN	RW	0x0	Interrupt Enable for Expansion MSC. Each bit n enables or disables the input interrupt signal SMSCEXPSTATUS[n]. The parameter MSCEXP_DIS defines if each bit within this register is implemented such that if MSCEXP_DIS[i] = 1, then S_MSCEXP_EN[i] is disabled and any writes to it are ignored.
[15:1]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
0	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.

BRGINTSTAT, BRGINTCLR and BRGINTEN

AHB bus bridges are necessary to handle clock domain crossing.

To improve system performance, some of these bridges are able to buffer write data, and complete a write access on their slave interfaces before any potential error response is received for the write access on their master interfaces. When this occurs, these bridges can raise a combined interrupt to the Cortex-M33 NVIC.

The Bridge Buffer Error Interrupt Status, Clear, and Enable registers allow software to determine source of the interrupt, clear the interrupt, and enable or disable (Mask) the interrupt.

Since the secondary CPU (CPU 1) can operate at a higher clock frequency, **FCLK**, compared to the main system **SYSCLK**, a bridge within the SSE-200 supports a write buffer to improve performance.

The following table describes the bits used in the BRGINTSTAT register:

Table 3-45 BRGINTSTAT register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:16]	BRGEXP_STATUS	RO	0x0	Interrupt Clear of Expansion Bridge Buffer Error Interrupts. Each bit <i>n</i> shows the status of BRGEXPSTATUS[<i>n</i>]. The parameter BRGEXP_DIS defines if each bit within this register is implemented such that if BRGEXP_DIS[<i>i</i>] = 1, then BRGEXP_STATUS[<i>i</i>] is disabled and always reads as zero.
[15:1]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
0	BRG_CPU1SYS_STATUS	RO	0x0	Interrupt Status of Write Buffer Bridge Error for Bridge between CPU1 and System. If CPU 1 does not exist, then this register is reserved as will read as zero.

The following table describes the bits used in the BRGINTCLR register:

Table 3-46 BRGINTCLR register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:16]	BRGEXP_CLR	WO	0x0	Interrupt Status of Expansion Bridge Buffer Error Interrupts. Each bit <i>n</i> drives the output signal BRGEXPCLR[<i>n</i>]. The parameter BRGEXP_DIS defines if each bit within this register is implemented such that if BRGEXP_DIS[<i>i</i>] = 1, then BRGEXP_CLR[<i>i</i>] is disabled and any writes to it is ignored.
[15:1]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
0	BRG_CPU1SYS_CLR	WO	0x0	Interrupt Clear of Write Buffer Bridge Error for Bridge between CPU1 and System. If CPU 1 does not exist, this register is reserved and any writes to this register will be ignored.

The following table describes the bits used in the BRGINTEN register:

Table 3-47 BRGINTEN register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:17]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
[16]	BRGEXP_EN	RW	0x0	Interrupt Enable of Expansion Bridge Buffer Error Interrupts. Each bit <i>n</i> enables the input interrupt BRGEXPSTATUS[<i>n</i>]. The parameter BRGEXP_DIS defines if each bit within this register is implemented such that if BRGEXP_DIS[<i>i</i>] = 1, then BRGEXP_EN[<i>i</i>] is disabled and any writes to it are ignored.
[15:1]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
0	BRG_CPU1SYS_EN	WO	0x0	Interrupt Enable of Write Buffer Bridge Error for Bridge between CPU1 and System. If CPU 1 does not exist, this register is reserved and any writes to this register are ignored.

AHBNSPPC0

The Non-Secure Access AHB Slave Peripheral Protection Controller Register allows software to configure if each AHB peripheral that it controls from an AHB PPC is secure access only or is non-secure access only.

Each field defines the secure or non-secure access setting for an associated peripheral, as follows:

- 1: Allow non-secure access only
- 2: Allow secure access only

The SSE-200 has one AHB slave interface, the Cordio Element, that requires security configuration support of the PPC. If the Cordio Element is not present, this register is reserved and RAZWI.

Table 3-48 AHBNSPPC0 register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:1]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
0	CORDIO	RW	0x0	AHB security access settings for Cordio.

AHBNSPPCEXP0, AHBNSPPCEXP1, AHBNSPPCEXP2 and AHBNSPPCEXP3

The Expansion Non-Secure Access AHB Slave Peripheral Protection Controller registers 0, 1, 2 and 3 allow software to configure each AHB peripheral that it controls from each AHB PPC that resides in the expansion subsystem outside the SSE-200. Each field defines the secure or non-secure access setting for an associated peripheral, as follows:

- 1: Allow non-secure access only
- 2: Allow secure access only

These controls directly control the expansion signals on the Security Control Expansion interface. All four register are similar and each register, N where N is from 0 to 3 as described in the following table:

Table 3-49 AHBNSPPCEXP0 register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:16]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
[15:0]	AHBNSPPCEXP<N>	RW	0x0	Expansion N Non_Secure Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each bit 'n' drives the output signal AHBNSPPCEXP<N>[n]. The parameter AHBNSPPCEXP_DIS<N> defines if each bit within this register is implemented such that if AHBNSPPCEXP_DIS<N>[i] = 1, AHBNSPPCEXP<N>[i] is disabled, reads as zeros and any writes to it are ignored.

APBNSPPC0 and APBNSPPC1

A Non-Secure Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control Register allows software to configure if each APB peripheral that it controls from an APB PPC is secure access only or is non-secure access only. Each field defines the Secure or Non-secure access setting for an associated peripheral, as follows:

- 1: Allow non-secure access only. Secure access is not allowed
- 2: Allow secure access only. Non-secure access is not allowed

The APBNSPPC0 register controls peripherals that are in the Base element, while APBNSPPC1 register controls peripherals that are in the System Control element.

Table 3-50 APBNSPPC0 register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:5]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
4	NS_MHU1	RW	0x0	APB access security setting for MHU 1
3	NS_MHU0	RW	0x0	APB access security setting for MHU 0
2	NS_DTIMER	RW	0x0	APB access security setting for DUAL TIMER
1	NS_TIMER1	RW	0x0	APB access security setting for TIMER 1
0	NS_TIMER0	RW	0x0	APB access security setting for TIMER 0

The following table describes the bits used in the APBSPPC1 register:

Table 3-51 APBSPPC1 Register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:1]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
0	NS_S32K Timer	RW	0x0	S32K Timer

AHBSPPPC0

Secure Unprivileged Access AHB Slave Peripheral Protection Controller Register allows software to configure if each AHB peripheral that it controls from an AHB PPC is only Secure privileged Secure Access only or is allowed Secure Unprivileged access as well. Each field defines this for an associated peripheral, by the following settings:

- 1: Allow secure unprivileged and privileged access.
- 2: Allow secure privileged access only.

There is one AHB Slave, the Cordio Element, that requires software configurable secure privileged Secure Access controls with the subsystem. If the Cordio Element is not present, this register is reserved and RAZWI.

Table 3-52 AHBSPPPC0 Register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:1]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
0	CORDIO	RW	0x0	AHB peripheral protection controller Secure Privilege Access setting for Cordio.

AHBSPPPCEXP0, AHBSPPPCEXP1, AHBSPPPCEXP2 and AHBSPPPCEXP3

The Expansion Secure Privilege Access AHB Slave Peripheral Protection Controller Register 0, 1, 2 and 3 allow software to configure each AHB peripheral that it controls from each AHB PPC, that resides in the expansion subsystem outside the SSE-200, is only secure privileged Access only or is allowed secure Unprivileged access as well. Each field defines this for an associated peripheral, by the following settings:

- 1: Allow secure unprivileged and privileged access.
- 2: Allow secure privileged access only.

These directly controls the expansion signals on the Security Control Expansion interface. All four register are similar and each register, N where N is from 0 to 3 is as described in the following table:

Table 3-53 AHBSPPPCEXP0 register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:16]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
[15:0]	AHBSPPPCEXP<N>	RW	0x0	Expansion N Secure Privilege Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each bit n will drive the output signal AHBSPPPCEXP<N>[n] if AHBSPPPCEXP<N>[n] is LOW, where N is 0 to 3. The parameter AHBSPPPCEXP_DIS<N> defines if each bit within this register is implemented such that if AHBSPPPCEXP_DIS<N>[i] = 1, AHBSPPPCEXP<N>[i] is disabled, reads as zeros and any writes to it are ignored.

APBSPPPC0 and APBSPPPC1

Each APB peripheral controlled by an APB PPC is either secure privileged access only or secure unprivileged access is also enabled. Each field defines this for an associated peripheral by the following:

- 1: Enable secure unprivileged and privileged access.
- 2: Enable secure privileged access only.

Table 3-54 APBSPPPC0 register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:5]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
4	SP_MHU1	RW	0x0	APB access secure privileged setting for MHU 1
3	SP_MHU0	RW	0x0	APB access secure privileged setting for MHU 0
2	SP_DTIMER	RW	0x0	APB access secure privileged setting for DUAL TIMER
1	SP_TIMER1	RW	0x0	APB access secure privileged setting for TIMER 1
0	SP_TIMER0	RW	0x0	APB access secure privileged setting for TIMER 0

Table 3-55 APBSPPPC1 Register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:1]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
0	SP_S32KTIMER	RW	0x0	APB access secure privileged setting for S32KCLK Timer

APBSPPPCEXP0, APBSPPPCEXP1, APBSPPPCEXP2 and APBSPPPCEXP3

The Expansion Secure Privilege Access APB Slave Peripheral Protection Controller Register 0, 1, 2 and 3 allow software to configure each APB peripheral that it controls from each APB PPC, that resides in the expansion subsystem outside the SSE-200, is only secure privileged access only or is allowed secure unprivileged access as well. Each field defines this for an associated peripheral, by the following settings:

- 1: Allow secure unprivileged and privileged access.
- 2: Allow secure privileged access only.

These controls directly controls the expansion signals on the Security Control Expansion interface. All four register are similar and each register, N where N is from 0 to 3 is as follows:

Table 3-56 APBSPPPCEXP0 register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:16]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
[15:0]	APBSPPPCEXP< N >	RW	0x0	Expansion N Secure Privilege Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each bit 'n' will drive the output signal APB_P_PPCEXP< N >[n] if APBNSPPPCEXP< N >[n] is LOW, where N is 0 to 3. The parameter APBPPPCEXP_DIS< N > defines if each bit within this register is implemented such that if APBPPPCEXP_DIS< N >[i] = 1, APBSPPPCEXP< N >[i] is disabled, reads as zeros and any writes to it are ignored.

NSMSCEXP

The Non-Secure Expansion Master Security Controller register allows software to configure if each master that is located behind each MSC in the expansion subsystem is a secure or non-secure device.

Table 3-57 NSMSCEXP register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:16]	NS_MSCEXP	RW	0x0	Expansion MSC Non-secure Configuration. Each bit 'n' controls the non-secure configuration of each MSC and drives the signals NS_MSCEXP[n]. Set to HIGH to define a Master as non-secure. Else it is secure. The parameter MSCEXP_DIS< N > defines if each bit within this register is implemented such that if MSCEXP_DIS< N >[i] = 1, NS_MSCEXP[i] is disabled, reads as zeros and any writes to it are ignored.
[15:0]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved

3.4.7 Non-secure Privilege Control Block

The Non-secure Privilege Control Block implements program visible states that allows software to control various security gating units within the design.

This register is non-secure privileged access only and supports 32-bit R/W access. Any byte and half word writes will result in its write data ignored.

This register block base address is 0x4008_0000. The following table lists the non-secure privilege control registers.

Table 3-58 Summary of Non-secure Privilege Control registers

Offset	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
0c000 – 0x06C	Reserved	-	-	Reserved.
0x090	AHBNSPPPC0	RW	0x0	Non-Secure Unprivileged Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control 0. Each bit in this register defines the non-secure unprivileged access settings for an associated AHB slave peripheral.
0x094 – 0x09C	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
0x0A0	AHBNSPPPCEXP0	RW	0x0	Expansion 0 Non-Secure Unprivileged Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each bit in this register defines the non-secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral.
0x0A4	AHBNSPPPCEXP1	RW	0x0	Expansion 1 Non-Secure Unprivileged Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each bit in this register defines the non-secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral.
0x0A8	AHBNSPPPCEXP2	RW	0x0	Expansion 2 Non-Secure Unprivileged Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each bit in this register defines the non-secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral.
0x0AC	AHBNSPPPCEXP3	RW	0x0	Expansion 3 Non-Secure Unprivileged Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each bit in this register defines the non-secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral.
0x0B0	APBNSPPPC0	RW	0x0	Non-Secure Unprivileged Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control 0. Each bit in this register defines the Non-secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral.
0x0B4	APBNSPPPC1	RW	0x0	Non-Secure Unprivileged Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control 0. Each bit in this register defines the non-secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral.
0x0B8 – 0x0BC	Reserved	-	0x0	Reserved
0x0C0	APBNSPPPCEXP0	RW	0x0	Expansion 0 Non-Secure Unprivileged Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each bit in this register defines the non-secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral.
0x0C4	APBNSPPPCEXP1	RW	0x0	Expansion 1 Non-Secure Unprivileged Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each bit in this register defines the non-secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral.

Table 3-58 Summary of Non-secure Privilege Control registers (continued)

Offset	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
0x0C8	APBNSPPPCEXP2	RW	0x0	Expansion 2 Non-Secure Unprivileged Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each bit in this register defines the non-secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral.
0x0CC	APBNSPPPCEXP3	RW	0x0	Expansion 3 Non-Secure Unprivileged Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each bit in this register defines the non-secure unprivileged access settings for an associated peripheral.
0x0D0 – 0xFFC	Reserved	-	0x0	Reserved
0xFD0	PIDR4	RO	0x0	Peripheral ID 4
0xFD4	PIDR5	RO	0x0	Reserved
0xFD8	PIDR6	RO	0x0	Reserved
0xFDC	PIDR7	RO	0x0	Reserved
0xFE0	PIDR0	RO	0x0000_0053	Peripheral ID 0
0xFE4	PIDR1	RO	0x0000_00B8	Peripheral ID 1
0xFE8	PIDR2	RO	0x0000_000B	Peripheral ID 2
0xFEC	PIDR3	RO	0x0000_0000	Peripheral ID 3
0xFF0	CIDR0	RO	0x0000_000D	Component ID 0
0xFF4	CIDR1	RO	0x0000_00F0	Component ID 1
0xFF8	CIDR2	RO	0x0000_0005	Component ID 2
0xFFC	CIDR3	RO	0x0000_00B1	Component ID 3

AHBNSPPPC0

Non-Secure Unprivileged Access AHB Slave Peripheral Protection Controller Register allows software to configure if each AHB peripheral that it controls from an AHB PPC is non-secure privileged access only or is allowed non-secure Unprivileged access. Each field defines this for an associated peripheral, by the following settings:

- 1: Allow secure unprivileged and privileged access.
- 2: Allow secure privileged access only.

There is one AHB Slave, the Cordio Element, that requires software configurable non-secure unprivileged access controls with the subsystem. If the Cordio Element is not present, this register is reserved and RAZWI.

Table 3-59 AHBNSPPPC0 register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:1]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
0	CORDIO	RW	0x0	AHB peripheral protection controller Non-secure privilege access setting for Cordio.

AHBNSPPPCEXP0, AHBNSPPPCEXP1, AHBNSPPPCEXP2 and AHBNSPPPCEXP3

The Expansion Non-Secure Privilege Access AHB Slave Peripheral Protection Controller Register 0, 1, 2 and 3 allow software to configure each AHB peripheral that it controls from each AHB PPC, that resides in the expansion subsystem outside the SSE-200, is only non-secure privileged secure access only or is allowed non-secure unprivileged access as well. Each field defines this for an associated peripheral, by the following settings:

- 1: Allow secure unprivileged and privileged access.
- 2: Allow secure privileged access only.

These directly controls the expansion signals on the Security Control Expansion interface

All four register are similar. The bits for register N , where N is from 0 to 3, are as follows:

Table 3-60 AHBNSPPPCEXP0 register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:16]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
[15:0]	AHBNSPPPCEXP<N>	RW	0x0	Expansion N Non-Secure Privilege Access AHB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each bit n will drive the output signal AHBPPPCEXP<N>[n] if AHBNSPPPCEXP<N>[n] is HIGH, where N is 0 to 3. The parameter AHBPPPCEXP_DIS<N> defines if each bit within this register is implemented such that if AHBPPPCEXP_DIS<N>[i] = 1, AHBNSPPPCEXP<N>[i] is disabled, reads as zeros and any writes to it are ignored.

APBNSPPPC0 and APBNSPPPC1

Non-Secure Unprivileged Access APB Slave Peripheral Protection Controller Register allows software to configure if each APB peripheral that it controls (by an APB PPC) is non-secure privileged access only or is also allowed Non-secure Unprivileged access.

Table 3-61 APBNSPPPC0 register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:5]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
4	NS_MHU1	RW	0x0	APB access Non-secure privileged setting for MHU 1
3	NS_MHU0	RW	0x0	APB access Non-secure privileged setting for MHU 0
2	NSP_DTIMER	RW	0x0	APB access Non-secure privileged setting for DUAL TIMER
1	NSP_TIMER1	RW	0x0	APB access Non-secure privileged setting for TIMER 1
0	NSP_TIMER0	RW	0x0	APB access Non-secure privileged setting for TIMER 0

Table 3-62 APBNSPPPC1 register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:1]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
0	NSP_S32KTIMER	RW	0x0	APB access Non-secure privileged setting for S32KCLK Timer

APBNSPPPCEXP0, APBNSPPPCEXP1, APBNSPPPCEXP2 and APBNSPPPCEXP3

The Expansion Non-Secure Privilege Access APB Slave Peripheral Protection Controller Register 0, 1, 2 and 3 allow software to configure each APB peripheral that it controls from each APB PPC, that resides in the expansion subsystem outside the SSE-200, is non-secure privileged access only or is allowed non-secure Unprivileged access. Each field defines this for an associated peripheral, by the following settings:

- 1: Allow non-secure unprivileged and privileged access.
- 2: Allow non-secure privileged access only.

These controls directly controls the expansion signals on the Security Control Expansion interface. All four register are similar and each register, N where N is from 0 to 3 is as follows:

Table 3-63 APBNSPPPCEXP0 register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:16]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
[15:0]	APBNSPPPCEXP<N>	RW	0x0	<p>Expansion N Non-Secure Privilege Access APB slave Peripheral Protection Control. Each bit <i>n</i> will drive the output signal APBPPPCEXP<N>[<i>n</i>] if APBNSPPPCEXP<N>[<i>n</i>] is HIGH, where N is 0 to 3.</p> <p>The parameter APBPPPCEXP_DIS<N> defines if each bit within this register is implemented such that if APBPPPCEXP_DIS<N>[<i>i</i>] = 1, APBNSPPPCEXP<N>[<i>i</i>] is disabled, reads as zeros and any writes to it are ignored.</p>

3.5 SRAM element

Up to four SRAM elements can be present. Security for the SRAM regions is controlled by the MPCs in the base element.

Up to four Memory Protection Controllers (MPC) are included, one on each path to a SRAM block so that accesses can be blocked when a security violation occurs.

Each SRAM block is implemented within an SRAM element. Each MPC APB configuration interface is mapped to the following base addresses:

- 0x5008_3000 for SRAM Bank 0.
- 0x5008_4000 for SRAM Bank 1.
- 0x5008_5000 for SRAM Bank 2.
- 0x5008_6000 for SRAM Bank 3.

If any of the SRAM bank does not exist, the associated MPC will not exist and the address area of that MPC will be reserved, and any access to it will be RAZWI.

The `cfg_init_value` of each MPC is tied to 0 so that at boot, the SRAM is secure only. Software must change or restore the settings in the MPC to release memory for non-secure world use.

All SRAM MPCs reside in the PD_SYS power domain and is reset by `nWARMRESETSYS`.

Power management for the SRAM elements is from the PIKs which are controlled from the system control element.

3.6 System control element

This section describes the registers associated with controlling the SSE-200. It contains the following subsections:

- [System control registers.](#)
- [System information registers on page 3-59.](#)
- [CMSDK timer on page 3-62.](#)
- [System Control Register block on page 3-62.](#)
- [Power Policy Unit registers on page 3-78.](#)
- [CMSDK Watchdog timer on page 3-79.](#)

For information on the Cortex-M33 registers, see the following documents:

- [ARM® Cortex®-M System Design Kit Technical Reference Manual.](#)
- [ARM® Cortex®-M33 Processor Technical Reference Manual.](#)
- [ARM®v7M Architecture Reference Manual.](#)

3.6.1 System control registers

The System Control Region contains the peripherals in the System Control element.

The System Control Region occupies the following areas:

- 0x4002_0000 to 0x4003_FFFF, which is non-secure
- 0x5002_0000 to 0x5003_FFFF, which is secure.

Table 3-64 System control regions

Row ID (alias)	Address		Size	Region name	Description	Security
	From	To				
1 (5)	0x4002_0000	0x4002_0FFF	4KB	SYSINFO	System Information Registers Block.	NS
2	0x4002_1000	0x4002_EFFF		Reserved	Reserved ^a	
3 (18)	0x4002_F000	0x4002_FFFF	4KB	S32KTIMER	CMSDK Timer running on S32KCLK .	NS-PPC
4	0x4003_0000	0x4003_FFFF		Reserved	Reserved	
5 (1)	0x5002_0000	0x5002_0FFF	4KB	SYSINFO	System Information Registers Block.	S
6	0x5002_1000	0x5002_1FFF	4KB	S_SYSCONTROL	System Control Registers Block.	SP
7	0x5002_2000	0x5002_2FFF	4KB	SYS_PPU	System Power Policy Unit.	SP
8	0x5002_3000	0x5002_3FFF	4KB	CPU0CORE_PPU	CPU 0 Core Power Policy Unit.	SP
9	0x5002_4000	0x5002_4FFF	4KB	CPU0DBG_PPU	CPU 0 Debug Power Policy Unit.	SP
10	0x5002_5000	0x5002_5FFF	4KB	CPU1CORE_PPU	CPU 1 Core Power Policy Unit.	SP
11	0x5002_6000	0x5002_6FFF	4KB	CPU1DBG_PPU	CPU 1 Debug Power Policy Unit.	SP
	0x5002_7000	0x5002_7FFF	4KB	CRYPTO_PPU	CryptoCell Power Policy Unit.	SP
	0x5002_8000	0x5002_8FFF	4KB	Reserved	Reserved ^b	
12	0x5002_9000	0x5002_9FFF	4KB	DEBUG_PPU	System Debug Power Policy Unit.	SP

Table 3-64 System control regions (continued)

Row ID (alias)	Address		Size	Region name	Description	Security
	From	To				
13	0x5002_A000	0x5002_AFFF	4KB	RAM0_PPU	SRAM Bank 0 Power Policy Unit.	SP
14	0x5002_B000	0x5002_BFFF	4KB	RAM1_PPU	SRAM Bank 1 Power Policy Unit.	SP
15	0x5002_C000	0x5002_CFFF	4KB	RAM2_PPU	SRAM Bank 2 Power Policy Unit.	SP
16	0x5002_D000	0x5002_DFFF	4KB	RAM3_PPU	SRAM Bank 3 Power Policy Unit.	SP
17	0x5002_E000	0x5002_EFFF	4KB	S32KWATCHDOG	CMSDK Watchdog on S32KCLK.	SP
18 (3)	0x5002_F000	0x5002_FFFF	4KB	S32KTIMER	CMSDK Timer on S32KCLK.	S-PPC
19	0x5003_0000	0x5003_FFFF		Reserved	Reserved.	

a. This region is RZZ/WI.

b. This region is RAZ/WI.

Note

- For NS_PPC, any secure access targeting these regions is blocked. Non-secure access to these regions is controlled by PPCs.
- For S_PPC, any secure access targeting this region is blocked. Secure access to this region is controlled by PPCs.
- NSP indicates non-secure private access only.
- SP indicates secure privilege access only.
- S indicates secure access only.
- Reserved regions respond with RAZWI when accessed.

3.6.2 System information registers

The System Information Register Block provides information on the system configuration and identity. This register block is read-only and accessible by accesses of any security attributes.

This module resides at base address 0x5002_0000 in the secure region, and 0x4002_0000 in the non-secure region of the Base Peripheral Region.

Note

The System information registers block is mapped to both the secure and non-secure regions and is visible to both regions without any security protection.

Table 3-65 Summary of System Information Block registers

Offset	Name	Access	Reset value	Description	Security
0x000	SYS_VERSION	RO	0x2004_1743	System Version register	All
0x004	SYS_CONFIG	RO	System configuration dependent	System Hardware Configuration register	All
0x010 – 0xFCC	Reserved	-	-	-	-
0xFD0	PIDR4	RO	0x0000_0004	Peripheral ID 4	All
0xFD4	PIDR5	RO	0x0	Reserved	-
0xFD8	PIDR6	RO	0x0	Reserved	-
0xFDC	PIDR7	RO	0x0	Reserved	-
0xFE0	PIDR0	RO	0x0000_0058	Peripheral ID 0	All
0xFE4	PIDR1	RO	0x0000_00B8	Peripheral ID 1	All
0xFE8	PIDR2	RO	0x0000_000B	Peripheral ID 2	All
0xFEC	PIDR3	RO	0x0000_0000	Peripheral ID 3	All
0xFF0	CIDR0	RO	0x0000_000D	Component ID 0	All
0xFF4	CIDR1	RO	0x0000_00F0	Component ID 1	All
0xFF8	CIDR2	RO	0x0000_0005	Component ID 2	All
0xFFC	CIDR3	RO	0x0000_00B1	Component ID 3	All

SYS_VERSION

The System Version register enables software to read the system part number and revision

Table 3-66 SYS_VERSION Register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:28]	CONFIGURATION	RO	0x2	Set to 0x2 for SSE-200 r1.
[27:24]	MAJOR_REVISION	RO	0x0	Set to 0x0.
[23:20]	MINOR_REVISION	RO	0x0	Set to 0x0.
[19:12]	DESIGNER_ID	RO	0x41	ARM Product with designer code 0x41.
[11:0]	PART_NUMBER	RO	0x743	Part Number for the SSE-200.

SYS_CONFIG

The System Hardware Configuration register enables software to determine the system configuration.

Table 3-67 SYS_CONFIG Register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:28]	CPU1_TYPE	RO	0b0010	CPU 1 Core Type: b00 Does not exist. b10 Cortex-M33 core. Other Reserved.
[27:24]	CPU0_TYPE	RO	0b0010	CPU 0 Core Type: b00 Does not exist. b10 Cortex-M33 core. Other Reserved.
[23:20]	CPU1_TCM_BANK_NUM	RO	0x3	Number of SRAM banks: b11 if 4 SRAM banks. b10 if 3 SRAM banks. b01 if 2 SRAM banks. Otherwise b00. The SRAM Bank that maps CPU1 Data TCM.
[19:16]	CPU0_TCM_BANK_NUM	RO	0x0	The SRAM Bank that maps CPU0 Data TCM.
[15:13]	Reserved	RO	0b000	Reserved.
12	HAS_CRYPT0	RO	Configuration dependent	CryptoCell Included: 0 No. 1: Yes.
11	HAS_CORDIO	RO	0b0	Cordio RF Core Included: 0: No. 1: Yes.
10	CPU1_HAS_TCM	RO	0b1	CPU 1 has Data TCM: 0: No. 1: Yes.
9	CPU0_HAS_TCM	RO	0x0	CPU 0 has Data TCM: 0: No. 1: Yes.
[8:4]	SRAM_ADDR_WIDTH	RO	Configuration dependent	SRAM Bank Address Width. The size of each SRAM bank is equal to 2 SRAM_ADDR_WIDTH. Supported values are in the range of: Minimum of 10: 1 KB. Maximum of 24: 16MB (only if 1 SRAM element exists).
[3:0]	SRAM_NUM_BANK	RO	0b0100	SRAM Number of Banks: SSE-200 supports four banks.

3.6.3 CMSDK timer

The System Control element implements a CMSDK timer running on the **S32KCLK** clock.

See [CMSDK timer on page 3-25](#) for a summary of the control registers.

See the *ARM® Cortex®-M System Design Kit Technical Reference Manual*.

3.6.4 System Control Register block

The System Control Register Block implements registers for power, clocks, resets and other general system control.

This module resides at base address **0x5002_1000** in the secure region of the base peripheral region. The System Control Register Block is secure privilege access only.

For write access to these registers, only 32-bit writes are supported. Any byte or half-word writes result in the write data being ignored. The following table lists the registers in this block.

Table 3-68 Summary of System Control registers

Offset	Name	Access	Reset	Description
0x000	SECDBGSTAT	RO	0x0000_0000	Secure Debug Configuration Status.
0x004	SECDBGSET	WO	0x0000_0000	Secure Debug Configuration Set.
0x008	SECDBGCLR	WO	0x0000_0000	Secure Debug Configuration Clear.
0x00C	SCSECCTRL	RW	0x0000_0000	System Control Security Control.
0x010	FCLK_DIV	RW	Parameterized	Fast Clock Divider Configuration.
0x014	SYSCLK_DIV	RW	Parameterized	System Clock Divider Configuration.
0x018	CLOCK_FORCE	RW	0x0000_0000	Clock Force.
0x01C – 0x0FC	-	RO	0x0000_0000	Reserved.
0x100	RESET_SYNDROME	RW	0x0000_0001	Reset Syndrome. Register only cleared at Power ON Reset.
0x104	RESET_MASK	RW	0x0000_0030	Reset Mask.
0x108	SWRESET	WO	0x0000_0000	Software Reset.
0x10C	GRETREG	RW	0x0000_0000	General Purpose Retention.
0x110	INITSVRTOR0	RW	Static tied input	Initial Secure Reset Vector Register For CPU 0.
0x114	INITSVRTOR1	RW	Static tied input	Initial Secure Reset Vector Register For CPU 1.
0x118	CPUWAIT	RW	Parameterized	CPU Boot wait control after reset.
0x11C	NMI_ENABLE	RW	0x0000_0000	NAMI Enable Register.
0x120	WICCTRL	RW	0x0000_0000	WIC request and acknowledge handshake.
0x124	EWCTRL	RW	0x0000_0000	External Wakeup Control.
0x128 – 0x1FF	-	-	0x0000_0000	Reserved.

Table 3-68 Summary of System Control registers (continued)

Offset	Name	Access	Reset	Description
0x200	PDCM_PD_SYS_SENSE	RW	0x0000_007F	Power Control Dependency Matrix PD_SYS Power Domain Sensitivity.
0x204	-	-	0x0000_0000	Reserved.
0x208	-	-	0x0000_0000	Reserved.
0x20C	PDCM_PD_SRAM0_SENSE	RW	0x0000_0000	Power Control Dependency Matrix PD_SRAM0 Power Domain Sensitivity.
0x210	PDCM_PD_SRAM1_SENSE	RW	0x0000_0000	Power Control Dependency Matrix PD_SRAM1 Power Domain Sensitivity.
0x214	PDCM_PD_SRAM2_SENSE	RW	0x0000_0000	Power Control Dependency Matrix PD_SRAM2 Power Domain Sensitivity.
0x218	PDCM_PD_SRAM3_SENSE	RW	0x0000_0000	Power Control Dependency Matrix PD_SRAM3 Power Domain Sensitivity.
0x21C – 0x22C	-	-	-	Reserved.
0x230	-	-	0x0000_0000	Reserved.
0x234 – 0x23C	-	-	0x0000_0000	Reserved.
0x240 – 0x24C	-	-	0x0000_0000	Reserved.
0x250 – 0xFCC	-	-	-	Reserved.
0xFD0	PIDR4	RO	0x0000_0004	Peripheral ID 4.
0xFD4	PIDR5	RO	0x0000_0000	Reserved.
0xFD8	PIDR6	RO	0x0000_0000	Reserved.
0xFDC	PIDR7	RO	0x0000_0000	Reserved.
0xFE0	PIDR0	RO	0x0000_0054	Peripheral ID 0.
0xFE4	PIDR1	RO	0x0000_00B8	Peripheral ID 1.
0xFE8	PIDR2	RO	0x0000_000B	Peripheral ID 2.
0xFEC	PIDR3	RO	0x0000_0000	Peripheral ID 3.
0xFF0	CIDR0	RO	0x0000_000D	Component ID 0.
0xFF4	CIDR1	RO	0x0000_00F0	Component ID 1.
0xFF8	CIDR2	RO	0x0000_0005	Component ID 2.
0xFFC	CIDR3	RO	0x0000_00B1	Component ID 3.

SECDBGSTAT, SECDBGSET and SECDBGCLR

The Secure Debug Configuration registers are used to select the source value for the combined Secure Debug Authentication Signals **DBGEN**, **NIDEN**, **SPIDEN**, **SPNIDEN**, and **LLCDBGEN**. For each signal, a selector is provided to select between an internal register value and the value on the boundary of the SSE-200.

Secure software can set each value by setting the associated bit in the SECDBGSET register. or clear a value by setting the associated bit in the SECDBGCLR register.

Secure software can read the system wide value by reading the associated SECDBGSTAT register bit.

For example, the source of **DBGEN** value used in the system is selected by DBGEN_SEL where:

- If DBGEN_SEL is LOW, the input **DBGENIN** signal is used to define the system-wide DBGEN value.
- If DBGEN_SEL is HIGH the internal register value DBGEN_I is used to define the system wide DBGEN value.

For example:

- To set DBGEN_I to HIGH, write to the SECDBGSET register with DBGEN_I_SET set HIGH.
- To set DBGEN_SEL to HIGH, write to the SECDBGSET register with DBGEN_SEL_SET set to HIGH.
- To set DBGEN_I to LOW, write to the SECDBGCLR register with DBGEN_I_CLR set to HIGH respectively.
- To set DBGEN_SEL to LOW, write to the SECDBGCLR register with DBGEN_SEL_CLR set to HIGH.
- To read the value of DBGEN, read the SECDBGSTAT register for the DBGEN_SEL_STAT value.

The DGBEN value is also made available to external expansion logic from the DBGEN output signal of the SSE-200.

These registers are reset by **nPORESETAON** only.

Top-level static configuration signals **DBGENSELDIS**, **NIDENSELDIS**, **SPIDENSELDIS**, **SPNIDENSELDIS**, and **LLCDBGENSELDIS**, are provided to enable each of the selectors, DBGEN_SEL_STATUS, NIDEN_SEL_STATUS, SPIDEN_SEL_STATUS, SPNIDEN_SEL_STATUS and LLCDBGEN_SEL_STATUS respectively to be forced to zero, forcing each respective input to use its external value. This method can be used to prevent secure firmware from modifying or overriding the Debug Authentication value, in particular, when the CryptoCell element exists in the system and the intention is to use signals that are derived from **CCDCUEN** to control the Debug Authentication signal.

The table lists the bits for the Secure Debug Configuration Status register:

Table 3-69 SECDBGSTAT register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:10]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
9	LLCDBGEN_SEL_SET	RO	0x0	Active HIGH Debug Enable Selector value for the Cordio LLC Embedded Cortex-M0 core.
8	LLCDBGEN_I_SET	RO	LLCDBGEN_IN	Active High Debug Enable value for the Cordio LLC Embedded Cortex-M0 core.
7	SPNIDEN_SEL_SET	RO	0x0	Active HIGH secure privilege non-invasive debug enable selector value.
6	SPNIDEN_I_SET	RO	SPNIDEN_IN1	Active HIGH secure privilege non-invasive debug enable value.

Table 3-69 SECDBGSTAT register (continued)

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
5	SPIDEN_SEL_SET	RO	0x0	Active HIGH secure privilege invasive debug enable selector value.
4	SPIDEN_I_SET	RO	SPIDEN_IN	Active HIGH secure privilege invasive debug enable value.
3	NIDEN_SEL_SET	RO	0x0	Active HIGH non-invasive debug enable selector value.
2	NIDEN_I_SET	RO	NIDEN_IN	Active HIGH non-invasive debug enable value.
1	DBGEN_SEL_SET	RO	0x0	Active HIGH debug enable selector value.
0	DBGEN_I_SET	RO	DBGEN_IN	Active HIGH debug enable value.

The table lists the bits for the Secure Debug Configuration Set register:

Table 3-70 SECDBGSET register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:10]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
9	LLCDBGEN_SEL_SET	WO	0x0	Active HIGH Debug Enable set control for the Cordio LLC Embedded Cortex-M0 core.
8	LLCDBGEN_I_SET	WO	0x0	Active High Debug Enable set control for the Cordio LLC Embedded Cortex-M0 core.
7	SPNIDEN_SEL_SET	WO	0x0	Active HIGH secure privilege non-invasive debug enable selector set control.
6	SPNIDEN_I_SET	WO	0x0	Active HIGH secure privilege non-invasive debug enable set control.
5	SPIDEN_SEL_SET	WO	0x0	Active HIGH secure privilege invasive debug enable selector set control.
4	SPIDEN_I_SET	WO	0x0	Active HIGH secure privilege invasive debug enable set control.
3	NIDEN_SEL_SET	WO	0x0	Active HIGH non-invasive debug enable selector set control.
2	NIDEN_I_SET	WO	0x0	Active HIGH non-invasive debug enable set control.
1	DBGEN_SEL_SET	WO	0x0	Active HIGH debug enable selector set control.
0	DBGEN_I_SET	WO	0x0	Active HIGH debug enable set control.

The table lists the bits for the Secure Debug Configuration clear register:

Table 3-71 SECDBGCLR register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:10]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
9	LLCDBGEN_SEL_CLR	WO	0x0	Active HIGH Debug Enable Selector clear control for the Cordio LLC Embedded Cortex-M0 core.
8	LLCDBGEN_I_CLR	WO	0x0	Active High Debug Enable clear control for the Cordio LLC Embedded Cortex-M0 core.
7	SPNIDEN_SEL_CLR	WO	0x0	Active HIGH secure privilege non-invasive debug enable selector clear control.
6	SPNIDEN_I_CLR	WO	0x0	Active HIGH secure privilege non-invasive debug enable clear control.
5	SPIDEN_SEL_CLR	WO	0x0	Active HIGH secure privilege invasive debug enable selector clear control.
4	SPIDEN_I_CLR	WO	0x0	Active HIGH secure privilege invasive debug enable clear control.
3	NIDEN_SEL_CLR	WO	0x0	Active HIGH non-invasive debug enable selector clear control.
2	NIDEN_I_CLR	WO	0x0	Active HIGH non-invasive debug enable clear control.
1	DBGEN_SEL_CLR	WO	0x0	Active HIGH debug enable selector clear control.
0	DBGEN_I_CLR	WO	0x0	Active HIGH debug enable clear control.

SCSECCTRL

The System Control Security Controls provide register bits to configure the Certificate access path and the Secure Configuration lock of this register block.

The register is reset by **nPORESETAON** only.

Table 3-72 SCSECCTRL register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:18]	Reserved	RO	0x0	-
[15:3]	Reserved	RO	0x0	-
17	CERTREADENABLED	RO	0x0	Active HIGH status that indicates that the certification read access is enabled. This status is also set to LOW whenever the PD_DEBUG Power Domain is in the OFF state. It is also set to LOW when CERTDISABLED is HIGH.
16	CERTDISABLED	RO	0x0	Active HIGH status that indicates that the Certification write path has been disabled. This status is also set to HIGH whenever the PD_DEBUG Power Domain is in the OFF state.

Table 3-72 SCSECCTRL register (continued)

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
2	SCSECCFGLOCK	Write 1 to set	0x0	Active HIGH control to disable writes to security related control registers in this register block. After setting HIGH, it can no longer be cleared to zero except by a PowerOn Reset. When set to HIGH, write access to SECDBGSET, SECDBGCLR, INITSVTOR0 and INITSVTOR1 are ignored.
1	CERTREADEN	RW	0x0	Active HIGH control to enable read access on the certification path as long as CERTDISABLE is also LOW. If CERTDISABLE is HIGH, read access is disabled on the certification path and CERTREADEN value is ignored.
0	CERTDISABLE	Write 1 to set	0x0	Active HIGH control to disable certification path. After setting HIGH, this bit cannot be cleared to zero except by a PowerOn Reset. It can also be set HIGH by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Driving CERTDISABLEEXT HIGH. Turning PD_DEBUG OFF. Changing PD_CPU0CORE power domain from ON.

FCLK_DIV

The Fast Clock Divider register allows software to configure the divider ratio that generates **FCLK** from **MAINCLK**. After writing to the FCLKDIV field, always check that the new clock divider ratio has been applied by reading it back on FCLKDIV_CUR before doing any other operations.

The register is reset by **nPORESETAON** only.

Table 3-73 FCLK_DIV register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:21]	Reserved	RO	0x0	-
[20:16]	FCLKDIV_CUR	RO	0x0	Clock Divider Current Value. This field returns the currently selected clock divider value FCLKDIV used to generate FCLK from MAINCLK . The clock divider setting is the value of FCLKDIV + 1. For example, setting a value of 0 indicates a divider value of 1
[15:5]	Reserved	RO	0x0	-
[4:0]	FCLKDIV	RW	FCLKDIV_RST	FCLK from MAINCLK Clock Divider Ratio Request. The clock divider setting is the value of FCLKDIV + 1. For example, setting a value of 0 indicates a divider value of 1

SYSCLK_DIV

The System Clock Divider register allows software to configure the divider ratio that generates **SYSCLK** from **FCLK**. After writing to the SYSCLKDIV field, always check that the new clock divider ratio has been applied by reading it back on SYSCLKDIV_CUR before doing any other operations.

The register is reset by **nPORESETAON** only.

Table 3-74 System Clock Divider register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:21]	Reserved	RO	0x0	-
[20:16]	SYSCLKDIV_CUR	RO	0x0	Clock Divider Current Value. This field returns the currently selected clock divider value SYSCLKDIV used to generate SYSCLK from FCLK. The clock divider setting is the value of SYSCLKDIV_CUR + 1. For example, setting a value of 0 indicates a divider value of 1.
[15:5]	Reserved	RO	0x0	-
[4:0]	SYSCLKDIV	RW	SYSCLKDIV_RST	SYSCLK from FCLK Clock Divider Ratio Request. The clock divider setting requested is the value of SYSCLKDIV + 1. For example, setting a value of 0 indicates a divider value of 1.

CLOCK_FORCE

The Clock Force register allows software to override dynamic clock gating that might be implemented in the system and keep each clock running.

Note these clock force signal does not apply to clock gates within the design. Instead, it is applied to hierarchical dynamic clock gating within the system. Forcing a clock ON can reduce the latency that is incurred as a result of dynamic clock control, but can also increase the dynamic power consumption of the system.

The register is reset by **nPORESETAON** only.

Table 3-75 CLOCK_FORCE register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:9]	Reserved	RO	0x0	-
8	CRYPTOSYSCLK_ENABLE	RW	0x0	Enable FCLK gating by HINTSYSCLKEN when CPU 1 is OFF. Clear this bit to LOW to improve SRAM3 access latency at the cost of increased power consumption.
7	CRYPTOSYSCLK_FORCE	RW	0x0	Force all CryptoCell clocks to run when set to HIGH.
6	CPUFCLK_FORCE	RW	0x0	Force all CPU FCLK to run when set to HIGH.
5	CPUSYSCLK_FORCE	RW	0x0	Force all CPU SYSCLK to run when set to HIGH.
4	SRAMFCLK_FORCE	RW	0x0	Force SRAM Local FCLK to run when set to HIGH.
3	SRAMSYSCLK_FORCE	RW	0x0	Force SRAM Local SYSCLK to run when set to HIGH.

Table 3-75 CLOCK_FORCE register (continued)

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
2	SYSFCLK_FORCE	RW	0x0	Force Base element Local FCLK to run when set to HIGH.
1	SYSSYSCLK_FORCE	RW	0x0	Force Base element Local SYSCLK to run when set to HIGH.
0	MAINCLK_FORCE	RW	0x0	Force MAINCLK to run when set to HIGH.

RESET_SYNDROME

This register stores the reason for the last RESET event.

This register is cleared by **nPORESET** input or by software writing zeros to each bit to clear them.

Writing HIGH to a bit results in that bit maintaining its previous value.

———— Note ————

LOCKUP0 and LOCKUP1 do not actually generate reset, but when HIGH, indicate that a CPU has locked-up and could be a precursor to another reset event such as, for example, a watchdog timer reset request.

Table 3-76 RESET_SYNDROME register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:10]	Reserved	RO	0x0	
9	SWRESETREQ	write 0 to clear	0x0	System Warm Reset Request.
8	WARMRESETINPUT	write 0 to clear	0x0	External Warm Reset Request.
7	LOCKUP1	write 0 to clear	0x0	CPU 1 Lock-up Status.
6	LOCKUP0	write 0 to clear	0x0	CPU 0 Lock-up Status.
5	SYSRSTREQ1	write 0 to clear	0x0	CPU 1 System Reset Request.
4	SYSRSTREQ0	write 0 to clear	0x0	CPU 0 System Reset Request.
3	S32KWD	write 0 to clear	0x0	Watchdog on the S32KCLK clock.
2	SWD	write 0 to clear	0x0	Secure watchdog.
1	NSWD	write 0 to clear	0x0	Non-secure watchdog.
0	PoR	write 0 to clear	0x1	Power-On.

RESET_MASK

The RESET_MASK register allows software to control which reset sources are merged to generate the system wide warm reset, **nSYSRESETAON**, or the **nPORESETAON** signal.

Set each bit to HIGH to enable each source. This register is reset by the **nPORESET** input.

Note that each of these mask bits, if cleared, not only prevents the reset source generating the reset, it also prevents the associated **RESET_SYNDROME** register bit from recording the event.

Table 3-77 RESET_MASK register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:6]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
5	SYSRSTREQ1_EN	RW	SYSRSTREQ1_EN_RST	Enable Merging CPU 1 System Reset Request.
4	SYSRSTREQ0_EN	RW	SYSRSTREQ0_EN_RST	Enable Merging CPU 0 System Reset Request.
[3:2]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
1	NSWD_EN	RW	0x0	Enable NON-SECURE WATCHDOG Reset.
0	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.

SWRESET

The **SWRESET** register allows software to request for a System reset. This register is reset by **nPORESETAON** and **nWARMRESETAON**.

Table 3-78 SWRESET register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:10]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
9	SWRESETREQ	WO	0x0	Software Reset Request. Set to HIGH to request a system reset.
[8:0]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.

GRETREG

The General Purpose Retention Register provides 16 bits of retention register for general storage, especially through power down and the reset of the system. This register is reset by **nPORESETAON** only.

Table 3-79 GRETREG register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:16]	Reserved	RO		Reserved.
[15:0]	GRETREG	RW	0x0	General Purpose Retention Register.

INITSVTOR0, INITSVTOR1

This contains the value of the Secure Vector table offset address for CPU_n.

The default value is set by the static configuration signals **INTSVTORn_RST** from the top level.

Register INTSVTOR0 is connected to the CPU0 element, and INTSVTOR1 is connected to the CPU1 element.

The same bit assignments apply for both the INTSVTOR0 and INTSVTOR1 registers.

Table 3-80 INTSVTOR0 register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:0]	Reserved	RO	0x200000	Vector table offset.

CPUWAIT

This register provides controls to force each CPU to wait after reset rather than Boot Immediately. This allows another entity in the expansion system or the debugger to access the system prior to the CPU booting. This register is reset by **nPORESETAON**.

Table 3-81 CPUWAIT register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:2]	Reserved	RO		Reserved.
1	CPU1WAIT	RW	CPU1WAIT_RST	CPU 1 waits at boot: 0: boot normally. 1: wait at boot. If CPU 1 does not exist, this field is RAZWI
0	CPU0WAIT	RW	CPU0WAIT_RST	CPU 0 waits at boot: 0: boot normally. 1: wait at boot.

NMI_ENABLE

This register provides controls to enable, or disable, internally or externally generated Non-Maskable Interrupt sources from generating an NMI interrupt on each CPU core. This allows a CPU to take control of all internal NMI interrupt sources and mask external NMI interrupts if required. This register is reset by **nPORESETAON** only and its reset value is defined by configuration parameters.

Table 3-82 NMI_ENABLE register

Bits	Name	Access	Width	Reset value	Description
32:18	Reserved	RO	14		Reserved.
17	CPU1_EXPTNMI_ENABLE	RW	1	CPU1_EXPTNMI_ENABLE_RST	CPU1 Externally Sourced NMI Enable. This determines if the top level pin, CPU1EXPNMI , can raise an NMI interrupt on CPU1: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HIGH, allowed. LOW, masked and not allowed.
16	CPU0_EXPTNMI_ENABLE	RW	1	CPU0_EXPTNMI_ENABLE_RST	CPU0 Externally Sourced NMI Enable. This determines if the top level pin, CPU0EXPNMI , can raise an NMI interrupt on CPU0: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HIGH, allowed. LOW, masked and not allowed.
15:2	Reserved	RO	14		Reserved
1	CPU1_INTNMI_ENABLE	RW	1	CPU1_INTNMI_ENABLE_RST	CPU1 Internally Sourced NMI Enable. This determines if the subsystem internally generated NMI interrupt sources can raise an NMI interrupt on CPU1: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HIGH, allowed. LOW, masked and not allowed.
0	CPU0_INTNMI_ENABLE	RW	1	CPU0_INTNMI_ENABLE_RST	CPU0 Internally Sourced NMI Enable. This determines if the subsystem internally generated NMI interrupt sources can raise an NMI interrupt on CPU0: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HIGH, allowed. LOW, masked and not allowed.

WICCTRL

The WIC Control register allows software to perform the WIC Enable handshake for each individual CPU. This register is reset by **nPORESETAON** and **nWARMRESET**.

Table 3-83 WICCTRL register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:18]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
17	CPU1WICRDY	RO	0x0	CPU 1 WIC Enable Acknowledge. If CPU 1 does not exist, this field is RZWI.
16	CPU0WICRDY	RO	0x0	CPU 0 WIC Enable Acknowledge.
[15:10]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved

Table 3-83 WICCTRL register (continued)

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
9	CPU1WICEN_CLR	WO	0x0	CPU 1 WIC Enable Request. Clear. Write 1 to clear CPU1WICEN_STATUS to LOW. If CPU 1 does not exist, this field is RZWI.
8	CPU0WICEN_CLR	WO	0x0	CPU 0 WIC Enable Request Clear. Write 1 to clear CPU0WICEN_STATUS to LOW.
[7:6]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
5	CPU1WICEN_SET	WO	0x0	CPU 1 WIC Enable Request Set. Write 1 to set CPU1WICEN_STATUS to HIGH.. If CPU 1 does not exist, this field is RZWI.
4	CPU0WICEN_SET	WO	0x0	CPU 0 WIC Enable Request Set. Write 1 to set CPU0WICEN_STATUS to HIGH.
[3:2]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
1	CPU1WICEN_STATUS	RO	0x0	CPU 1 WIC Enable Request Status. Set to HIGH by writing 1 to CPU1WICEN_SET to request enabling of the CPU1 WIC. If CPU 1 does not exist, this field is RZWI.
0	CPU0WICEN_STATUS	RO	0x0	CPU 0 WIC Enable Request Status. Set to HIGH by writing 1 to CPU0WICEN_SET to request enabling of the CPU0 WIC.

EWCTRL

The External Wakeup Control register allows software to perform handshake with the External Wakeup Controllers that is associated with each individual CPU to support waking the associated CPU core when it is fully powered down.

This register is reset by **nPORESETAON** and **nWARMRESET**.

Table 3-84 External Wakeup Control register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:10]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
9	EWCIEN_CLR	WO	0x0	External Wakeup Controller 1 Clear. Writing 1 to this bit clears EWC1EN_STATUS. This field always returns 0 when read. If CPU 1 does not exist, this field is RZWI.
8	EWCIEN_0CLR	WO	0x0	External Wakeup Controller 0 Clear. Writing 1 to this bit clears EWC1EN_STATUS. This field always returns 0 when read. If CPU 1 does not exist, this field is RZWI.
[7:6]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
5	EWCIEN_SET	WO	0x0	External Wakeup Controller 1 Set. Writing 1 to this bit sets EWC1EN_STATUS. This field always returns 0 when read. If CPU 1 does not exist, this field is RZWI.
4	EWCIEN_0SET	WO	0x0	External Wakeup Controller 0 Set. Writing 1 to this bit sets EWC1EN_STATUS. This field always returns 0 when read. If CPU 1 does not exist, this field is RZWI.

Table 3-84 External Wakeup Control register (continued)

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[3:2]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved
1	EWC1EN_STATUS	RO	0x0	External Wakeup Controller 1 Enable. If HIGH, the External Wakeup Controller will, on entering Deepsleep with the WIC enabled, start the process of holding interrupts that might arrive when the CPU 1 is powered down, and depending on the interrupt mask, attempt to wake CPU 1. If CPU 1 does not exist, this field is RZWI.
0	EWC0EN_STATUS	RO	0x0	External Wakeup Controller 0 Enable. If HIGH, the External Wakeup Controller will, on entering Deepsleep with the WIC enabled, start the process of holding interrupts that might arrive when the CPU 0 is powered down, and depending on the interrupt mask, attempt to wake CPU 0.

PDCM_PD_SYS_SENSE

The Power Dependency Control Matrix System Power domain (PD_SYS) Sensitivity register is used to define what will keep awake the PD_SYS domain. This register is reset by **nPORESETAON** and **nWARMRESET**.

Table 3-85 Power Dependency Control Matrix System Power Domain Sensitivity register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:20]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
19	S_PD_EXP3_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[3] signal Sensitivity.
18	S_PD_EXP2_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[2] signal Sensitivity.
17	S_PD_EXP1_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[1] signal Sensitivity.
16	S_PD_EXP0_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[0] signal Sensitivity.
[15:13]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
12	S_PD_CRYPTON_ON	RO	0x1	Tied to HIGH. PD_SYS Will always try to keep ON if S_PD_CRYPTON_ON is ON.
[11:7]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
6	S_PD_SRAM3_ON	RO	0x1	Tied to HIGH. PD_SYS Will always try to keep ON if SRAM3 power domain is ON.
5	S_PD_SRAM2_ON	RO	0x1	Tied to HIGH. PD_SYS Will always try to keep ON if SRAM2 power domain is ON.
4	S_PD_SRAM1_ON	RO	0x1	Tied to HIGH. PD_SYS Will always try to keep ON if SRAM1 power domain is ON.
3	S_PD_SRAM0_ON	RO	0x1	Tied to HIGH. PD_SYS Will always try to keep ON if SRAM0 power domain is ON.

Table 3-85 Power Dependency Control Matrix System Power Domain Sensitivity register (continued)

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
2	S_PD_CPU1CORE_ON	RO	0x1	Tied to HIGH. PD_SYS will always try to stay ON if PD_CPU1CORE is ON.
1	S_PD_CPU0CORE_ON	RO	0x1	Tied to HIGH. PD_SYS will always try to stay ON if PD_CPU0CORE is ON.
0	S_PD_SYS_ON	RW	0x1	Enable PD_SYS ON Sensitivity. Set HIGH to keep PD_SYS awake after powered ON.

PDCM_PD_SRAM<N>_SENSE

The Power Dependency Control Matrix SRAM<N> Power domain (PD_SRAM) Sensitivity registers are used to define what will keep awake the each of the PD_SRAM<N> power domain, where <n> is 0:3. This register is reset by **nPORESETAON** and **nWARMRESET**.

Table 3-86 PDCM_PD_SRAM0_SENSE registers

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:20]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
19	S_PD_EXP3_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[3] signal Sensitivity.
18	S_PD_EXP2_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[2] signal Sensitivity.
17	S_PD_EXP1_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[1] signal Sensitivity.
16	S_PD_EXP0_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[0] signal Sensitivity.
[15:13]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
12	S_PD_CRYPTON_ON	RO	0x0	Tied to LOW. Ignores PD_CRYPTON.
[11:7]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
6	S_PD_SRAM3_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM3 state.
5	S_PD_SRAM2_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM2 state.
4	S_PD_SRAM1_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM1 state.
3	S_PD_SRAM0_ON	RW	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_SRAM0.
2	S_PD_CPU1CORE_ON	RW	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_CPU1CORE.
1	S_PD_CPU0CORE_ON	RW	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_CPU0CORE.
0	S_PD_SYS_ON	RW	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_SYS.

Table 3-87 PDCM_PD_SRAM1_SENSE registers

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:20]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
19	S_PD_EXP3_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[3] signal Sensitivity.
18	S_PD_EXP2_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[2] signal Sensitivity.
17	S_PD_EXP1_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[1] signal Sensitivity.
16	S_PD_EXP0_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[0] signal Sensitivity.
[15:13]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
12	S_PD_CRYPTON_ON	RO	0x0	Tied to LOW. Ignores PD_CRYPTON.
[11:7]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
6	S_PD_SRAM3_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM3 state.
5	S_PD_SRAM2_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM2 state.
4	S_PD_SRAM1_ON	RO	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_SRAM1.
3	S_PD_SRAM0_ON	RW	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM0 state.
2	S_PD_CPU1CORE_ON	RW	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_CPU1CORE.
1	S_PD_CPU0CORE_ON	RW	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_CPU0CORE.
0	S_PD_SYS_ON	RW	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_SYS.

Table 3-88 PDCM_PD_SRAM2_SENSE registers

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:20]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
19	S_PD_EXP3_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[3] signal Sensitivity.
18	S_PD_EXP2_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[2] signal Sensitivity.
17	S_PD_EXP1_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[1] signal Sensitivity.
16	S_PD_EXP0_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[0] signal Sensitivity.
[15:13]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
12	S_PD_CRYPTON_ON	RO	0x0	Tied to LOW. Ignores PD_CRYPTON.
[11:7]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
6	S_PD_SRAM3_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM3 state.
5	S_PD_SRAM2_ON	RO	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_SRAM2.
4	S_PD_SRAM1_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM1 state.
3	S_PD_SRAM0_ON	RW	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM0 state.

Table 3-88 PDCM_PD_SRAM2_SENSE registers (continued)

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
2	S_PD_CPU1CORE_ON	RW	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_CPU1CORE.
1	S_PD_CPU0CORE_ON	RW	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_CPU0CORE.
0	S_PD_SYS_ON	RW	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_SYS.

Table 3-89 PDCM_PD_SRAM3_SENSE registers

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:20]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
19	S_PD_EXP3_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[3] signal Sensitivity.
18	S_PD_EXP2_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[2] signal Sensitivity.
17	S_PD_EXP1_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[1] signal Sensitivity.
16	S_PD_EXP0_IN	RW	0x0	Enable PDEXPIN[0] signal Sensitivity.
[15:13]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
12	S_PD_CRYPTON_ON	RO	0x0	Tied to LOW. Ignores PD_CRYPTON.
[11:7]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
6	S_PD_SRAM3_ON	RO	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_SRAM3.
5	S_PD_SRAM2_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM2 state.
4	S_PD_SRAM1_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM1 state.
3	S_PD_SRAM0_ON	RW	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM0 state.
2	S_PD_CPU1CORE_ON	RW	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_CPU1CORE.
1	S_PD_CPU0CORE_ON	RW	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_CPU0CORE.
0	S_PD_SYS_ON	RW	0x0	Enable sensitivity to PD_SYS.

PDCM_PD_CRYPTON_SENSE

The Power Dependency Control Matrix CryptoCell Power domain (PD_CRYPTON) Sensitivity register defines what will wake, or keep awake, the PD_CRYPTON domains.

Note

- The power domain cannot be configured to be sensitive to other power domain power states.
- Powering down the CryptoCell requires following a strict sequence which can only be initiated from the CryptoCell driver.

Table 3-90 PDCM_PD_CRYPT0_SENSE register

Bits	Name	Access	Reset value	Description
[31:20]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
19	S_PD_EXP3_IN	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores the PDEXPIN[3] signal.
18	S_PD_EXP2_IN	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores the PDEXPIN[2] signal.
17	S_PD_EXP1_IN	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores the PDEXPIN[1] signal.
16	S_PD_EXP0_IN	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores the PDEXPIN[0] signal.
[15:13]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
12	S_PD_CRYPT0_ON	RO	0x1	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_CRYPT0.
[11:7]	Reserved	RO	0x0	Reserved.
6	S_PD_SRAM3_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM3 state.
5	S_PD_SRAM2_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM2 state.
4	S_PD_SRAM1_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM1 state.
3	S_PD_SRAM0_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SRAM0 state.
2	S_PD_CPU1CORE_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_CPU1CORE state.
1	S_PD_CPU0CORE_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_CPU0CORE state.
0	S_PD_SYS_ON	RO	0x0	Tied LOW. Ignores PD_SYS.

3.6.5 Power Policy Unit registers

The following table lists the PPU registers. For more information on programming the PPU, see the *ARM® Power Policy Unit Version 1.1 Specification*.

Table 3-91 Summary of PPU registers

Offset	Name	Access	Short Name
0x000	Power Policy Register	RW	PPU_PWPR.
0x004	Power Mode Emulation Register	RW	PPU_PMER.
0x008	Power Status Register	RO	PPU_PWSR.
0x00C	Reserved	RO	-
0x010	Device Interface Input Current Status Register	RO	PPU_DISR.
0x014	Miscellaneous Input Current Status Register	RO	PPU_MISR.
0x018	Stored Status Register	RO	PPU_STSR.
0x01C	OFF Unlock register	RW	PPU_UNLK.
0x020	Power Configuration Register	RW	PPU_PWCR.
0x024	Power Mode Transition Configuration Register	RW	PPU_PTCR.

Table 3-91 Summary of PPU registers (continued)

Offset	Name	Access	Short Name
0x030	Interrupt Mask Register	RW	PPU_IMR.
0x034	Additional Interrupt Mask Register	RW	PPU_AIMR.
0x038	Interrupt Status Register	RW	PPU_ISR.
0x03C	Additional Interrupt Status Register	RW	PPU_AISR.
0x040	Input Edge Sensitivity Register	RW	PPU_IESR.
0x044	Operating Mode Active Edge Sensitivity Register	RW	PPU_OPSR.
0x050	Functional Retention RAM Configuration Register	RW	PPU_FUNRR.
0x054	Full Retention RAM Configuration Register	RW	PPU_FULRR.
0x058	Memory Retention RAM Configuration Register	RW	PPU_MEMRR.
0x160	Power Mode Entry Delay Register 0	RW	PPU_EDTR0.
0x164	Power Mode Entry Delay Register 1	RW	PPU_EDTR1.
0x170	Device Control Delay Configuration Register 0	RW	PPU_DCCR0.
0x174	Device Control Delay Configuration Register 1	RW	PPU_DCCR1.
0xFB0	PPU Identification Register 0	RO	PPU_IDR0.
0xFB4	PPU Identification Register 1	RO	PPU_IDR1.
0xFC8	Implementation Identification Register	RO	PPU_IIDR.
0xFCC	Architecture Identification Register	RO	PPU_AIDR.
0xFD0 - FFF	IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED Identification Registers	RO	-

3.6.6 CMSDK Watchdog timer

The System Control element implements a CMSDK Watchdog timer running on the **S32KCLK** clock.

See [CMSDK watchdog timers on page 3-28](#) for a summary of the control registers.

3.7 Debug and trace element

This section describes the SSE-200 programmable options for debug and trace. It contains the following subsection:

- [Debug access interface](#).

For more information on debug and trace, see the *ARM® Cortex®-M33 Processor Technical Reference Manual*.

Note

If the system is configured for CoreSight SoC, a license is required for that IP and the following corresponding ARM documentation:

- *ARM® CoreSight™ SoC-400 System Design Guide*.
- *ARM® CoreSight™ SoC-400 Technical Reference Manual*.
- *ARM® CoreSight™ SoC-400 User Guide*.
- *ARM® CoreSight™ TPIU-Lite Technical Reference Manual*.
- *ARM® CoreSight™ DAP-Lite Technical Reference Manual*.

3.7.1 Debug access interface

The Debug access interface provides access to three access ports which provide access to the System Debug region of the memory map, the CPUs debug access ports, and associated debug logic.

The following table shows the address map for the debug access interfaces of the SSE-200 for the three Access Ports (APs) in the debug subsystem.

Table 3-92 Debug access region interface

Row ID	Address		Size	Region name	Description
	From	To			
1	0x0000	0x00FF	256B	SYSTEM APB-AP	Debug System Access APB-AP.
2	0x0100	0x01FF	256B	CPU0 AHB-AP	CPU0 Access AHB-AP.
3	0x0200	0x02FF	256B	CPU1 AHB-AP	CPU1 Access AHB-AP.
4	0x0300	0xFFFF	-	-	Reserved.

The Debug System APB-AP is used to access debug components that are in the debug subsystem, which includes components in the Debug element and components connected to the Debug APB Expansion Interface.

Table 3-93 System APB-AP address map

Row ID	Address		Size	Region Name	Description
	From	To			
1	0x0000_0000	0xEFFF_FFFF	-	-	Reserved.
2	0xF000_0000	0xF000_0FFF	4KB	SYSCSRAM	Debug System CoreSight ROM.

Table 3-93 System APB-AP address map (continued)

Row ID	Address		Size	Region Name	Description
3	0xF000_1000	0xF000_1FFF	4KB	SYSFUNNEL	Debug System Trace Funnel.
4	0xF000_2000	0xF000_2FFF	4KB	SYSCTI	Debug System Cross Trigger Interface.
5	0xF000_3000	0xF007_FFFF	500KB	-	Reserved.
6	0xF008_0000	0xF00F_FFFF	512KB	Debug APB Expansion Interface	Debug APB Expansion Interface Region.
4	0x_F010_0000	0xFFFF_FFFF	-	-	Reserved.

CPU0 AHB-AP is for CPU0 (Primary CPU) debug access and also for certification access. It also maps a CoreSight ROM and a Granular Power Requester (GPR).

The address map depends on the configuration parameter CERTDISABLED.

The map for CPU1 when CERTDISABLED is LOW is shown in the following table:

Table 3-94 CPU0 AHB-AP Address Map when CERTDSIABLED is LOW

Row ID	Address		Size	Region name	Description
	From	To			
1	0x0000_0000	0x2FFF_FFFF		-	System memory access by the CPU0 debug access port.
2	0x3000_0000	0x3000_1FFF	8KB	CERTMEM	Certificate Access Memory region, residing in SRAM0. Write access is allowed and read data is masked to zero if CERTREADENABLED is LOW. Access bypasses the CPU core.
3	0x3000_2000	0xF000_7FFF		-	System memory access by the CPU0 debug access port.
2	0xF000_8000	0xF000_8FFF	4KB	CPU0CSROM	CPU0 Access CoreSight ROM
3	0xF000_9000	0xF000_9FFF	4KB	CPU0GPR	CPU0 GPR
4	0xF000_A000	0xFFFF_FFFF		-	System memory access by the CPU0 debug access port.

The map for CPU1when CERTDISABLED is HIGH is shown in the following table:

Table 3-95 CPU0 AHB-AP Address Map when CERTDSIABLED is HIGH

Row ID	Address		Size	Region name	Description
	From	To			
1	0x0000_0000	0xF000_7FFF		-	System memory access by the CPU0 debug access port.

Table 3-95 CPU0 AHB-AP Address Map when CERTDSIABLED is HIGH (continued)

Row ID	Address		Size	Region name	Description
2	0xF000_8000	0xF000_8FFF	4KB	CPU0CSR OM	CPU0 Access CoreSight ROM.
3	0xF000_9000	0xF000_9FFF	4KB	CPU0GPR	CPU0 GPR
4	0xF000_A000	0xFFFF_FFFF	-	-	System memory access by the CPU0 debug access port.

CPU1 AHB-AP is for CPU1 (Secondary CPU) debug access. It also maps a CoreSight ROM and a Granular Power Requester (GPR). The following table lists the memory map for CPU1 AHB-AP.

Table 3-96 CPU1 AHB-AP Address Map

Row ID	Address		Size	Region name	Description
	From	To			
1	0x0000_0000	0xF000_7FFF	-	-	System memory access by the CPU1 debug access port.
2	0xF000_8000	0xF000_8FFF	4KB	CPU1CSR OM	CPU1 Access CoreSight ROM
3	0xF000_9000	0xF000_9FFF	4KB	CPU1GPR	CPU0 GPR
4	0xF000_A000	0xFFFF_FFFF	-	-	System memory access by the CPU1 debug access port.

Appendix A

Signal Descriptions

This appendix summarizes the interface signals present in the SSE-200 elements.

It contains the following sections:

- *Overview of system interconnections on page A-2.*
- *Clock, reset, and power control signals on page A-3.*
- *Interrupt signals on page A-9.*
- *AHB expansion bus signals on page A-10.*
- *Debug and Trace signals on page A-13.*
- *Security component interfaces on page A-17.*
- *Miscellaneous top-level signals on page A-22.*
- *CryptoCell-312 signals on page A-25.*

A.1 Overview of system interconnections

The elements in the subsystem are shown below:




Figure A-1 Subsystem elements

A.2 Clock, reset, and power control signals

This section describes the clock, reset, and power control signals.

It contains the following subsections:

- [Functional clock and reset signals.](#)
- [Clock control Q-Channel signals on page A-6.](#)
- [Power control Q-Channel signals on page A-7.](#)
- [Expansion power control dependency signals on page A-8.](#)

A.2.1 Functional clock and reset signals

The following table lists the clock and reset signals in the SSE-200 interfaces:

Table A-1 Clock and reset signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Power Domain	Description
MAINCLK	1	Input	AON	Main Clock Input. This clock is used by the System to generate Most other clocks used within the system.
MAINCLKREQ	1	Output	AON	Main Clock Request Signal. 1 indicates a request for the main clock to be active. 0 indicates that the clock can be turned off.
MAINCLKRDY	1	Input	AON	Main Clock Ready Signal. 1 indicates that the clock is running, stable, and the system can start to use it. 0 indicates that the clock has stopped or is unstable and must not be used.
S32KCLK	1	Input	AON	Slow Clock. Typically a 32KHz clock input and is completely asynchronous to the other clocks in the system.
nPORESET	1	Input	AON	Active Low Power-On Reset Input Signal.
nSRST	1	Input	AON	Active Low System Reset Input from Debugger.
RESETREQ	1	Input	AON	Active High Request to perform a system reset.
nPORESETAON	1	Output	AON	Active Low Power-On Reset for the Expansion System. This Power-On Reset merges other reset sources within the system with nPORESET to generate this reset
nWARMRESETAON	1	Output	AON	Active Low System Reset Output
FCLK	1	Output	AON	Ungated Fast clock. This is generated from MAINCLK .
SYSCLK	1	Output	AON	Ungated System Clock. This clock is generated from FCLK and is synchronous to FCLK .
HINTSYSCLKENCLK	1	Output	AON	The HINTSYSCLKENCLK hint function is a clock pulse generated to indicate when, relative to the divided clock FCLK an enable must be generated on SYSCLK .

Table A-1 Clock and reset signals (continued)

Signal name	Width	Direction	Power Domain	Description
EXPCLKREQ	1	Input	AON	Clock Request signal from expansion hardware to request for FCLK and SYSCLK to be active. 1 indicates request for clocks to be active. 0 indicates that clocks can be turned off.
EXPCLKRDY	1	Output	AON	Clock Ready signal to expansion hardware to indicate that FCLK and SYSCLK are active. 1 indicates that clocks are running, stable, and the system can start to use them. 0 indicates that clocks has stopped or is unstable and must not be used.
SYSFCLK	1	Output	PD_SYS	Base element Fast System Clock. This clock is to be used for Base element Expansion. This clock is synchronous to FCLK and is the PD_SYS power gated and Base element hierarchically clock gated version of FCLK .
SYSSYSCLK	1	Output	PD_SYS	Base element System Clock. This clock is to be used for Base element Expansion. This clock is synchronous to SYSCLK and is the PD_SYS power gated and Base element hierarchically clock gated version of SYSCLK .
SYSSYSUGCLK	1	Output	AON	Base element Ungated System Clock. This clock is to be used for Base element Expansion. This clock is synchronous to SYSCLK and is the PD_SYS power gated version of SYSCLK . This clock does not include Base element hierarchical clock gating. This signal is gated in the AON domain and is intended to be used only in the PD_SYS power domain.
SYSFUGCLK	1	Output	AON	Base Element Ungated Fast Clock. This clock is for Base Element expansion. It is synchronous to FCLK and is the PD_SYS power gated version of FCLK . This clock does not include Base Element hierarchical clock gating.
nWARMRESETSYS	1	Output	PD_SYS	Base element Active Low Warm Reset Output.
DEBUGFCLK	1	Output	AON	Debug Fast clock. This clock is to be used for Debug element Expansion only. This clock is a clock gated version of FCLK and is synchronous to FCLK . This signal is gated in the AON domain and intended to be used only in the PD_DEBUG power domain.
DEBUGSYSCLK	1	Output	AON	Debug System clock. This clock is to be used for Debug element Expansion only. This clock is a clock gated version of SYSCLK and is synchronous to SYSCLK . This signal is gated in the AON domain and intended to be used only in the PD_DEBUG power domain.

Table A-1 Clock and reset signals (continued)

Signal name	Width	Direction	Power Domain	Description
DEBUGHINTSYSCLKENCLK	1	Output	AON	DEBUGHINTSYSCLKENCLK is the equivalent but gated version of HINTSYSCLKENCLK for the debug power domain expansion. It is a clock pulse generated by the divider to indicate when, relative to the divided clock DEBUGFCLK the enable must be generated.
nPORESETDBG	1	Output	PD_DEBUG	Debug System Active Low Power On Reset Output. This signal is generated in the AON domain and intended to be used only in the PD_DEBUG power domain.
CRYPTOSYSCLK	1	Output	PD_CRYPTO	Crypto Element System Clock. This clock is to be used for Crypto Element Expansion. This clock is synchronous to CRYPTOSYSCLK and is the PD_CRYPTO power gated and Crypto Element hierarchically clock gated version of SYSCLK . This output only exists if the CryptoCell Element exists.
nWARMRESETCRYPTO	1	Output	PD_CRYPTO	Crypto Element Active Low Warm Reset Output. This output only exists if the CryptoCell Element exists. The CryptoCell block itself can only be reset at boot or when resuming from power gating.
CPUDEBUGPIKCLK	1	Output	AON	CPU and Debug Element Power Integration Clock. This is a hierarchically clock gated version of SYSCLK . It is intended for used by expansion power control logic that is expected to be reset using nCPUDEBUGPIKRESET and controlled using the CPUDEBUGPIKCLK Q-Channel interface.
nCPUDEBUGPIKRESET	1	Output	AON	CPUDEBUGPIKCLK Reset. This reset is a CPUDEBUGPIKCLK resynchronised version of nPORESETAON reset.
BCRYPTOSPIKCLK	1	Output	AON	Base, Crypto and System Power Integration Clock. This is a hierarchically clock gated version of SYSCLK . It is intended for used by expansion power control logic that is expected to be reset using nBCRYPTOSPIKRESET and controlled using the BCRYPTOSPIKCLK Q-Channel interface.
nBCRYPTOSPIKRESET	1	Output	AON	BCRYPTOSPIKCLK Reset. This reset is a BCRYPTOSPIKCLK resynchronised version of nWARMRESETAON reset.

A.2.2 Clock control Q-Channel signals

The subsystem provides a Q-Channel interface for each of the two output clocks to allow expansion logic to control the availability of each clock output. These are used to support hierarchical clock gating:

- Base element SYSCLK Q-Channel interface for **SYSSYSCLK** which includes:
 - **SYSSYSCLKQREQn** output.
 - **SYSSYSCLKQACCEPTn** input.
 - **SYSSYSCLKQDENY** input.
 - **SYSSYSCLKQACTIVE** input.
- Base element FCLK Q-Channel interface for **SYSFCLK** which includes:
 - **SYSFCLKQREQn** output.
 - **SYSFCLKQACCEPTn** input.
 - **SYSFCLKQDENY** input.
 - **SYSFCLKQACTIVE** inputs.
- Crypto Element SYSCLK Q-Channel interface for **CRYPTOSYSCLK** which includes:
 - **CRYPTOSYSCLKQREQn** output.
 - **CRYPTOSYSCLKQACCEPTn** input.
 - **CRYPTOSYSCLKQDENY** input,
 - **CRYPTOSYSCLKQACTIVE** inputs.
- CPU and Debug Element Power Integration Q-Channel interface for **CPUDEBUGPIKCLK** which includes:
 - **CPUDEBUGPIKCLKQREQn** output,
 - **CPUDEBUGPIKCLKQACCEPTn** input,
 - **CPUDEBUGPIKCLKQDENY** input,
 - **CPUDEBUGPIKCLKQACTIVE** inputs.
- Base, Crypto and System Power Integration Q-Channel interface for **BCRYPTOSPIKCLK** which includes:
 - **BCRYPTOSPIKCLKQREQn** output,
 - **BCRYPTOSPIKCLKQACCEPTn** input,
 - **BCRYPTOSPIKCLKQDENY** input,
 - **BCRYPTOSPIKCLKQACTIVE** inputs.

Each of these interfaces are asynchronous. If an interface is not used, the **QACTIVE** and **QDENY** signals must be tied LOW and the **QREQn** output loop back into its **QACCEPTn** input.

The subsystem does not provide a Q-Channel interface to control **DEBUGSYSCLK** and **DEBUGFCLK**. This clock is controlled by the debug power domain, PD_DEBUG, and as long as the debug power domain is ON, **DEBUGSYSCLK** and **DEBUGFCLK** are active.

————— Note —————

The Q-Channel Interfaces does not support waking the system from hibernation. To wake from hibernation, you must use the EWC, power control Q-Channel interfaces, or the **PDEXPIN** inputs.

The Crypto Element SYCLK Q-Channel interfaces only exist if the Crypto Element exists.

For more details on the Q-Channel protocol, see the *AMBA® Low Power Interface Specification ARM Q-Channel and P-Channel Interfaces*.

A.2.3 Power control Q-Channel signals

The subsystem provides two power control Q-Channel interfaces to allow expansion logic to control the readiness of external expansion logic to power on and off:

- PD_SYS Power Q-Channel interface for the PD_SYS power domain which includes the following signals:
 - **SYSPWRQREQn** output.
 - **SYSPWRQACCEPTn** input.
 - **SYSPWRQDENY** input.
 - **SYSPWRQACTIVE** input.

These signals must be driven by logic within the PD_SYS power domain and is to determine if it is safe to change to a lower PD_SYS power state. The interface can also be driven from a power domain more ON than the PD_SYS domain in order to request PD_SYS to power-up. This interface is synchronous to **SYSSYSUGCLK** and **SYSSYSCLK**.

If you use the **SYSPWRQACTIVE** signal to request PD_SYS to power up, you must drive the **SYSPWRQACTIVE** signal HIGH at least until the PD_SYS power domain ON indication, **PDSYSON**, goes HIGH. This ensures that the PD_SYS is turned on correctly.

- PD_DEBUG Power Q-Channel interface for the PD_DEBUG power domain which includes the following signals:
 - **DEBUGPWRQREQn** output.
 - **DEBUGPWRQACCEPTn** input.
 - **DEBUGPWRQDENY** input.
 - **DEBUGPWRQACTIVE** input.

These signals must be driven by expansion logic that resides within the PD_DEBUG power domain. They are used to determine if it is safe to change to a lower PD_DEBUG power state. It can also be driven from a different power domain to wake the PD_DEBUG domain. This is synchronous to **DEBUGSYSCLK**.

If you use the **DEBUGPWRQACTIVE** signal to request PD_DEBUG to power up, you must drive the **DEBUGPWRQACTIVE** signal HIGH at least until the PD_DEBUG power domain ON indication, **PDDEBUGON**, goes HIGH. This ensures that the PD_DEBUG is turned on correctly.

- PD_CRYPTOPower Q-Channel interface for the PD_CRYPTOPower domain which includes:
 - **CRYPTOPWRQREQn** output,
 - **CRYPTOPWRQACCEPTn** input,
 - **CRYPTOPWRQDENY** input,
 - **CRYPTOPWRQACTIVE** input.

This Q-Channel interface only exists if the Crypto Element exists.

These signals must be driven by expansion logic that within the PD_CRYPTOPower domain which includes logic in the CryptoCell Non-Volatile Memory Interface. The signals determine if it is safe to change to a lower PD_CRYPTOPower state.

PD_CRYPTO only supports static power control, so this interface cannot be used to request the PD_CRYPTO power domain to power up. This interface is synchronous to CRYPTOSYSCLK.

If an interface is not used, then **QACTIVE** and **QDENY** signal must be tied LOW and the **QREQn** output loop back into its **QACCEPTn** input.

———— **Note** ————

When using the PD_SYS Power Q-Channel interface to wake the system from hibernation, you must consider context restoration.

A.2.4 Expansion power control dependency signals

The subsystem provides a set of four signals that allow external power domains to use the Power Dependency Control Matrix to keep power domains within the subsystem from entering a lower power state. These are the Power Dependency Inputs, **PDEXPIN[3:0]**.

These are asynchronous signals and resides in the PD_AON power domain.

A.2.5 Power domain ON status signals

The SSE-200 provides a set of output signals that indicate if a power domain is in the ON state:

- **PDSYSON** when HIGH indicates that the PD_SYS power domain is ON. When LOW it indicates that the power domain is at a lower power state.
- **PDCPU0COREON** when HIGH indicates that the PD_CPU0CORE power domain is ON. When LOW it indicates that the power domain is at a lower power state.
- **PDCPU1COREON** when HIGH indicates that the PD_CPU1CORE power domain is ON. When LOW it indicates that the power domain is at a lower power state.
- **PDDEBUGON** when HIGH indicates that the PD_DEBUG power domain is ON. When LOW it indicates that the power domain is at a lower power state.

These status signals can be used by external expansion logic for separate power domains to determine if the power domain should remain powered, or to go to a lower power state.

A.3 Interrupt signals

The following table lists interrupt signals in the SSE-200 interface.

Table A-2 Interrupt signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
CPU0EXPIRQ[<i>NUMIRQ0</i>-1:0]	<i>NUMIRQ0</i> ^a	Input	<p>These are Interrupt inputs from the expansion subsystem to the CPU 0 interrupt controller within the SSE-200. The processor in the SSE-200 implements a configurable number of external interrupt lines and of these 32 are reserved for internal use and the remaining are made available here.</p> <p>Note that each bit CPU0EXPIRQ[<i>n</i>] is ultimately connected to IRQ[32+<i>n</i>] of the NVIC for CPU 0.</p>
CPU1EXPIRQ[<i>NUMIRQ1</i>-1:0]	<i>NUMIRQ1</i> ^b	Input	<p>These are Interrupt inputs from the expansion subsystem to the CPU 1 interrupt controller within the SSE-200. The processor in the SSE-200 implements a configurable number of external interrupt lines and of these 32 are reserved for internal use and the remaining are made available here.</p> <p>Note that each bit CPU1EXPIRQ[<i>n</i>] is ultimately connected to IRQ[32+<i>n</i>] of the NVIC for CPU 1. If the system is configured to not include CPU 1, then this interface will not exist.</p>
CPU0EXPNMI	1	Input	<p>This provides a non-maskable interrupt input from the expansion subsystem to the interrupt controller of CPU 0 within the SSE-200. This input is merged with other non-maskable interrupt sources within the SSE-200 before being seen by the NVIC of the CPU core.</p>
CPU1EXPNMI	1	Input	<p>This provides a non-maskable interrupt input from the expansion subsystem to the interrupt controller of CPU 1 within the SSE-200. This input is merged with other non-maskable interrupt sources within the SSE-200 before being seen by the NVIC of the CPU core. If the system is configured to not include CPU 1, then this interface will not exist.</p>

a. *NUMIRQ0* is the number of expansion interrupts for core 0 and is defined at configuration.

b. *NUMIRQ1* is the number of expansion interrupts for core 1 and is defined at configuration.

A.4 AHB expansion bus signals

The following table lists the signals for the two AHB master interfaces.

Table A-3 External AHB target port signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
HSEL	1	Output	Slave Select.
HADDR	32	Output	Address bus.
HBURST	3	Output	Burst type.
HMASTLOCK	1	Output	Locked Sequence.
HPROT	4	Output	Protection Control.
HSIZE	3	Output	Transfer Size.
HNONSEC	1	Output	Indicates that the current transfer is either a Non-secure transfer or a Secure transfer.
HEXCL	1	Output	Exclusive Transfer. Indicates that the transfer is part of an Exclusive access sequence.
HMASTER	4	Output	Master Select.
HTRANS	2	Output	Transfer Type.
HWDATA	32	Output	Write Data.
HWRITE	1	Output	Transfer Direction.
HAUSER	1	Output	Address USER signals (Not used by the SSE-200 processors).
HWUSER	4	Output	Write-data USER signals (Not used by the SSE-200 processors).
HRUSER	3	Input	Read-data USER signals (Not used by the SSE-200 processors).
HRDATA	32	Input	Read data bus.
HREADYOUT	1	Input	When HIGH, the HREADY signal indicates to the master and all slaves, that the previous transfer is complete.
HRESP	1	Input	Transfer response.
HEXOKAY	1	Input	Exclusive OK.

The following table lists the signals for the two AHB slave interfaces.

Table A-4 External AHB initiator port signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
HSEL	1	Input	Slave Select.
HADDR	32	Input	Address bus.
HBURST	3	Input	Burst type.
HMASTLOCK	1	Input	Locked Sequence.
HPROT	4	Input	Protection Control.

Table A-4 External AHB initiator port signals (continued)

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
HSIZE	3	Input	Transfer Size.
HNONSEC	1	Input	Indicates that the current transfer is either a Non-secure transfer or a secure transfer.
HEXCL	1	Input	Exclusive Transfer. Indicates that the transfer is part of an Exclusive access sequence.
HMASTER	4	Input	Master Select.
HTRANS	2	Input	Transfer Type.
HWDATA	32	Input	Write Data.
HWRITE	1	Input	Transfer Direction.
HAUSER	1	Input	Address USER signals (Not used by the SSE-200 processors).
EXREQ	1	Input	Exclusive Request signal.
HWUSER	4	Input	Write-data USER signals (Not used by the SSE-200 processors).
HRUSER	3	Output	Read-data USER signals (Not used by the SSE-200 processors).
HRDATA	32	Output	Read data bus.
HREADY	1	Output	HREADY feedback.
HRESP	1	Output	Transfer response.
HREADYOUT	1	Output	When HIGH, the HREADY signal indicates to the master and all slaves, that the previous transfer is complete.
HEXOKAY	1	Output	Exclusive OK.

The following table lists the signals on the code expansion bus:

Table A-5 External code bus signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
CODEEXPHSEL	1	Output	Slave select.
CODEEXPHADDR	32	Output	Address bus.
CODEEXPHBURST	3	Output	Burst type.
CODEEXPHMASTLOCK	1	Output	Locked sequence.
CODEEXPHPROT	4	Output	Protection control.
CODEEXPHSIZE	3	Output	Transfer size.
CODEEXPHNONSEC	1	Output	Indicates that the current transfer is either a non-secure transfer or a secure transfer.
CODEEXPHEXCL	1	Output	Exclusive transfer. Indicates that the transfer is part of an Exclusive access sequence.

Table A-5 External code bus signals (continued)

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
CODEEXPHMASTER	4	Output	Master select.
CODEEXPHTRANS	2	Output	Transfer type.
CODEEXPHWDATA	32	Output	Write data.
CODEEXPHWRITE	1	Output	Transfer direction.
CODEEXPHAUSER	1	Output	Address USER signals.
CODEEXPHWUSER	4	Output	Write channel USER signals.
CODEEXPHRUSER	3	Input	Read channel USER signals.
CODEEXPHRDATA	32	Input	Read data bus.
CODEEXPHREADYOUT	1	Input	When HIGH, the HREADY signal indicates to the master and all slaves, that the previous transfer is complete.
CODEEXPHRESP	1	Input	Transfer response.
CODEEXPHEXOKAY	1	Input	Exclusive OK.

A.5 Debug and Trace signals

This section lists signals related to debug and trace. It has the following subsections:

- [DAP signals](#).
- [Timestamp interface on page A-14](#).
- [Cross trigger channel interfaces on page A-14](#).
- [Debug APB expansion interface on page A-15](#).
- [ATB Trace interface on page A-15](#).
- [Debug authentication interface on page A-16](#).

A.5.1 DAP signals

The following table lists the DAP Access Bus Interface signals which allow an external DAP to access debug logic within the system and to also request for the debug system to wake.

———— **Note** ————

All signals on this interface, unless stated otherwise, are:

- Synchronous to **DEBUGSYSCLK**.
- Reset by **nPORESETDEBUG**.
- In the PD_DEBUG power domain.

Table A-6 DAP Access Buffer signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Clock domain	Description
DAPCADDRS	14	Input	DEBUGSYSCLK	DAP compressed address bus.
DAPSELS	1	Input	DEBUGSYSCLK	Select signal generated from the DAP decoder to each AP. This signal indicates that the slave device is selected, and a data transfer is required.
DAPENABLES	1	Input	DEBUGSYSCLK	DAP enable.
DAPWRITES	1	Input	DEBUGSYSCLK	When HIGH indicates a DAP write access from DP to AHB-AP. When LOW, indicates a read access.
DAPWDATAS	32	Input	DEBUGSYSCLK	DAP write data bus.
DAPABORTS	1	Input	DEBUGSYSCLK	DAP abort.
DAPRDATAS	32	Output	DEBUGSYSCLK	DAP read data bus.
DAPREADY	1	Output	DEBUGSYSCLK	DAP ready.
DAPSLVERRS	1	Output	DEBUGSYSCLK	DAP error.

A.5.2 Timestamp interface

The following table lists the timestamp interface signals. This timestamp is expected to be driven by a timestamp generator in the expansion subsystem. This input is synchronous to **DEBUGSYSCLK** and resides in the PD_DEBUG power domain.

Table A-7 Timestamp signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Clock domain	Description
TSVALUEB	64	Input	DEBUGSYSCLK	Timestamp input value in binary.

A.5.3 Cross trigger channel interfaces

The following table lists the cross trigger channel interface signals. This interface allows partners to expand the cross trigger infrastructure. This interface is synchronous to **DEBUGSYSCLK** and resides in the PD_DEBUG power domain.

Table A-8 Cross trigger channel signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Clock domain	Description
CTMCHOUT	4	Output	DEBUGSYSCLK	Channel out port
CTMCHOUTACK	4	Input	DEBUGSYSCLK	Channel out acknowledge port 0
CTMCHIN	4	Input	DEBUGSYSCLK	Channel in port
CTMCHINACK	4	Output	DEBUGSYSCLK	Channel in acknowledge port 0

A.5.4 Cross trigger signals

Most of the trigger signals are used within the system. The following table lists the signals that are available for system expansion.

Table A-9 Cross trigger signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Clock domain	Description
CTITRIGIN	8	Input	DEBUGSYSCLK ^a	Trigger inputs ports.
CTITRIGINACK	8	Output	DEBUGSYSCLK	Trigger inputs acknowledge.
CTITRIGOUT	4	Output	DEBUGSYSCLK	Trigger outputs port.
CTITRIGOUTACK^b	4	Input	DEBUGSYSCLK ^c	Trigger outputs acknowledge.

a. If parameter TISBYPASSIN = HIGH. Else this signal is asynchronous.

b. If not bypassed (Parameter TIHSBYPASS = LOW). If bypassed, the signal is not required and must be tied HIGH

c. If parameter TISBYPASSACK = HIGH. Else this signal is asynchronous.

This interface is synchronous to **DEBUGSYSCLK** and resides in the PD_DEBUG power domain.

The CTI also outputs the configuration signals **TINIDENSEL**, **TIHSBYPASS**, **TISBYPASSACK**, **TISBYPASSIN** and **TODEBUGENSEL**. See [Miscellaneous top-level signals on page A-22](#).

A.5.5 Debug APB expansion interface

The following table lists the debug APB expansion interface signals which allow partners to add more debug functionality to the SSE-200.

This interface:

- is only accessible from the debug interface using an external DAP.
- is synchronous to **DEBUGSYSCLK**.
- is reset using **nPORESETAON**.
- resides in the PD_DEBUG power domain.

Table A-10 Debug APB expansion signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Clock domain	Description
DEBUGPRDATA[31:0]	32	Input	DEBUGSYSCLK	APB read data. Drives this bus during read cycles
DEBUGPREADY	1	Input	DEBUGSYSCLK	APB ready. Uses this signal to extend an APB transfer.
DEBUGPSLVERR	1	Input	DEBUGSYSCLK	Indicates a transfer failure. The APB peripherals are not required to support the pslverr pin.
DEBUGPADDR[31:2]	30	Output	DEBUGSYSCLK	The APB address bus for master interface
DEBUGPSEL	1	Output	DEBUGSYSCLK	APB select. Indicates that the slave device is selected, and a data transfer is required.
DEBUGPENABLE	1	Output	DEBUGSYSCLK	APB enable. Indicates the second and subsequent cycles of an APB transfer.
DEBUGPWRITE	1	Output	DEBUGSYSCLK	APB RW transfer. Indicates an APB write access when HIGH, and an APB read access when LOW.
DEBUGPWDATA[31:0]	32	Output	DEBUGSYSCLK	Write data.

A.5.6 ATB Trace interface

The following table lists the ATB Trace interface signals that are intended to connect to an external TPIU.

This trace interface is synchronous to **DEBUGFCLK**, is reset using **nPORESETDEBUG**, and resides in the PD_DEBUG power domain.

Table A-11 Trace signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Clock domain	Description
ATVALID	1	Output	DEBUGFCLK	A transfer is valid during this cycle. If LOW, all the other ATB signals must be ignored in this cycle.
ATID	7	Output	DEBUGFCLK	An ID that uniquely identifies the source of the trace.
ATBYTE	1	Output	DEBUGFCLK	The number of bytes on ATDATA to be captured, minus 1.
ATDATA	16	Output	DEBUGFCLK	Trace data bus.
ATREADY	1	Input	DEBUGFCLK	Slave is ready to accept data.
AFVALID	1	Input	DEBUGFCLK	This is the flush signal. All buffers must be flushed because trace capture is about to stop.
AFREADY	1	Output	DEBUGFCLK	This is a flush acknowledge. Asserted when buffers are flushed.
SYNCREQ	1	Input	DEBUGFCLK	Trace synchronization request trace sinks

A.5.7 Debug authentication interface

The interface input signals define the values when the signals are not overridden by the internal Secure Debug Configuration registers. The final debug authentication signals are then output to the rest of the system.

Table A-12 Debug authentication

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
DEBUGENIN	1	Input	Debug Enable Input
NIDENIN	1	Input	Non Invasive Debug Enable Input
SPIDENIN	1	Input	Secure Privilege Invasive Debug Enable Input
SPNIDENIN	1	Input	Secure Privilege Non Invasive Debug Enable Input
DEBUGEN	1	Output	Merged Debug Enable Output
NIDEN	1	Output	Merged Non Invasive Debug Enable Output
SPIDEN	1	Output	Merged Secure Privilege Invasive Debug Enable Output
SPNIDEN	1	Output	Merged Secure Privilege Non Invasive Debug Enable Output

A.6 Security component interfaces

This section lists components related to security. It has the following subsections:

- [Memory protection controller interface](#).
- [APB peripheral protection controller interface on page A-18](#).
- [AHB peripheral protection controller interface on page A-19](#).
- [Master security expansion interface on page A-20](#).
- [Bridge buffer error interface on page A-20](#).
- [Miscellaneous security expansion signals on page A-20](#).

Note

- These interface signals allow all of the components to be controlled using the same set of security control registers already implemented within the subsystem.
 - While the SSE-200 defines a full set of signals as described in this document, many of these interfaces and even individual bits can be disabled by configuration parameters. Disabling each bit of the interface or the entire interface does not remove the interface, but does remove the logic behind it and ties any unused outputs to zero.
 - All signals in this section are synchronous to **SYSSYSCLK**, and the Base Element **SYSCLK** Q-Channel interface will be needed to control the availability of **SYSSYSCLK**. These signals reside in the PD_SYS power domain.
-

A.6.1 Memory protection controller interface

The following table lists the MPC signals:

Table A-13 MPC expansion

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
SMPCEXPSTATUS	16	Input	<p>Interrupt Status inputs from all Expansion Memory Protection Controller. These are visible to the programmer by the S_MPCEXP_STATUS register in the Secure Privilege Control Register Block and are used to raise an interrupt using the MPC Combined Interrupt.</p> <p>The top level parameter MPCEXP_DIS allows each individual bit of the interface to be disabled.</p>

A.6.2 APB peripheral protection controller interface

The following table lists the APB PPC interface signals. Up to four additional PPCs can be added to the system.

Table A-14 APB peripheral protection controller

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
SAPBPPCEXPSTATUS	4	Input	APB PPC Interrupt Status Input. Each bit N is to be connected to a single APB PPC $\langle N \rangle$, where N is 0 to 3. These are associated to the S_APBPPCEXP_STATUS field in the SECPPCINTSTAT register.
SAPBPPCEXPCLR	4	Output	APB PPC Interrupt Clear Output. Each bit N is to be connected to a single APB PPC $\langle N \rangle$, where N is 0 to 3. These are associated to the S_APBPPCEXP_CLR field in the SECPPCINTCLR register.
APBNSPPCEXP0	16	Output	APB PPC Non-secure Gating Control. These are a set of four 16 bit interfaces, and each interface connects to a PPC. When each bit m of an interface is HIGH, it defines the APB $\langle m \rangle$ interface that the target PPC controls as non-secure access only.
APBNSPPCEXP1	16	Output	
APBNSPPCEXP2	16	Output	
APBNSPPCEXP3	16	Output	
			Each 16 bit signal APBNSPPCEXP $\langle N \rangle$ is driven by the APBNSPPCEXP $\langle N \rangle$ register, where N is 0 to 3. The top level parameters APBPPCEXP_DIS $\langle N \rangle$ allows individual bits of the each 16 bit bus to be disabled.
APBPPCEXP0	16	Output	APB PPC Privilege Gating Control. These are a set of four 16 bit interfaces, When each bit m of an interface is HIGH it defines the APB $\langle m \rangle$ interface that the target PPC controls as privilege access only.
APBPPCEXP1	16	Output	
APBPPCEXP2	16	Output	
APBPPCEXP3	16	Output	
			Each bit of each 16 bit signal is selected from either APBNSPPCEXP $\langle N \rangle[m]$ if APB_NS_PPCEXP $\langle N \rangle[m]$ is 0 or APBNSPPCEXP $\langle N \rangle[m]$ otherwise, where N is 0 to 3. The top level parameters APBPPCEXP_DIS $\langle N \rangle$ allows individual bits of each 16 bit bus to be disabled.

A.6.3 AHB peripheral protection controller interface

The following table lists the AHB PPC interface signals. Up to four additional PPCs can be added to the system.

Table A-15 PPC signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
SAHBPPCEXPSTATUS	4	Input	AHB PPC Interrupt Status Input. Each bit <i>N</i> is to be connected to a single AHB PPC < <i>N</i> > where <i>N</i> is 0 to 3. These are associated to the S_AHBPPCEXP_STATUS field in the SECPPCINTSTAT register.
SAHBPPCEXPCLR	4	Output	AHB PPC Interrupt Clear Output. Each bit <i>N</i> is to be connected to a single AHB PPC < <i>N</i> > where <i>N</i> is 0 to 3. These are associated to the S_AHBPPCEXP_CLR field in the SECPPCINTCLR register.
AHBNSPPCEXP0	16	Output	AHB PPC Non-secure Gating Control. These are a set of four 16 bit interfaces, and each interface connects to a PPC. When each bit <i>m</i> of an interface is HIGH, it defines the AHB< <i>m</i> > interface that the target PPC controls as non-secure access only. Each 16 bit signal AHB_NS_PPCEXP<<i>N</i>> is driven by the AHBNSPPCECP< <i>N</i> > register, where <i>N</i> is 0 to 3. The top level parameters AHBPPCEXP_DIS< <i>N</i> > allows individual bits of each 16 bit bus to be disabled.
AHBNSPPCEXP1	16	Output	
AHBNSPPCEXP2	16	Output	
AHBNSPPCEXP3	16	Output	
AHBPPPCEXP0	16	Output	Four 16-bit AHB PPC Privilege Gating Control interfaces. When each bit <i>m</i> of an interface is HIGH, it defines the AHB< <i>m</i> > interface that the target PPC controls as privilege access only. Each bit of an interface is selected from either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> AHBSPPCEXP<<i>N</i>>[<i>m</i>] if AHB_NS_PPCEXP<<i>N</i>>[<i>m</i>] = 0 AHBNSPPPCEXP<<i>N</i>>[<i>m</i>] otherwise., where <i>N</i> is 0 to 3. The top-level parameters AHBPPCEXP_DIS< <i>N</i> > allow individual bits of each 16-bit bus to be disabled. <i>N</i> is 0 to 3
AHBPPPCEXP1	16	Output	
AHBPPPCEXP2	16	Output	
AHBPPPCEXP3	16	Output	

A.6.4 Master security expansion interface

The following table lists the master security expansion signals:

Table A-16 Master security expansion

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
SMSCEXPSTATUS	16	Input	MSC Interrupt Status Input. Each bit <i>N</i> is to be connected to a single MSC <i><N></i> where <i>N</i> is 0 to 15. These are associated with the S_MSCEXP_STATUS field in the SECMSINTSTAT register. The top level Parameter MSCEXP_DIS allows each individual bit of the interface to be disabled.
SMSCEXPCLR	16	Output	MSC Interrupt Clear Output. Each bit <i>N</i> is to be connected to a single MSC <i><N></i> where <i>N</i> is 0 to 15. These are associated with the S_MSCEXP_CLR field in the SECMSINTCLR register. The top level Parameter MSCEXP_DIS allows each individual bit of the interface to be disabled.
NSMSCEXP	16	Output	MSC Non-secure Configuration. Each bit <i>N</i> is to be connected to a single MSC <i><N></i> where <i>N</i> is 0 to 15. Set to HIGH to configure a master as non-secure. These are associated with the NS_MSCEXP field in the NSMSCEXP register. The top level Parameter MSCEXP_DIS allows each individual bit of the interface to be disabled.

A.6.5 Bridge buffer error interface

The following table lists the bridge buffer interface signals. Up to 16 additional bridges with buffer error signalling to be added to the expansion system.

Table A-17 Bridge buffer signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
BRGEXPSTATUS	16	Input	Bridge Error Interrupt Status Input. Each bit <i>N</i> is to be connected to a single bridge <i><N></i> where <i>N</i> is 0 to 15. These are associated with the BRGEXP_STATUS field in the BRGINSTAT Register. The top level Parameter BRGEXP_DIS allows each individual bit of the interface to be disabled.
BRGEXPCLR	16	Output	Bridge Error Interrupt Clear Output. Each bit <i>N</i> is to be connected to a single bridge <i><N></i> where <i>N</i> is 0 to 15. These are associated with the BRGEXP_CLR field in the BRGINSTAT Register. The top level Parameter BRGEXP_DIS allows each individual bit of the interface to be disabled.

A.6.6 Miscellaneous security expansion signals

The following table lists the signals required by the PPCs and MSCs in the system.

Table A-18 Security expansion signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
SECRESPCFG	1	Output	<p>This signal configures how to respond to an access when a security violation occurs.</p> <p>0 - Read-Zero Write Ignore</p> <p>1 - bus error</p> <p>This signal is controlled by the SECRESPCFG register.</p>
ACCWAITNSTATUS	1	Output	<p>This signal controls any external gating unit that might be required to block accesses to the system from the AHB Slave Expansion interfaces.</p> <p>1 – No Gating</p> <p>0 – Access Gated.</p> <p>This signal is controlled by the BUSWAIT register.</p>
ACCWAITN	1	Input	<p>This status signal indicates the state of any external gating unit that can be used to block accesses to the system from the AHB Slave Expansion interfaces.</p> <p>1 – No Gating</p> <p>0 – Access Gated.</p> <p>This signal can be read from the BUSWAIT register.</p>
CERTDISABLEEXT	1	Input	<p>The Certificate Path Disable External input signal allows an external entity to drive this signal HIGH to directly set the CERTDISABLE register bit in the SCSECCTRL register.</p> <p>Tie to HIGH to disable certificate access by default. Tie to LOW if this signal is not used.</p>

A.7 Miscellaneous top-level signals

This section lists the top-level signals. It has the following subsections:

- [Top-level signals](#).
- [Top level static configuration signals](#).

A.7.1 Top-level signals

The following table lists signals at the top level of the SSE-200.

Table A-19 SSE-200 top-level signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
LOCKNSVTOR0	1	Input	When HIGH, disables writes to the CPU 0 Non-secure vector table base address register, VTOR_NS. If not used, tie to LOW.
LOCKNSVTOR1	1	Input	When HIGH, disables writes to the CPU 1 Non-secure vector table base address register, VTOR_NS. This signal does not exist if CPU 1 does not exist in the system. If not used, tie to LOW.
LOCKNSMPU0	1	Input	When HIGH, disables writes to the MPU_CTRL_NS, MPU_RNR_NS, MPU_RBAR_NS, MPU_RLAR_NS, MPU_RBAR_A_NS _n and MPU_RLAR_A_NS _n in CPU 0 When HIGH all writes to the registers are ignored. This signal has no effect if the CPU 0 has been configured without any Non-secure MPU regions. If not used, tie to LOW.
LOCKNSMPU1	1	Input	When HIGH, disables writes to the MPU_CTRL_NS, MPU_RNR_NS, MPU_RBAR_NS, MPU_RLAR_NS, MPU_RBAR_A_NS _n and MPU_RLAR_A_NS _n in CPU 1 When HIGH, all writes to the registers are ignored. This signal has no effect if the CPU 1 has been configured without any Non-secure MPU regions. This signal does not exist if CPU 1 does not exist in the system. If not used, tie to LOW.
CPU0TRCENA	1	Output	Trace Enable. This signal reflects the setting of the DEMCR.TRCENA bit for CPU0. It can be used as control signal to enable or disable trace related functionality outside the subsystem.
CPU1TRCENA	1	Output	Trace Enable. This signal reflects the setting of the DEMCR.TRCENA bit for CPU1. It can be used as control signal to enable or disable trace related functionality outside the subsystem.

A.7.2 Top level static configuration signals

The following table lists the static configuration signals that are at the top level of the SSE-200. These static signals are asynchronous and are expected to remain unchanged after de-assertion of power-on reset.

Table A-20 Top-level static configuration signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
SYSCLKENTRYDELAY	8	Input	The SYSCLKENTRYDELAY defines the number of delay cycles that a SYSCLK related hierarchical clock gated domain is idle before clocks are sequenced to turn off.
FCLKENTRYDELAY	8	Input	The FCLKENTRYDELAY defines the number of delay cycles that a FCLK related hierarchical clock gated domain is idle before clocks are sequenced to turn off.
INITSVTOR0_RST[31:7]	25	Input	Reset Value of the CPU 0 (Primary) Secure Vector table offset present in the address register in the System Control Register
INITSVTOR1_RST[31:7]	25	Input	Reset Value of the CPU 1 (Secondary) Secure Vector table offset present in the address register in the System Control Register.
CTMCHCISBYPASS	1	Input	Defines if the CTMCHIN and CTMCHOUTACK[3:0] of the Cross Trigger Channel Interface is synchronous or asynchronous to the DEBUGSYSCLK : 0: Asynchronous. Signals are resynchronised internally. 1: Synchronous. Signals are not resynchronised internally.
CTMCHCIHSBYPASS[31:7]	4	Input	Defines whether the handshake logic associated to each CTMCHOUT pin is used. Tie HIGH to disable the handshake logic. Handshake logic is not required if CTMCHOUT drives synchronous logic
TINIDENSEL[7:0]	8	Input	NIDEN mask on CTITRIGINT. When each bit is set to LOW, it masks the associated Cross Trigger Interface's trigger input when NIDEN is LOW.
TIHSBYPASS[7:4]	4	Input	Cross Trigger interface handshake bypass on CTITRIGOUT. Tie each bit to HIGH to disable the associated handshake logic on the respective CTITRIGOUT bit.
TISBYPASSACK[7:4]	4	Input	Cross Trigger Interface synchronous bypass on CTITRIGOUTACK. If a CTITRIGOUTACK input is synchronous to DEBUGSYSCLK , and is driven from the same clock domain, tie its associated TISBYPASSACK pin HIGH to bypass the synchronization logic.
TISBYPASSIN[7:0]	8	Input	Cross Trigger Interface synchronous bypass on CTITRIGIN. If a CTITRIGIN input is synchronous to DEBUGSYSCLK , and is driven from the same clock domain, tie its associated TISBYPASSIN pin HIGH to bypass the synchronization logic.
TODEBUGENSEL[7:4]	4	Input	DEBUGEN mask on CTITRIGOUT. When each bit is set to LOW, it masks the associated Cross Trigger Interface's trigger output when DEBUGEN is LOW.
DEBUGENSELDIS	1	IN	DEBUGEN Selector Disable. When set HIGH, disables the DEBUGEN Selector Logic and forces DEBUGEN to use DEBUGENIN. If the CryptoCell Element exists, this must be tied to HIGH.
NIDENSELDIS	1	IN	NIDEN Selector Disable. When set HIGH, disables the NIDEN Selector Logic and forces DEBUGEN to use NIDENIN. If the CryptoCell Element exists, this must be tied to HIGH.

Table A-20 Top-level static configuration signals (continued)

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
SPIDENSELDIS	1	IN	SPIDEN Selector Disable. When set to HIGH disables the SPIDEN Selector Logic and forces DEBUGEN to use SPIDENIN. If the CryptoCell Element exists, this must be tied to HIGH.
SPNIDENSELDIS	1	IN	SPNIDEN Selector Disable. When set to HIGH disables the SPNIDEN Selector Logic and forces SPNIDEN to use SPNIDENIN. If the CryptoCell Element exists, this must be tied to HIGH.
LLCDEBUGENSELDIS	1	IN	DEBUGEN Selector Disable for Cordio LLC embedded Cortex-M0 core. When set to HIGH disables the LLCDEBUGEN Selector Logic and forces LLCDEBUGEN to use LLCDEBUGENIN. If the CryptoCell Element exists, this must be tied to HIGH.

A.8 CryptoCell-312 signals

The CryptoCell Element implements an cryptographic accelerators.

The CryptoCell signals are not present if the CryptoCell Element is absent.

A.8.1 CryptoCell Lifecycle Indication Interface

The CryptoCell Lifecycle Indication Interface indicates the lifecycle state of the system through different stages of manufacture and deployment of the final product. The following table shows the output signals on the CryptoCell Lifecycle Indication Interface. All signals are synchronous to **CRYPTOSYSCLK** and are on the Always ON power domain.

Table A-21 CryptoCell Lifecycle Indication signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
CRYPTOLCS[2:0]	3	Output	Lifecycle State values: 0b000 Chip Manufacture (CM). 0b001 Device Manufacture (DM). 0b101 Secure State (SE). 0b111 Return to Manufacturer (RMA).
CRYPTOLCSVALID	1	Output	Lifecycle State values on CRYPTOLCS is Valid, where: 1: CRYPTOLCS[2:0] is valid. 0: CRYPTOLCS[2:0] is not valid.

A.8.2 CryptoCell Debug Control Enable

The CryptoCell Debug Control Enable Interface provides signals to be used by customers to control the Debug Authentication signals at the top level of system, provide tests, debug, and security-related functionality in SoC.

The following table shows the output signals on the CryptoCell Debug Control Enable Interface. All signals are synchronous to **CRYPTOSYSCLK**.

Table A-22 CryptoCell debug control enable signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
CRYPTODCUEN[127:1]	127	Output	Debug Control Enable Values.

A.8.3 CryptoCell Non-Volatile Memory Interface

The CryptoCell Non-Volatile Memory Interface is the Cryptocell interface to the OTP memory.

The following table shows the output signals on the CryptoCell Debug Control Enable Interface. All signals are synchronous to **CRYPTOSYSCLK** and are reset by **nWARMRESETCRYPTO**.

Table A-23 CryptoCell Non-Volatile Memory signals

Signal name	Width	Direction	Description
CRYPTONVMPADDR	13	Output	APB Address
CRYPTONVMPENABLE	1	Output	APB Enable
CRYPTONVMPSEL	1	Output	APB Select
CRYPTONVMPSTRB	4	Output	APB Byte Lane Strobe
CRYPTONVMPWDATA	32	Output	APB Write Data
CRYPTONVMPWRITE	1	Output	APB Write Enable
CRYPTONVMPRDATA	32	Input	APB Read Data
CRYPTONVMPREADY	1	Input	APB Response Ready
CRYPTONVMPSLVERR	1	Input	APB Slave Error
CRYPTONVMPROGCOMPLETED	1	Input	Program Completed status. This signal indicates that any programming of the OTP-NVM memory is completed.

Appendix B

Revisions

This appendix describes the technical changes between released issues of this book.

Table B-1 Issue A

Change	Location	Affects
First release (BETA)	-	-

Table B-2 Differences between issue A and issue B

Change	Location	Affects
Cordio Bluetooth radio added	Cordio Bluetooth Radio element on page 2-55	r1p0
CryptoCell-312 element added	CryptoCell-312 element on page 2-56	r1p0
Changes for CryptoCell and Cordio	Memory map on page 3-3	r1p0
HALLOC field added to register	Instruction Cache Control Register, ICCTRL on page 3-14	r1p0
Register name change	Debug Fill Error Register, ICDBGFILLERR on page 3-16	r1p0
Register name change	Instruction Cache Statistic Hit register, ICSH on page 3-16	r1p0
Register name change	Instruction Cache Statistic Miss Count register, ICSM on page 3-17	r1p0
More detail on slave response	SECRESPCFG on page 3-41	r1p0

Table B-2 Differences between issue A and issue B (continued)

Change	Location	Affects
More detail on debug enable sequence	SECDBGSTAT, SECDBGSET and SECDBGCLR on page 3-63	r1p0
CryptoCell support	CLOCK_FORCE on page 3-68	r1p0
New register for non-maskable interrupt sources	NMI_ENABLE on page 3-72	r1p0
CryptoCell support	PDCM_PD_SYS_SENSE on page 3-74	r1p0
CryptoCell support	PDCM_PD_SRAM<N>_SENSE on page 3-75	r1p0
CryptoCell support	PDCM_PD_CRYPTO_SENSE on page 3-77	r1p0
CryptoCell and Cordio support	Overview of system interconnections on page A-2	r1p0
Clock changes including for CryptoCell and Cordio support	Clock, reset, and power control signals on page A-3	r1p0
Timestamp signals from CTI	Timestamp interface on page A-14	r1p0
CryptoCell support	Debug authentication interface on page A-16	r1p0
Certificate Path Disable	Miscellaneous security expansion signals on page A-20	r1p0
Cross trigger disable signals	Top level static configuration signals on page A-22	r1p0
CryptoCell signals	CryptoCell-312 signals on page A-25	r1p0

Glossary

This glossary contains terms specific to the SSE-200 family of product.

Note

See the *ARM Glossary* for a list of terms used in ARM documentation. The *ARM Glossary* does not contain terms that are industry standard unless the ARM meaning differs from the generally accepted meaning.

The *ARM Glossary* is available on the ARM Infocenter at <http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.aeg0014-/index.html>.

ACG

See *Access Control Gate*

Access Control Gate

The AHB5 Access Control Gate (ACG) is an IP block which can be placed on a synchronous clock or power domain boundary, as it is capable of blocking AHB5 transfers whenever the receiving side of the transactions is not able to accept the transfer. The transfer is latched internally and the module generates automatic responses when necessary.

CMSDK

See *Cortex-M System Design Kit*

Cortex-M System Design Kit

The Cortex-M System Design Kit (CMSDK) contains bus and peripheral components, synthesis scripts, and example code for software drivers. The CMSDK help design products that use ARM Cortex-M processors.

EAM

See *Exclusive Access Monitor*

EWC

See *External Wakeup Controller*

Exclusive Access Monitor

The Exclusive Access Monitor (EAM) implements the Exclusive Access Monitor feature as described in the AHB5 specification. It is a component that can be added on an AHB path to monitor access to slaves downstream of it.

External Wakeup Controller	The External Wakeup Controller (EWC) the interrupt mask stored in the Wakeup Interrupt Controller and holds any pulse-type interrupts for the WIC and NVIC when the CPU clocks are OFF. Depending on the settings of the interrupt masks, it can also wake the CPU. See Wakeup Interrupt Controller .
IDAU	See Implementation Defined Attribution Unit
Implementation Defined Attribution Unit	The Implementation Defined Attribution Unit (IDAU) can define the main system partitioning between the secure and non-secure world where there is a strict association of addresses spaces with security. The IDAU provides a low-overhead implementation of security control, but has low granularity.
Master Security Controller	The MSC gates accesses from a master to slave AHB5 bus depending on configuration signals and the specified address. It can be used to add TrustZone capability to legacy components.
Message Handling Unit	Message Handling Units (MHU) allow software to raise interrupts to the CPU cores
MHU	See Message Handling Unit
MPC	See TrustZone Memory Protection Controller
PDCM	See Power Dependency Control Matrix
Power Control State Machine	The Power Control State Machine (PCSM) controls the PIK blocks.
Power Dependency Control Matrix	The Power Dependency Control Matrix (PDCM) contains registers that define what will wake up, or keep awake, the power domains in the system.
PIK	See Power Integration Kit
Power Integration Kit	The Power Integration Kit (PIK) works with the Q-Channel PPUs to control static and dynamic power for system power domains.
Power Policy Unit	The Power Policy Unit (PPU) control power domains in a system. Each power domain has its own PPU.
PPC	See TrustZone Peripheral Protection Controller
PPU	See Power Policy Unit
SAU	See Security Attribution Unit
Security Attribution Unit	The Secure Attribution Unit (SAU) allows trusted firmware to map memory for secure use only, and define memory areas as Non-secure Callable. It is used with an IDAU to control access to Secure and Non-secure spaces. See Implementation Defined Attribution Unit .
TrustZone Memory Protection Controller	The MPC gates transactions towards an AHB5 memory interface when a security violation occurs.
TrustZone Peripheral Protection Controller	The TrustZone Peripheral Protection Controller (PPC) gates transactions to AHB5 peripherals when a security violation occurs during the multiplexing of a response to the upstream interface.
Wakeup Interrupt Controller	The Wakeup Interrupt Controller (WIC) allows a processor that is in DeepSleep mode to go into an even lower power mode, where the core and the NVIC clocks are turned off. The WIC stores the interrupt masks from the NVIC and holds any outstanding interrupts. The WIC can be used with the EWC to wake the processor from low-power modes. See External Wakeup Controller .
WIC	See Wakeup Interrupt Controller